GUERRILLA WARFARE . Mikhail Kryzhanovsky

GUERILLA WAR  

by Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, a former KGB and CIA "Filament"  

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Guerrilla warfare  

Guerrilla warfare is the unconventional warfare and combat with which a  

small group use mobile tactics (ambushes, raids, etc) to fight a larger and  

less mobile regular army. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY WRONG – they sabotage  

the rear! Same mistake Soviet guerrillas did during World War II, though Chechnya is  

an example.  

Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence, ambush, deception, sabotage,  

undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. A  

guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation above what  

the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrillas  

may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even  

combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle.  

These tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale  

of the guerrillas. In many cases, a small force holds off a much larger and  

better equipped army for a long time, as in Russia’s Second Chechen War.  

Guerrilla operations include attacks on transportation routes, individual  

groups of police and military, installations and structures, economic  

enterprises and targeted civilians, politicians included. Attacking in small  

groups, using camouflage and captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla  

force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers,  

while still allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of  

such attacks is not only military but political, aiming to demoralize target  

populations or governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the  

population to take sides for or against the guerrillas. Ambushes on key  

transportation routes are a hallmark of guerrilla operations, causing both  

economic and political disruption.  

Whatever the particular tactics used, the guerrillas primarily fight to  

preserve his forces and political support, not capture or hold specific  

territory as a conventional force would.  

Guerrilla warfare resembles rebellion, yet it is a different concept.  

Guerrilla organization ranges from small, local, rebel groups of a few dozen  

guerrillas, to thousands of fighters, deploying from cells to regiments. In  

most cases, the leaders have clear political aims for the warfare they wage.  

Typically, the organization has political and military wings, to allow the  

political leaders a plausible denial for military attacks. Guerrillas  

operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to conventional  

formations. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed bases and  

depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and  

destroy. Mobility and speed are the keys and wherever possible, the guerrilla  

must live off the land, or draw support from the civilian population in which  

he is embedded. Financing of operations ranges from direct individual  

contributions (voluntary or not), and actual operation of business  

enterprises by insurgent operatives, to bank robberies, kidnappings and  

complex financial networks based on kin, ethnic and religious affiliation  

(such as used by Jihad organizations). Permanent and semi-permanent bases  

form part of the guerilla logistical structure, usually located in remote  

areas or in cross-border sanctuaries sheltered by friendly regimes.  

Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting (mujahedeen and  

Taliban in Afghanistan, the Contras of Nicaragua). Guerrillas however  

successfully operate in urban settings (as in Jerusalem, Israel or Baghdad,  

Iraq). Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of  

cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas.  

Urban guerrillas blend into the population and are also dependent on a  

support base among the people.  

Intelligence is very important; collaborators and sympathizers will usually  

provide a steady flow of information.  

Public sources of information and Internet serve very well, too.  

Intelligence is concerned also with political factors such as occurrence of  

an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy  

morale.  

Able to choose the time and place to strike, guerrillas possess the  

tactical initiative. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear  

numerical superiority can be achieved in the target area. Individual suicide  

bomb attacks offer another pattern, involving only one individual bomber and  

his support team. Whatever approach is, guerrillas hold the initiative and  

can prolong their survival through varying the intensity of combat. This  

means that attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to  

years. During interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply, train,  

provide propaganda indoctrination, gather intelligence, infiltrate into army,  

police, political parties and community organizations,  

Relationships with civil population are influenced by whether the  

guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly  

population is of huge importance to guerrillas, providing shelter, supplies,  

financing, intelligence and recruits. Popular mass support in a confined  

local area or country however is not always strictly necessary. Guerrillas  

can still operate using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing  

supplies, weapons, intelligence, local security and diplomatic cover. The  

Al-Qaeda is an example of the latter type, drawing sympathizers and support  

primarily from the wide-ranging Arab world.  

Foreign support (soldiers, weapons, sanctuary or statements of sympathy for  

the guerrillas can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory.  

Foreign diplomatic support may bring the guerrilla cause to international  

attention, putting pressure on local opponents to make concessions, or  

garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries  

can add heavily to guerrilla chances, furnishing weapons, supplies, materials  

and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law,  

particularly if the sponsoring government is successful in concealing its  

support and in claiming aplausible denial for attacks by operatives  

based on its territory. Al-Qaeda, for example, made effective use of remote  

territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, to plan and  

execute its operations.  

Terror is used by guerrillas to focus international attention on the  

guerrilla cause, kill opposition leaders, extort money from targets,  

intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers  

and potential defectors in line. Such tactics may backfire and cause the  

civil population to withdraw its support, or to back countervailing forces  

against the guerrillas. Such situations occurred in Israel, where suicide  

bombings encouraged most Israeli opinion to take a harsh stand against  

Palestinian attackers, including general approval of targeted  

killings to kill enemy cells and leaders. Civilians may be attacked or  

killed for alleged collaboration, or as a policy of intimidation and coercion  

– operations are sanctioned by the guerrilla leaders if they see a  

political benefit. Attacks may be aimed to weaken civilian morale so that  

support for the guerrilla opponents decreases. The use of attacks against  

civilians to create atmosphere of chaos ( and thus political advantage where  

the atmosphere causes foreign occupiers to withdraw or offer concessions), is  

well established in guerrilla and national liberation struggles.  

Examples of successful guerrilla warfare against a native regime include  

the Cuban Revolution, Chinese Civil War, Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua.  

Many coups and rebellions in Africa reflect guerrilla warfare, with various  

groups having clear political objectives and using the above mentioned  

tactics (Uganda, Liberia). In Asia, native or local regimes have been  

overthrown by guerrilla warfare (Vietnam, China, Cambodia). Unsuccessful  

examples include Portuguese Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau),  

Malaysia (then Malaya), Bolivia, Argentina and the Philippines. The  

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, fighting for an independent homeland in the  

north and east of Sri Lanka, achieved significant military successes against  

the Sri Lankan military and the government itself for twenty years. It was  

even able to use these tactics effectively against the peace keeping force  

sent by India.  

INSURGENCY  

1. Leadership  

Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and  

focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision,  

guidance, coordination and organizational coherence. The leaders of the  

insurgency must make their cause known to people. They must gain popular  

support, and their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the  

government and to establish their movement’s credibility. They must replace  

the government’s legitimacy with that of their own. Their education,  

background, family, social connections and experience shape how they think,  

what they want, and how they fulfill their goals. Leadership is both a  

function of organization and of personality. Some organizations de-emphasize  

individual personalities and provide mechanisms for rebundancy and  

replacement in decision making; these mechanisms produce collective power and  

do not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. They are  

easier to penetrate but more resilient to change. Other organizations may  

depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a  

rallying point for the movement. Leadership organized in this way can  

produce decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, nut it is vulnerable to  

disruption if key personalities are removed or co-opted.  

