WORLD WAR III: Guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky

MIkhail Kryzhanovsky, the author of Espionage and COUNTERESPIONAGE.  

kryzhanovsky7777@gmail. com  

NYC  

Guerrilla warfare  

Guerrilla warfare is the unconventional warfare and combat with which a small group use mobile tactics (ambushes, raids, etc) to fight a larger and  

less mobile regular army. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY WRONG – they sabotage the rear! Same mistake Soviet guerrillas did during World War II, though Chechnya is an example.  

Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence, ambush, deception, sabotage, undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. A  

guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation above what the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrillas may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle. These tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale of the guerrillas. In many cases, a small force holds off a much larger and better equipped army for a long time, as in Russia’s Second Chechen War. Guerrilla operations include attacks on transportation routes, individual groups of police and military, installations and structures, economic enterprises and targeted civilians, politicians included. Attacking in small groups, using camouflage and captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers, while still allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of such attacks is not only military but political, aiming to demoralize target populations or governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the population to take sides for or against the guerrillas. Ambushes on key transportation routes are a hallmark of guerrilla operations, causing both economic and political disruption.  

Whatever the particular tactics used, the guerrillas primarily fight to preserve his forces and political support, not capture or hold specific territory as a conventional force would.  

Guerrilla warfare resembles rebellion, yet it is a different concept. Guerrilla organization ranges from small, local, rebel groups of a few dozen guerrillas, to thousands of fighters, deploying from cells to regiments. In most cases, the leaders have clear political aims for the warfare they wage.  

Typically, the organization has political and military wings, to allow the political leaders a plausible denial for military attacks. Guerrillas operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to conventional formations. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed bases and depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and destroy. Mobility and speed are the keys and wherever possible, the guerrilla must live off the land, or draw support from the civilian population in which he is embedded. Financing of operations ranges from direct individual contributions (voluntary or not), and actual operation of business enterprises by insurgent operatives, to bank robberies, kidnappings and complex financial networks based on kin, ethnic and religious affiliation (such as used by Jihad organizations). Permanent and semi-permanent bases form part of the guerilla logistical structure, usually located in remote areas or in cross-border sanctuaries sheltered by friendly regimes. Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting (mujahedeen and Taliban in Afghanistan, the Contras of Nicaragua). Guerrillas however successfully operate in urban settings (as in Jerusalem, Israel or Baghdad,  

Iraq). Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerrillas blend into the population and are also dependent on a support base among the people.  

Intelligence is very important; collaborators and sympathizers will usually provide a steady flow of information.  

Public sources of information and Internet serve very well, too. Intelligence is concerned also with political factors such as occurrence of an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy morale.  

Able to choose the time and place to strike, guerrillas possess the tactical initiative. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear numerical superiority can be achieved in the target area. Individual suicide bomb attacks offer another pattern, involving only one individual bomber and his support team. Whatever approach is, guerrillas hold the initiative and can prolong their survival through varying the intensity of combat. This means that attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to years. During interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply, train, provide propaganda indoctrination, gather intelligence, infiltrate into army, police, political parties and community organizations,  

Relationships with civil population are influenced by whether the guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly population is of huge importance to guerrillas, providing shelter, supplies, financing, intelligence and recruits. Popular mass support in a confined local area or country however is not always strictly necessary. Guerrillas can still operate using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing supplies, weapons, intelligence, local security and diplomatic cover. The Al-Qaeda is an example of the latter type, drawing sympathizers and support primarily from the wide-ranging Arab world.  

Foreign support (soldiers, weapons, sanctuary or statements of sympathy for the guerrillas can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory. Foreign diplomatic support may bring the guerrilla cause to international attention, putting pressure on local opponents to make concessions, or garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries can add heavily to guerrilla chances, furnishing weapons, supplies, materials and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law, particularly if the sponsoring government is successful in concealing its support and in claiming a plausible denial for attacks by operatives based on its territory. Al-Qaeda, for example, made effective use of remote territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, to plan and execute its operations.  

Terror is used by guerrillas to focus international attention on the guerrilla cause, kill opposition leaders, extort money from targets, intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers and potential defectors in line. Such tactics may backfire and cause the civil population to withdraw its support, or to back countervailing forces against the guerrillas. Such situations occurred in Israel, where suicide bombings encouraged most Israeli opinion to take a harsh stand against Palestinian attackers, including general approval of targeted killings to kill enemy cells and leaders. Civilians may be attacked or killed for alleged collaboration, or as a policy of intimidation and coercion operations are sanctioned by the guerrilla leaders if they see a political benefit. Attacks may be aimed to weaken civilian morale so that support for the guerrilla opponents decreases. The use of attacks against civilians to create atmosphere of chaos ( and thus political advantage where the atmosphere causes foreign occupiers to withdraw or offer concessions), is well established in guerrilla and national liberation struggles.  