2. Ideology.  

To win, insurgency must have a program that justifies its actions and  

explains what is wrong with society. It must promise great improvement after  

the government is overthrown. Ideology guides the insurgents in offering  

society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for  

ease of focus. The insurgent leader can use ideology to justify the use of  

violence and extralegal action in challenging the current social order, and  

to form a framework of the program for the future. Ideology identifies those  

sectors of society which the insurgency targets. Ideology may suggest  

probable objectives and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgents’  

perception of his environment. The combination of the insurgents’ ideology  

and his perception of his environment shapes the movement’s organizational  

and operational methods.  

3. Objectives.  

The strategic objective is the insurgents’ desired end state and that is, how the insurgent will use power once he has it.  

Operational objectives are those which the insurgents pursue as part of the  

overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively  

establishing their desired end state. The following are examples of  

operational objectives:  

–isolation of the government from diplomatic and material support, and  

increased international support for the insurgency  

–destruction of the self-confidence of the government’s leaders, cadre and  

armed forces, causing them to abdicate or withdraw  

–establishment of civil cervices and administration ion areas under insurgent  

control  

–capture of the support (or neutrality) of critical segments of the  

population  

Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, for example,  

the dissemination of a psychological operation product or the attack and  

seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives which  

lead to operational goals.  

4. External support.  

There are four types of external support:  

– moral acknowledgement of the insurgent cause as just and admirable  

– political active promotion of the insurgents strategic goals in  

international forums  

– resources money, weapons, food, advisors, training  

– sanctuary secure training, operational and logistic bases  

5. Organizational and operational patterns.  

a)Subversive.  

Subversive insurgents penetrate the political structure to control it and  

use it for their own purposes. They seek elective and appointed offices. They  

employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, disrupt  

and discredit the government. Violence shows the system is incompetent. It  

may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response which  

further undermines its legitimacy. A subversive insurgency most often appears  

in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal  

and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal  

party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law.  

Subversive insurgencies can quickly shift to the critical-cell pattern  

when conditions dictate. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930s is an example of  

this model. Subversive insurgencies primarily present a problem for police  

and counter-intelligence.  

b)Critical-cell.  

In the critical-cell, the insurgents also infiltrate government  

institutions. Their object is to destroy system from within. The moles  

operate both covertly and overtly. Normally, the insurgents do not reveal  

their affiliation or program. They seek to undermine institutional legitimacy  

and convince or coerce others to assist them. Their violence remains covert  

until the institutions are so weakened that the insurgency’s superior  

organization seizes power, supported by armed force. The Russian October,  

1917 revolution followed this pattern.  

There are variations of the critical-cell pattern, too. The first is the  

co-opting of an essentially leaderless, mass popular revolution. The  

Sandinistas takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution is a case of point. The  

insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing  

government. The insurgent movement then emerges, activating its cells to  

guide reconstruction under its direction. It provides a disciplined structure  

to control the former bureaucracy. The mass popular revolution then coalesces  

around the structure.  

A second variation of the critical-cell pattern is the foco (or Cuban  

model) insurgency. A foco is a single, armed cell which emerges from hidden  

strong holds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this  

cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents  

erect new institutions and establish control on the basis of that support.  

The foco insurgencies are often made up predominantly of guerrilla fighters  

operating initially from remote enclaves. The Cuban revolution occurred in  

this manner. The Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative  

revolutionary attempts patterned on it, principally in Latin America and  

Africa – they all failed, but that does not discredit foco theory. It does  

emphasize the importance of a particular set of circumstances to this model.  

Legitimacy must be near total collapse, timing is critical. The Nicaraguan  

insurgency for example, combined the foco with a broad-front political  

coalition.  

c) Mass oriented.  

The mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed  

mobilization of a large popular movement. They emphasize creating a political  

and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system  

and then destroy or supplant it. These insurgents patiently build a large  

armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base  

of active and passive political supporters. They plan a protracted campaign  

of increasing violence to destroy the governments and its institutions from  

the outside. They organize in detail. Their political leadership normally is  

distinct from their military leadership. Their movement establishes a rival  

government which openly proclaims its own legitimacy. They have a  

well-developed ideology and decide on their own objectives only after careful  

analysis. Highly organized and using propaganda and guerrilla action, they  

mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the  

government. Once established, mass-oriented insurgencies are extremely  

resilient because of their great depth of organization. Examples of this  

model include the communist revolution in China, the Vietcong insurgency, the  

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru.  

d)Traditional.  

The traditional insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances and  

initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, radical, religious or  

other similarly identifiable groups. These insurgents perceive that the  

government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to  

establish or restore them. The frequently seek withdrawal from government  

control through autonomy or semi-autonomy. They seldom seek specifically to  

overthrow the government or to control the whole society. They generally  

respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from  

strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. These  

insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgents  

demands. The concessions of insurgents demands, however, are usually so  

great that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them. Examples  

of this model include the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Ibo revolt in  

Nigeria (Biafra), the Tami separatists in Sri Lanka.  

No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively.  

Typical missions which guerrillas conduct to accomplish their goals include:  

destroying or damaging vital installations, equipment or supplies; capturing  

supplies, equipment, or key governmental or military personnel; diverting  

government forces from other operations; creating confusion and weakening  

government morale. Remember: guerrilla is a political war, and asymmetric  

warfare.  

Guerrillas are not normally organized or equipped for stand-and-fight type  

defensive operations. They prefer to defend themselves by moving, by  

dispersing into small groups, or by diverting the opponent’s attention  

while they withdraw. Whenever possible, these operations are accomplished by  

offensive operations against the opponent’s flank or rear. One of the most  

important needs of guerrilla forces is support, which can come from different  

sources — food can be stolen or supplied by political sympathizers, weapons  

can be gathered from raids on government installations or provided by a  

foreign power (as well as secret training and indoctrination).  

Guerrillas strength:  

– highly motivated leadership and simple organization. The basic guerrilla  

organization is an independent three- to five-men cell. The cells can be  

brought together for larger operations and dispersed later. Guerrillas are  

organized into cells for two reasons: first, it’s security, second, it’s  

for support (guerrillas must live off the land to a large degree, and small  

cells easier support themselves).  

– strong belief in a political, religious, or social cause (most of them are  

fanatics)  

– ability to blend with local population and perfect knowledge of environment  

– strong discipline  

– effective intelligence through penetration into the government agencies  

– limited responsibilities (the guerrillas usually don’t have the  

responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society)  

– the ability to utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage  

through conventional warfare. They don’t hesitate to use bombings,  

kidnappings, murders, torture, blackmail to press local authorities or  

provoke overreaction on the part of the government forces, so that the  

population will be alienated by the government forces actions (it happens  

when they target government leaders). In cities guerrillas can disrupt public  

utilities and services by sabotage and the government may lose control of the  

situation; they can widely use snipers and explosives there. They can  

generate widespread disturbances, attack government offices, create incidents  

or massing crowds in order to lure the government forces into a trap.  

– mobility. Guerrillas usually disperse during their movements and unite near  

the target area. The most common techniques employed by them are the ambush,  

raid and small-scale attacks against security posts, small forces, facilities  

and lines of communication, using mining, booby trapping and sniping. Targets  

are selected by the guerrilla based on an analysis of how much the  

elimination of the target will disrupt the government, what the effect on the  

populace will be, the risk of being killed or captured, and the amount of  

weapons or supplies which can be used (this analysis calls for timely  

intelligence, which is gained by active patrolling).  

Guerrilla Weaknesses:  

– mental and physical stress, caused by long periods of isolation in an  

unstable environment  

– fear of criminal prosecution by the government, or of reprisals against  

friends and family  

– feeling of numerical and technological inferiority of counter-guerrilla  

forces  

– limited personnel and resources, and uncertain public base of support  

– security problems about their base camps (they are usually not more than  

one day march from a village or town). If guerrillas receive support from  

external sources, they are faced with a problem of security for supply lines,  

transport means and storage facilities. Besides, you have to know their  

organization and plans, resources (arms, ammunition, food and medicine  

supply), leaders and their personalities, lines of communications, relations  

with civilian population, vulnerabilities. (Again, recruit, recruit and  

recruit! ). You have to evaluate also the effects of terrain (including  

landing and pickup zones) and the weather effect on men, weapons, equipment,  

visibility and mobility.  

Urban guerrilla warfare has its own peculiarities. Cities and towns are  

vulnerable to urban guerrilla because they are the focus of economic and  

political power. In many cases, public utilities can be disrupted and the  

government may appear to have lost control of the situation. The  

concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small area provides  

cover for the guerrilla. However, the insurgent may find support only in a  

certain areas of a town or a city. Anyway, the urban guerrilla lives in a  

community that is friendly to him or is too frightened to withhold its  

support or betray him. In a city the snipers and explosive devices can be  

placed everywhere. The availability of large numbers of people ensures that  

crowds can be assembled and demonstrations manipulated easily. The presence  

of women and children restricts counter-guerrilla force reactions, and  

excessive force may ensure a major incident that provides the guerrilla with  

propaganda. Publicity is easily achieved in an urban area because no major  

incident can be concealed from the local population even if it is not widely  

reported by the news media. Every explosion may be exploited to discredit the  

ability of the government to provide protection and control.  

Urban guerrilla tactics:  

– disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage  

– generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the  

counter-guerrilla force  

– creating incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the counter-guerrilla  

into a trap  

– provoking the counter-guerrilla force in the hope that it may overreact (to  

provide hostile propaganda after that)  

– fomenting interfactional strife  

– sniping at roadblocks, outposts and sentries  

– attacking buildings with rockets and mortars  

– planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or  

indiscriminately, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public  

morale  

–ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters  

COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE  

1. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter,  

financing, you must focus your efforts on providing physical and economic  

security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and  

propaganda.  

2. There must be a clear political program that can neutralize the guerrilla  

program – this can range from granting political autonomy to economic  

development measures in the affected region + an aggressive media campaign.  

3. You have to clean and re-build all levels of the government  

structure – usually insurgents talk about corrupted politicians a lot and  

that’s why they have support from population.  

4. You don’t have to overreact to guerrilla actions, because this is what  

they are looking for.  

5. Use big military operations only to break up significant guerrilla  

concentrations and split them into small groups.  

6. Keep insurgents on run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids,  

ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches. Intelligence and  

recruitment of informants is the key to success. (KGB in post WWII period  

used bogus guerrilla groups in Western Ukraine that helped reveal real  

insurgents).  

7. An ink spot clear and hold strategy must be used to divide the  

conflict area into sectors and assign priorities between them. Control must  

expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and  

eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to  

the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions  

elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.  

8. Mass forces, including village self-defense groups and citizen militias  

organized for community defense can be useful in providing civic mobilization  

and local security.  

9. Use special units and hunter-killer patrols.  

10. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully  

used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and  

technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops  

can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for  

victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper taking over the  

local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the  

guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the stream of dead  

foreigners mounts. Such scenario occurred with United States in Vietnam and  

since 2003 – in Iraq.  

11. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict,  

which wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces.  

Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time, but the  

counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done.  

TACTICAL COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS  

1. Encirclement, which is designed to cut off all ground routes for escape and  

reinforcement of the encircled force (darkness recommended) combined with  

combined with air assault, artillery and airborne troops. And it’s good  

to divide the enemy while encircling.  

Encirclement offers the best chance to fix guerrilla forces in position and  

achieve decisive results. The battalion and larger units will usually plan  

and conduct encirclements. The company and smaller units normally do not have  

the manpower and command and control capability to execute encirclements  

except as part of a larger force. Encirclements require accurate intelligence  

on the location of guerrilla elements. Since it requires a major portion of  

the counterguerrilla force to execute this maneuver, it is usually targeted  

against large guerrilla forces or guerrilla base complexes, a series of  

smaller base camps clustered within area. Planning, preparation and execution  

are aimed at encircling the guerrilla force rapidly. Maximum security and  

surprise can be gained by occupying the initial encirlclement positions  

during darkness. In large operations, air assault and airborne troops add  

speed and surprise to the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneously in  

order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not possible, probable  

escape routes are covered first. Initial occupation is the most critical  

period of the operation. When the guerrillas become aware that they are being  

encircled, they will probably probe for gaps or attack weak points and  

attempt to break out.  

Encircling units provide strong combat patrols far to their front to give  

early warning of attempted breakouts. Mobile reserves are positioned to  

counter a breakout and to reinforce difficult areas such as broken terrain or  

areas with caves, tunnels or fortification complexes. Indirect fire support  

can serve to cloak an encirclement by gaining and holding the guerrillas  

attention. Fires are planned in detail to support the encirclement. Following  

completion of the encirclement, the circle is contracted to capture or  

destroy the guerrilla force. AS the circle is contracted, units may be  

removed from the line and added to the reserve. Against small guerrilla  

forces, the encircled area may be cleared by contraction and a final sweep.  

Against larger guerrilla forces, however, at some point, some action other  

than contraction will be required. One technique consists of driving a wedge  

through the guerrilla force to divide it and then destroying the guerrillas  

in each subarea. Another technique, employed after some degree of  

contraction, is to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the  

perimeter while the remainder of the encircling force drives the guerrillas  

against blocking force. Either element may accomplish the actual destruction.  