Examples of successful guerrilla warfare against a native regime include the Cuban Revolution, Chinese Civil War, Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua. Many coups and rebellions in Africa reflect guerrilla warfare, with various groups having clear political objectives and using the above mentioned tactics (Uganda, Liberia). In Asia, native or local regimes have been overthrown by guerrilla warfare (Vietnam, China, Cambodia). Unsuccessful examples include Portuguese Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), Malaysia (then Malaya), Bolivia, Argentina and the Philippines. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, fighting for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka, achieved significant military successes against the Sri Lankan military and the government itself for twenty years. It was even able to use these tactics effectively against the peace keeping force sent by India.  

Insurgency  

1. Leadership  

Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, guidance, coordination and organizational coherence. The leaders of the insurgency must make their cause known to people. They must gain popular support, and their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government and to establish their movement’s credibility. They must replace the government’s legitimacy with that of their own. Their education, background, family, social connections and experience shape how they think, what they want, and how they fulfill their goals. Leadership is both a function of organization and of personality. Some organizations de-emphasize individual personalities and provide mechanisms for rebundancy and replacement in decision making; these mechanisms produce collective power and do not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. They are easier to penetrate but more resilient to change. Other organizations may depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a rallying point for the movement. Leadership organized in this way can produce decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, nut it is vulnerable to disruption if key personalities are removed or co-opted.  

2. Ideology.  

To win, insurgency must have a program that justifies its actions and explains what is wrong with society. It must promise great improvement after the government is overthrown. Ideology guides the insurgents in offering society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for ease of focus. The insurgent leader can use ideology to justify the use of violence and extralegal action in challenging the current social order, and to form a framework of the program for the future. Ideology identifies those sectors of society which the insurgency targets. Ideology may suggest probable objectives and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgents’perception of his environment. The combination of the insurgents’ ideology and his perception of his environment shapes the movement’s organizational and operational methods.  

3. Objectives.  

The strategic objective is the insurgents’ desired end state and that is how the insurgent will use power once he has it.  

Operational objectives are those which the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. The following are examples of operational objectives:  

–isolation of the government from diplomatic and material support, and increased international support for the insurgency  

–destruction of the self-confidence of the government’s leaders, cadre and armed forces, causing them to abdicate or withdraw  

–establishment of civil cervices and administration ion areas under insurgent control  

–capture of the support (or neutrality) of critical segments of the population  

Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, for example, the dissemination of a psychological operation product or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives which lead to operational goals.  

4. External support.  

There are four types of external support:  

– moral acknowledgement of the insurgent cause as just and admirable  

– political active promotion of the insurgents strategic goals in international forums  

– resources money, weapons, food, advisors, training  

– sanctuary secure training, operational and logistic bases  

5. Organizational and operational patterns.  

a)Subversive.  

Subversive insurgents penetrate the political structure to control it and use it for their own purposes. They seek elective and appointed offices. They  

employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, disrupt and discredit the government. Violence shows the system is incompetent. It  

may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response which further undermines its legitimacy. A subversive insurgency most often appears in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law. Subversive insurgencies can quickly shift to the critical-cell pattern  

when conditions dictate. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930s is an example of this model. Subversive insurgencies primarily present a problem for police and counter-intelligence.  

b)Critical-cell.  

In the critical-cell, the insurgents also infiltrate government institutions. Their object is to destroy system from within. The moles operate both covertly and overtly. Normally, the insurgents do not reveal their affiliation or program. They seek to undermine institutional legitimacy and convince or coerce others to assist them. Their violence remains covert until the institutions are so weakened that the insurgency’s superior organization seizes power, supported by armed force. The Russian October, 1917 revolution followed this pattern.  

There are variations of the critical-cell pattern, too. The first is the co-opting of an essentially leaderless, mass popular revolution. The Sandinistas takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution is a case of point. The insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing government. The insurgent movement then emerges, activating its cells to guide reconstruction under its direction. It provides a disciplined structure to control the former bureaucracy. The mass popular revolution then coalesces around the structure.  