The technique is effective when the blocking force can be located on, or  

immediately in the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.  

2. Search (of a village), which might be done in different ways:  

– assemble inhabitants in a central location (if they are hostile) and then  

start the operation  

– restrict inhabitants to their homes or control the heads of households (and  

take other family members to a central location) and then start the convoy  

security operation, which is one of your top priorities.  

Think about ambushes and mines on the route all the time and place a strong  

attack element at the rear of the convoy where it has maximum flexibility in  

moving forward to attack guerrillas attempting to ambush the head or center  

of the convoy. At the first indication of an ambush vehicles have to move out  

of the killing zone (do not drive to roadsides or shoulders, which may be  

mined). A security team immediately returns fire from inside vehicles to  

cover dismounting personnel (if you have to stop) and then dismounts last  

under cover of the fire by those who dismounted first. Upon dismounting,  

personnel caught in a killing zone open fire and immediately assault toward  

the ambush force. Any movements of the troops and supplies are planned and  

conducted as tactical operations with effective front, flank and rear  

security.  

Search techniques in built-up areas are required when you search either a  

few isolated huts or buildings, or for searching well-developed urban  

sections.  

Procedure :  

a) divide the area to be searched into zones, and assign a search party to  

each. A search party consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a  

security element (to encircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to  

secure open areas), and a reserve element (to assist, as required). Then the  

search element conducts the mission assigned for the operation. Normally it  

is organized into special teams. The security element surrounds the area  

while the search element moves in. Members of the security element orient  

primarily upon evaders from the populated area; however, they can cut off any  

insurgents trying to reinforce. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established.  

Subsurface routes of escape, such as subways and sewers, must be considered  

when operating in cities. The reserve element is a mobile force within a  

nearby area. Its specific mission is to assist the other two elements should  

they meet resistance they cannot handler. In addition, it is capable of  

replacing or reinforcing either of the other two elements should the need  

arise.  

b)consider any enemy material found, including propaganda signs and leaflets,  

to be booby-trapped until inspection proves it is safe.  

c) thoroughly search underground and underwater areas. Any freshly excavated  

ground can be a hiding place. Use mine detectors to locate metal objects  

underground and underwater.  

d) deploy rapidly, especially when a guerrilla force is still in the area to  

be searched. The entire area to be searched is surrounded simultaneously. If  

this is not possible, observed fire must cover that portion not covered by  

soldiers.  

3. Ambush.  

An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or  

temporary halted target. Ambushes give the counter-guerrilla force several  

advantages:  

a) an ambush does not require ground to be seized or held  

b) smaller forces with limited weapons and equipment can harass or destroy  

larger, better armed forces  

c) guerrillas can be forced to engage in decisive combat at unfavorable times  

and places  

d) guerrillas can be denied freedom of movement and deprived of weapons and  

equipment that are difficult to replace.  

Well-planned and well-executed ambushes is the most successful operational  

technique employed against guerrillas. It is an effective technique to  

interdict movement guerrilla forces within an area. Selection of the site is  

a key step in developing a well-organized ambush.  

Ambushes are executed to reduce the guerrillas overall combat  

effectiveness. Destruction is the primary purpose of an ambush since  

guerrillas killed or captured, and equipment and supplies destroyed or  

captured, critically affect the guerrilla force. Harassment, the secondary  

purpose, diverts guerrillas from other missions. A series of successful  

ambushes causes the guerrilla force to be less aggressive and more defensive,  

to be apprehensive and overly cautious, and to be reluctant to go on patrols  

and move in convoys or in small groups.  

There are two types of ambushes. A point ambush involves patrol elements  

deployed to support the attack of a single killing zone. An area ambush  

involves patrol elements deployed as multiple, related, point ambushes. An  

ambush is categorized as either hasty or deliberate. A hasty ambush is an  

immediate action drill, an action of a combat patrol with little or no  

information. When information does not permit detailed planning required for  

a deliberate ambush, a hasty ambush is planned. In this case, ambush patrol  

plans and prepares to attack the first suitable guerrilla force. A deliberate  

ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target. Detailed  

information of the guerrilla force is required: size, nature, organization,  

armament, equipment, route and direction of movement, and time the force will  

reach or pass certain points on its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned  

when reliable information is received on the intended movement of a specific  

force; patrols, convoys, carrying parties or similar forces establish  

patterns of size, time and movement sufficient to permit detailed planning  

for the ambush.  

Basic elements of an ambush are:  

1. Surprise. It has to be achieved or else the attack is not an ambush.  

Surprise, which distinguishes an ambush from other forms of attack, allows  

the ambush force to seize and retain control of the situation. Surprise is  

achieved by careful planning, preparation and execution. Guerrillas are  

attacked in a manner they least expect.  

2. Coordinated fires. All weapons, including mines and demolitions, are  

positioned, and all direct and indirect fires are coordinated to achieve  

isolation of the kill zone to prevent escape or reinforcement; surprise  

delivery of a large volume of concentrated fires into the kill zone to  

inflict maximum damage so the target can be assaulted and destroyed.  

3. Control. Close control is maintained during movement to, occupation of, and  

withdrawal from the ambush site. The ambush commander’s control of all  

elements is critical at the time of target approach. Control measures provide  

for early warning of target approach, withholding fire until the target moves  

into the kill zone, opening fire a the proper time, initiating appropriate  

actions if the ambush is prematurely detected, lifting or shifting supporting  

fires when the ambush includes assault of the target, timely and orderly  

withdrawal to an easily recognized rallying point.  

Planning  

Planning provides for simplicity, type of ambush and deployment. The attack  

may be by fire only (harassing ambush) or may include assault of the target  

(destruction ambush). The force is tailored for its mission. Two men may be  

adequate for a harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require the entire  

unit (squad, platoon, company).  

An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as other combat patrols to  

include headquarters, an assault element, a support element and a security  

element. The assault and support are the attack force; the security element  

is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is further  

organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site is to be occupied  

for an extended period, double ambush forces may be organized. One ambush  

force occupies the site while the other rests, eats and tends to personal  

needs at the objective rallying point or other concealed location. They  

alternate after a given time, which is usually 8 hours. If the waiting period  

is over 24 hours, three ambush forces may be organized.  

The selection of equipment and supplies needed is based on the mission,  

size of guerrilla force, means of transportation, distance and terrain,  

weight and bulk of equipment. A primary route is planned which allows the  

unit to enter the ambush site from the rear. The kill zone is not entered if  

entry can be avoided. If the kill zone must be entered to place mines or  

explosives, care is taken to remove any tracks or signs that might alert the  

guerrillas and compromise the ambush. If mines, mantraps or explosives are to  

be placed on the far side, or if the appearance of the site might cause the  

guerrillas to check it, then a wide detour around the killing zone is made.  

Here, too, care is taken to remove any traces which might reveal the ambush.  

Also, an alternate route from the ambush site is planned.  

Maps and aerial photos are used to analyze the terrain. As far as possible,  

so-called ideal ambush sites are avoided. Alert guerrillas are  

suspicious of these areas, avoid them and increase vigilance and security  

when they must be entered. Considering this, an ambush site must provide  

fields of fire, concealed positions, canalization of the guerrillas into the  

killing zone, covered routes of withdrawal ( to enable the ambush force to  

break contact and avoid pursuit), no-exit route for the guerrilla force.  

Ambush force, as a rule occupies the ambush site at the latest possible time  

permitted by the tactical situation and the amount of site preparation  

required. This not only reduces the risk of discovery but also reduces the  

time that soldiers must remain still and quiet in position.  

The unit moves into the ambush site from the rear. Security elements are  

positioned first to prevent surprise while the ambush is being established.  

Automatic weapons are then positioned so that each can fire along the entire  

killing zone. If this is not possible, they are given overlapping sectors of  

fire so the entire killing zone is covered. The unit leader then selects his  

position, located where he can see when to initiate the ambush. Claymore  

mines, explosives and grenade launchers may be used to cover any dead space  

left by the automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to  

provide mutual support. The unit leader sets a time by which positions are to  

be prepared. The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All men  

work at top speed during the allotted time. Camouflage is very important –  

each soldier must be hidden from the target and each one has to secure his  

equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions are prepared with  

minimal change in the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting  

from preparation of positions is concealed. Movement is kept to a minimum and  

the number of men moving at a time is closely controlled. Light discipline is  

rigidly enforced at night.  

Point ambush  

A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, is  

positioned along the expected route of approach of the guerrilla force.  

Formation is important because, to a great extent, it determines whether a  

point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of highly concentrated fire  

necessary to isolate, trap and destroy the guerrillas. The formation to be  

used is determined by carefully considering possible formations and the  

advantages and disadvantages of each in relation to terrain, conditions of  

visibility, forces, weapons and equipment ease or difficulty of control,  

force to be attacked and overall combat situation.  

1. Line formation.  

The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the guerrilla  

forces route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions the attack  

element parallel to the long axis of the killing zone and subjects the  

guerrilla force to heavy flanking fire. The size of the force that can be  

trapped in the killing zone is limited by the area which the attack element  

can effectively cover with highly concentrated fire. The force is trapped in  

the killing zone by natural obstacles, mines, demolitions, and direct and  

indirect fires. A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that  

lateral dispersion of the force may be too big for effective coverage. The  

line formation is appropriate in close terrain that restricts guerrilla  

maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is restricted by mines,  

demolitions or mantraps. Similar obstacles can be placed between the attack  

element and the killing zone to provide protection from guerrilla  

counter-ambush measures. When a destruction ambush is deployed in this  

manner, access lanes are left so that the force in the killing zone can be  

assaulted. The line formation can be effectively used by a rise from the  

ground ambush in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush. An advantage of  

the line formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of  

visibility.  

2. L-formation.  

The L-formation is a variation of the line formation. The long side of the  

attack element is parallel to the killing zone and delivers flanking fire.  

The short side of the attack element is at the end of, and at right angles  

to, the killing zone and delivers enfilading fire that interlocks with fire  

from the other leg. This formation is flexible. It can be established on a  

straight stretch of a trail or stream or at a sharp bend in a trail or  

stream. When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to parallel  

the long leg if the guerrilla force attempts to assault or escape in the  

opposite direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape in that  

direction or reinforcement from that direction.  

3. Z-formation.  

The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the L-formation. The attack  

force is deployed as in the L-formation but with an additional side so that  

the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side may serve to engage  

a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the guerrillas, restrict a flank,  

prevent envelopment (of the ambush force), seal the end of the killing zone.  

4. T-formation.  

The attack element is deployed across, and at right angles to, the route of  

movement of the hostile force so that the attack element and the target form  

the letter T. This formation can be used day or night to establish a purely  

harassing ambush, and at night to establish an ambush to interdict movement  

through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies). A small unit can use  

the T-formation to harass, slow and disorganize a larger force. When the lead  

guerrilla elements are engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver right  

or left to close with the ambush force. Mines, mantraps and other obstacles  

placed to the flanks of the killing zone slow the guerrillas movement and  

permit the unit to deliver heavy fire and then withdraw without becoming  

decisively engaged. The T-formation can be used to interdict small groups  

attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the attack element  

may be deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second member facing in  

the opposite direction. The attack of a force approaching from either  

direction requires only that every second member shift to the opposite side  

of the dike. Each member fires only to his front and only when the target is  

at a close range. Attack is by fire only, and each member keeps the guerrilla  

force under fire as long as it remains to his front. If the force attempts to  

escape in either direction along the dike, each member takes it under fire as  

it comes into his vicinity. The T-formation is effective at halting  

infiltration. It has one chief disadvantage: there is a possibility that  

while spread out the ambush will engage a superior force. Use of this  

formation must, therefore, fit the local enemy situation.  

5. V-formation.  

The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the guerrilla  

route of movement so that it forms a V. Care is taken to ensure that neither  

group (or leg) fires into the other. This formation subjects the guerrilla to  

both enfilading and interlocking fire. The V-formation is suited for fairly  

open terrain but can also be used in the jungle. When established in the  

jungle, the legs of the V close in as the lead elements of the guerrilla  

force approach the apex of the V, elements then open fire from close range.  

Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and fire is carefully  

coordinated and controlled to ensure that the fire of one leg does not  

endanger the other. Wider separation of the elements makes this formation  

difficult to control, and there are fewer sites that favor its use. Its main  

advantage is that it is difficult for the guerrilla to detect the ambush  

until well into the killing zone.  

6. Triangle formation.  

Closed triangle. The attack element is deployed in 3 groups, positioned so  

they form a triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each  

point of the triangle and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to  

interlock with either of the others. Elements are positioned so that their  

fields of fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When  

deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small unit strongpoint  

which is used to interdict night movement through open areas, when guerrilla  

approach is likely to be from any direction. The formation provides all-round  

security, and security elements are deployed only when they can be positioned  

so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will not compromise the  

ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is allowed to approach within  

close range before the ambush force opens fire. Advantages include ease of  

control, all-round security, and guerrillas approaching from any direction  

can be fired on by at least two automatic weapons. Disadvantages include the  

requirement for an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the  

danger of being overturn by a guerrilla force; one or more legs of the  

triangle may come under guerrilla enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion,  

particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla mortar fire.  

Open triangle (harassing ambush). This variation of the triangle ambush is  

designed to enable a small unit to harass, slow, and inflict heavy casualties  

upon a larger force without being decisively engaged. The attack group is  

deployed in 3 elements, positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a  

triangle containing the killing zone. When the guerrillas enter the killing  

zone, the element to the guerrillas front opens fire on the lead  

guerrillas. When the guerrillas counterattack, the element withdraws and an  

assault element to the flank opens fire. When this group is attacked, the  

element to the opposite flank opens fire. This process is repeated until the  

guerrillas are pulled apart. Each element reoccupies its position, if  

possible, and continues to inflict maximum damage without becoming decisively  

engaged.  

Open triangle (destruction ambush). The attack group is again deployed in 3  

elements, positioned so that each element is a point of the triangle, 200 to  

300 meters apart. The killing zone is the area within the triangle. The  

guerrillas are allowed to enter the killing zone; the nearest element attacks  

by fire. As the guerrillas attempt to maneuver or withdraw, the other  

elements open fire. One or more assault elements, as directed, assault or  

maneuver to envelop or destroy the guerrillas. As a destruction ambush, this  

formation is suitable for platoon-size or larger units; a unit smaller than a  

platoon would be in danger of being overrun. Also, control in assaulting or  

maneuvering is difficult. Close coordination and control are necessary to  

ensure that assaulting or maneuvering elements are not fired by another  

party; and the ambush site must be a fairly level, open area that provides  

(around its border) concealment for the ambush elements (unless it is a  

rise from the ground ambush).  

7. Box formation.  

This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush. The unit  

is deployed in 4 elements positioned so that each element becomes a corner of  

a square or rectangle containing the killing zone. It can be used as a  

harassing ambush or a destruction ambush in the same manner as the two  

variations of the open triangle ambush.  

Area ambush  

Killing zone. A point ambush is established at a site having several trails  

or other escape routes leading away from it. The site may be a water hole,  

guerrilla campsite, or known rendezvous point, or a frequently traveled  

trail. This site is the central killing zone.  

Area ambush multiple point.  

Point ambushes are established along the trails or other escape routes  

leading away from the central killing zone. The guerrilla force, whether a  

single group or several parties approaching from different directions, is  

permitted to move to the central killing zone. Outlying ambushes do not  

attack (unless discovered). The ambush is initiated when the guerrillas move  

into the central killing zone. When the guerrillas break contact and attempt  

to disperse, escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying  

ambushes. The multiple point ambush increases casualties and harassment and  

produces confusion.  

This version of the area ambush is best suited in terrain where movement is  

largely restricted to trails. It provides best results when established as a  

deliberate ambush. When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate  

ambush, an area ambush of opportunity (hasty ambush) may be established. The  

outlying ambushes are permitted to attack guerrillas approaching the central  

killing zone, if the guerrilla force is small. If it is too large for the  

particular outlying ambush, the guerrillas are allowed to continue and they  

are attacked in the central killing zone.  

Area ambush: baited trap.  

A variation of the area ambush. A central killing zone is established along  

the guerrillas route of approach. Point ambushes are established along the  

routes over which units relieving or reinforcing the guerrilla will have to  

approach. The guerrilla force in the central killing zone serves as a  

bait to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill  

zones of the outlying ambushes. A friendly force can also be used as the  

bait. The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to destroy  

their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes that delay, disorganize  

and cause casualties by successive contacts.  

This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as bait to  

lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the killing zone to  

overcome the installation or may use it as a ruse. These variations are best  

suited for situations where routes of approach for relieving or reinforcing  

guerrilla units are limited to those favorable for ambush.  

Unusual ambush techniques  

Spider hole ambush. This point ambush is designed for open areas that lack  

cover and concealment and other features normally desirable in a good  

ambush site. The attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to  

the overall situation. The attack element is concealed in the spider  

hole type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and positions  

camouflaged. When the ambush is initiated, the attack element members throw  

back the covers and rise from the ground to attack. This ambush takes  

advantage of the tendency of patrols and other units, to relax in areas that  

do not appear to favor ambush. The chief advantage is that the ambush element  

is vulnerable if detected prematurely.  

Demolition ambush. Dual primed, electrically detonated mines or demolition  

charges are planted in the area over which a guerrilla force is expected to  

pass. This may be a portion of as road or trail, an open field, or any area  

that can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are run to a  

concealed observation point sufficiently distant to ensure safety of the  

ambush element. As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine  

the area. The ambush element remains to fire the charges, other personnel  

return to the unit. When a guerrilla force enters the mined area (killing  

zone), the element on site detonates the explosives and withdraws immediately  

to avoid detection and pursuit.  

Special ambush situation. Attacks against columns protected by armored  

vehicles depend on the type and location of armored vehicles in a column, and  

the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed  

or disabled by fire or antitank weapons, landmines and Molotov cocktails, or  

by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize  

armored vehicles at a point where they are unable to give protection to the  

rest of the convoy and where they will block the route of other supporting  

vehicles. In alternate bounds, all except the first two vehicles keep their  

relative places in the column. The first two vehicles alternate as lead  

vehicles on each bound. Each covers the bound of the other. This method  

provides more rapid advance than movement by successive bounds but is less  

secure’ it doers not allow soldiers in the second vehicle enough time to  

thoroughly observe the terrain to the front before passing the first vehicle.  

Security is obtained by the vehicle commander who assigns each soldier a  

direction of observation: to the front, flank(s) or rear. This provides each  

vehicle with some security against surprise fire from every direction and  

provides visual contact with vehicles to the front and rear. For maximum  

observation, all canvas is removed from the vehicles.  

Action at danger areas. The commander of the leading vehicle immediately  

notifies the unit leader when he encounters an obstacle or other danger area.  

Designated soldiers reconnoiter these places under cover of the weapons in  

the vehicle. Obstacles are bypassed, if possible. When they cannot be  

bypassed, they are cautiously removed. Side roads intersecting the route of  

advance are investigated. Soldiers from one vehicle secure the road junction;  

one or two vehicles investigate the side road. The amount of reconnaissance  

of side roads is determined by the patrol leaders knowledge of the  

situation. Men investigating side roads do not, however, move past supporting  

distance of the main body of the patrol. Bridges, road junctions, defiles and  

curves (that deny observation beyond the turn) are danger areas. Soldiers  

dismount and take advantage of available cover and concealment to investigate  

these areas. The vehicle is moved off the road into a covered or concealed  

position; weapons from the vehicle cover the advance of the investigating  

personnel.  

Ambush during darkness is difficult to control, bur darkness increases the  

security of the ambush party and the confusion of those being ambushed.  

4. Roadblocks and checkpoints. Element of the checkpoint force has to be  

positioned and concealed at appropriate distance from the checkpoint to  

prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back.  

It’s necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to  

apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggling of controlled items. Since  

checkpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it’s important  

that the civil population understands that checkpoints are a preventive and  

not a punitive measure. Checkpoints may be deliberate or hasty. The  

deliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the open country, often  

on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. The hasty  

checkpoint is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the  

open country. The actual location of the hasty checkpoint is designed to  

achieve quick success.  

Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible. The  

location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a  

vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges or deep cuts may be  

suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that  

drivers do not see the checkpoint in sufficient time to avoid inspection.  

Safety disadvantages may outweight the advantages of such positions. A  

scarcity of good roads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint. A  

checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise by a  

guerrilla force.  

5. Patrols. Used to saturate areas of suspected guerrilla activity, control  

critical roads, maintain contact between villages and units, interdict  

guerrilla routes of supply and communication, provide internal security in  

rural and urban areas, locate guerrilla units and base camps. A patrol is a  

detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance  

operation. Patrolling is used when limited (or no) intelligence on guerrilla  

activity is available. Routes are planned carefully and coordinated with  

higher, lower and adjacent units, to include air and ground fire support  

elements and reserve forces. There are three key principles to successful  

patrolling: detailed planning, thorough reconnaissance, all-round security..  

It often happens that the patrol has to break the contact with a larger enemy  

(to break contact use the clock system. the direction the patrol moves is  

always 12 o’clock. When contact is made, the leader shouts a direction and  

distance to move (such as “7 o’clock, 400 meters. The leader can also  

use the system to shift or direct fire at a certain location).  

Saturation patrolling is extremely effective patrols are conducted by  

many lightly armed, small, fast-moving units and provide thorough area  

coverage. Patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which are engaged  

frequently to avoid establishing patterns. Use of saturation patrolling  

results in the sustained denial of an area to guerrilla forces as they seek  

to avoid contact with the counter-guerrilla units. In addition to harassment  

and discovery of guerrilla tactical forces, this technique provides an  

opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of operations; a form  

of reassurance to the local population that the government is concerned about  

their protection and security; a means by which information about the  

guerrilla can be obtained.  

Watch out: guerillas usually try to cut the lines of communications by mining  

roads, waterways and railways, or by ambushes located adjacent to them, blow  

up bridges and tunnels.  

Tracking  

Footprints. You can read the following by footprints:  

– the direction and rate of movement of a party  

– the number of persons in a party  

– whether or not heavy loads are carried  

– the sex of the members of the party  

– whether the members of a party know they are being followed  

If the footprints are deep and the pace is long, the party is moving  

rapidly. Very long strides and deep prints, with toe prints deeper than heel  

prints, indicate the party is running. If the prints are deep, short and  

widely spaced, with signs of scuffing or shuffling, a heavy load is probably  

being carried by the parson who left the prints. You can also determine a  

person’s sex by studying the size and position of the footprints. Women  

generally tend to be pigeon-toed, while men usually walk with their feet  

pointed straight ahead or slightly to the outside. Womens’ prints are  

usually smaller than mens’, and their strides usually shorter. If a party  

knows it is being followed, it may attempt to hide its tracks. Persons  

walking backward have a short, irregular stride. The prints have and  

unusually deep toe. The soil will be kicked in the direction of movement. The  

last person in a group usually leaves the clearest footprints. Therefore, use  

his prints as the key set.  

Use the box method to count the number of persons in the group. Up to 18  

persons can be counted. Use it when the key prints can be determined. To use  

this method, identify a key print on a trail and draw line from its heel  

across the trail. Then move forward to the key print of the opposite foot and  

draw a line through its instep. This should form a box with the edges of the  

trail forming two sides, and the drawn lines forming the other two sides.  

Next, count every print of partial print inside the box to determine the  

number of persons. Any person walking normally would have stepped in the box  

at least one time. Count the key prints as one.  

Also, you can track paying attention to such things as foliage, moss,  

vines, sticks or rocks moved from their original places; stones and sticks  

that are turned over; grass that is bent or broken in the direction of  

movement.  

Staining. A good example of staining is the mark left by blood from a  

bleeding wound. You can determine the location of a wound on a man being  

followed by studying the bloodstains. If the blood seems to be dripping  

steadily, it probably came from a wound on his trunk. A wound in the lungs  

will deposit bloodstains that are pink, bubbly, frothy. A bloodstain  

deposited from a head wound will appear heavy, wet and slimy, like gelatin.  

Abdominal wounds often mix blood with digestive juices so that the deposit  

will have an odor, and the stains will be light in color.  

Water in footprints in swampy ground may be muddy if the tracks are  

recent. In time, however, the mud will settle and the water is clear. The  

clarity of the water can be used to estimate the age of the prints. Normally,  

the mud will clear in 1 hour, but that will vary with terrain.  

If a party knows that you are tracking it, it will probably use camouflage  

to conceal its movements and to slow and confuse you. Remember: a  

well-defined approach that leads to the enemy will probably be mined,  

ambushed or covered by snipers.  

6. Aerial search. This technique has little value in areas of dense  

vegetation. Use of search units mounted in armed helicopters should be  

limited to those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to  

justify their use and then normally in conjunction with ground operations. In  

ground search operations, helicopters drop off troops in an area suspected of  

containing guerrillas. With the helicopters overmatching from the air, troops  

search the area. Troops are then picked up and the process is repeated in  

other areas.  

7. Raid. It is an operation involving a swift penetration of hostile territory  

to secure information, harass the guerrilla or destroy the guerrilla force  

and its installation. Raids are usually targeted against single, isolated  

guerrilla base camps. To assist in attaining surprise, the raiding force uses  

inclement weather, limited visibility, or terrain normally considered  

impassable. If night airborne or air assault raids are conducted, the force  

must be accurately inserted and oriented on the ground. Air assault forces  

supported by armed helicopters offer infinite possibilities for conducting  

raids. This type of force can move in, strike the objective and withdraw  

without extensive preparation or support from other sources.  

8. Crowd dispersal.  

9. Assassination of the guerrilla leader.  

10. Taking hostages to press guerrillas.  

11. Organization of false guerrilla units.  

Meanwhile the enemy will attempt to engage you in locations where your fire  

would endanger civilians or damage their property. You have to match the size  

of the guerrilla unit. Employing a large force to counter a smaller one is  

inefficient because it compromises the chance of achieving surprise.  

Psychological Operations  

Psychological operations (PSYOP) in foreign internal defense include  

propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes,  

and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups to support the  

achievement of national objectives. There are 5 major target groups for  

PSYOP:  

1. Insurgents. The major PSYOP objective here is to discredit the insurgents  

and isolate them from he population. The most important direction of attack  

is against their morale. Themes should publicize and exploit differences  

between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other themes  

might stress lack of support, isolation, homesickness, and hardship. Amnesty  

programs are often useful in neutralizing insurgents, and they are most  

effective when they are well publicized, directed against lower ranking  

members of the insurgency, and offer sufficient reason and benefits for  

quitting the unit. These programs do, however, have several disadvantages:  

they recognize the insurgents as a legitimate political force, they forgo  

punishment of anyone accepting amnesty, and they increase the image of the  

insurgents threat.  

2. The population supporting the insurgents. You have to achieve withdrawal  

of support for the insurgents and a total defection. Propaganda should  

highlight the insurgents shortcomings, ultimate government victory,  

government successes, and the practical advantages of surrendering or of  

accepting amnesty. Sometimes, displays of military might are used; invading  

forces may assemble and parade through the streets of conquered towns,  

attempting to demonstrate the futility of any further fighting. These  

displays may also include public executions of enemy soldiers, resistance  

fighters, and other conspirators. Particularly in antiquity, the death or  

imprisonment of a popular leader was sometimes enough to bring about a quick  

surrender. However, this has often had the unintended effect of creating  

martyrs around which popular resistance can rally.  

3. The uncommitted population. The major mission here is to build national  

morale, unity, and confidence in the government. There should also be a major  

effort to win popular acceptance of the government force, and convince the  

people that government programs serve their interests, the government forces  

can protect them, ultimate government victory is assured. This may be  

accomplished through re-education, allowing conquered citizens to  

participate in their government, or, especially in impoverished or besieged  

areas, simply by providing food, water and shelter.  

4. Government personnel. When targeting government personnel, seek to  

maintain loyalties and develop policies and attitudes which will result in  

group members who will realize the importance of popular support, promote  

public welfare and justice, take action to eliminate the basic causes of the  

subversive insurgency, and protect the population. You have to indoctrinate  

the host country security and military forces regarding the importance of the  

civilian population support. When government personnel interact with neutral  

and non-hostile elements of the population, the emphasis should be positive  

and constructive.  

5. Foreign audiences. There are two major groups to be addressed: neutral  

nations and hostile nations. For neutral nations, the purpose of  

psychological operations is to achieve friendly neutrality or active support  

for your side. For hostile powers, the major objective of these operations is  

to influence public opinion against involvement in supporting the insurgency.  

Besides, you have to use psychological operations to establish and maintain a  

favorable image of our country. The themes most useful in establishing that  

image are that the US presence is requested by the host country government,  

it is legal and necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory. Intelligence  

operations are facilitated by employing psychological operation media to  

inform the people that they should report to the proper authority information  

pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, and guerrilla activities.  

Posters and leaflets provide definite instruction as to persons and places  

that are available to receive the information (indicate what rewards are  

available).  

Vietnam experience  

The Viet Cong used hit and run attacks involving a small group,  

usually hiding in ambush and attacking a larger force, only to retreat  

seconds later. This reduced the advantages of the conventional forces  

advanced weapon systems. It gave an ambushed squad no time to call in  

artillery or air strike. Booby traps ( like simple spikes, incorporated into  

various types of traps, for example, in camouflaged pit into which a man  

might fall) were another common tactic among guerrillas. Grenade traps  

(poised with the pin removed) were also used. Moving them would take the  

pressure off the lever, causing the grenades to explode. Camouflage was very  

important, and fighters travelled in small groups, often wearing civilian  

clothes to make it difficult for American soldiers to know who they were.  

Often, they would in tunnels underground. Tunnels and spider holes were  

often used to spring ambushes on American troops. The Vietcong would wait for  

part of American formation to pass before coming out of the ground and  

opening fire. Before the Americans had a chance to realize where the fire  

came from, the Vietcong would duck back into the trenches. This often caused  

fratricide (friendly fire incident) because soldiers who were ambushed would  

fire back behind them, hitting other American patrols. American troops,  

usually assigned to Vietnam for a one-year tour of duty, found themselves  

ill-trained to wage a war against a mostly invisible enemy.  

Afghanistan experience  

When the Stinger missile was introduced to Mujahideen, they began to ambush  

Soviet helicopters and fixed wing aircraft at airfields. The Stinger was  

effective only up to 15, 000 feet (4, 600 m), so Mujahideen would attack  

aircraft as they were landing or taking off. Soviets modified their tactics:  

helicopters stayed over friendly forces, fixed wing aircraft began flying  

higher, and armor and electronic defense systems were added to aircraft to  

help protect them from Stinger. Also, Spetsnaz ( Special Forces) were used  

extensively. They would be flown into areas where Mujahideen often passed,  

had been seen or were ambushing someone. Tanks and aircraft were of  

comparatively little use. The only technology with a significant impact on  

Mujahideen were land mines and helicopters. As the Soviets got stalled, they  

began punishing the local population for supporting Mujahideen. It was not  

uncommon for Soviet helicopters to raze an Afghan village in retaliation for  

an attack against Soviet soldiers. They also dropped mines from aircraft in  

fields and pastures and shot livestock with machineguns. Another common  

tactic was to cordon off and search villages for Mujahideen.  

Chechnya (Russia) experience  

The conflict between Russia and Chechen terrorists has been mostly a  

guerilla war. Most fighting was done with the support of armored vehicles,  

artillery and aircraft, rather than infantry. Russian soldiers were not  

prepared for urban warfare in Grozny (the capital of Chechnya). Terrorists  

would hide on the top floors and basements of buildings armed with small arms  

and anti-tank weapons. The Russians came in with convoys of armored vehicles  

which were unprepared for the tactics the terrorists would use. Chechen  

ambush tactics were planned, and involved destroying the first and the last  

vehicle (armored personnel carrier or a tank) in the column. This was done by  

either rocket propelled grenade (RPG) or improvised explosive device. If the  

initial attack was successful, the rest of the convoy would be trapped in  

between. Later Russians used artillery and airstrikes more extensively.  

Terrorists changed their urban combat tactics and used fire-teams of three  

fighters : a machine gunner, a sniper and a fighter armed with rocket  

propelled grenade. As a result, a very small and mobile fire-team could meet  

any potential sizable threat with great effectiveness. Chechen snipers used  

to wound Russian soldiers and pick off their rescuers. They also shot off  

antennas from the moving armored personnel carriers since this was often  

the only means of communication with the command center, the troops inside  

would end up isolated and attacked with RPG or by the sniper as they tried to  

repair the antenna. As Russia controlled more area, ambushes gave place to  

roadside bombings, and these usually involved modified mines and improvised  

explosive devices.  

U. S. – Iraq war experience  

Suicide bombers attack American soldiers at checkpoints, on patrols, on  

their bases and in convoys. Iraqis used the same tactics Chechen terrorists  

used against convoys.