A second variation of the critical-cell pattern is the foco (or Cuban model) insurgency. A foco is a single, armed cell which emerges from hidden strong holds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents erect new institutions and establish control on the basis of that support. The foco insurgencies are often made up predominantly of guerrilla fighters operating initially from remote enclaves. The Cuban revolution occurred in this manner. The Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative revolutionary attempts patterned on it, principally in Latin America and Africa they all failed, but that does not discredit foco theory. It does emphasize the importance of a particular set of circumstances to this model. Legitimacy must be near total collapse, timing is critical. The Nicaraguan insurgency for example, combined the foco with a broad-front political coalition.  

c) Mass oriented.  

The mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. They emphasize creating a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system and then destroy or supplant it. These insurgents patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base of active and passive political supporters. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the governments and its institutions from the outside. They organize in detail. Their political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Their movement establishes a rival government which openly proclaims its own legitimacy. They have a well-developed ideology and decide on their own objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized and using propaganda and guerrilla action, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government. Once established, mass-oriented insurgencies are extremely resilient because of their great depth of organization. Examples of this model include the communist revolution in China, the Vietcong insurgency, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru.  

d)Traditional.  

The traditional insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances and initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, radical, religious or other similarly identifiable groups. These insurgents perceive that the government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to establish or restore them. The frequently seek withdrawal from government control through autonomy or semi-autonomy. They seldom seek specifically to overthrow the government or to control the whole society. They generally respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. These insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgentsdemands. The concessions of insurgents demands, however, are usually so great that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them. Examples of this model include the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Ibo revolt in Nigeria (Biafra), the Tami separatists in Sri Lanka.  

No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively.  

Typical missions which guerrillas conduct to accomplish their goals include: destroying or damaging vital installations, equipment or supplies; capturing supplies, equipment, or key governmental or military personnel; diverting government forces from other operations; creating confusion and weakening government morale. Remember: guerrilla is a political war, and asymmetric warfare.  

Guerrillas are not normally organized or equipped for stand-and-fight type defensive operations. They prefer to defend themselves by moving, by dispersing into small groups, or by diverting the opponent’s attention while they withdraw. Whenever possible, these operations are accomplished by offensive operations against the opponent’s flank or rear. One of the most important needs of guerrilla forces is support, which can come from different sources – food can be stolen or supplied by political sympathizers, weapons can be gathered from raids on government installations or provided by a foreign power (as well as secret training and indoctrination).  

Guerrillas strength:  

– highly motivated leadership and simple organization. The basic guerrilla organization is an independent three- to five-men cell. The cells can be brought together for larger operations and dispersed later. Guerrillas are organized into cells for two reasons: first, it’s security, second, it’s for support (guerrillas must live off the land to a large degree, and small cells easier support themselves).  

– strong belief in a political, religious, or social cause (most of them are fanatics)  

– ability to blend with local population and perfect knowledge of environment  

– strong discipline  

– effective intelligence through penetration into the government agencies  

– limited responsibilities (the guerrillas usually don’t have the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society)  

– the ability to utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage through conventional warfare. They don’t hesitate to use bombings, kidnappings, murders, torture, blackmail to press local authorities or provoke overreaction on the part of the government forces, so that the population will be alienated by the government forces actions (it happens when they target government leaders). In cities guerrillas can disrupt public utilities and services by sabotage and the government may lose control of the situation; they can widely use snipers and explosives there. They can generate widespread disturbances, attack government offices, create incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the government forces into a trap.  

– mobility. Guerrillas usually disperse during their movements and unite near the target area. The most common techniques employed by them are the ambush, raid and small-scale attacks against security posts, small forces, facilities and lines of communication, using mining, booby trapping and sniping. Targets are selected by the guerrilla based on an analysis of how much the elimination of the target will disrupt the government, what the effect on the populace will be, the risk of being killed or captured, and the amount of weapons or supplies which can be used (this analysis calls for timely intelligence, which is gained by active patrolling).  

Guerrilla Weaknesses:  

– mental and physical stress, caused by long periods of isolation in an unstable environment  

– fear of criminal prosecution by the government, or of reprisals against friends and family  

– feeling of numerical and technological inferiority of counter-guerrilla forces  

– limited personnel and resources, and uncertain public base of support  

– security problems about their base camps (they are usually not more than one day march from a village or town). If guerrillas receive support from external sources, they are faced with a problem of security for supply lines, transport means and storage facilities. Besides, you have to know their organization and plans, resources (arms, ammunition, food and medicine supply), leaders and their personalities, lines of communications, relations with civilian population, vulnerabilities. (Again, recruit, recruit and recruit! ). You have to evaluate also the effects of terrain (including landing and pickup zones) and the weather effect on men, weapons, equipment, visibility and mobility.  

Urban guerrilla warfare has its own peculiarities. Cities and towns arevulnerable to urban guerrilla because they are the focus of economic and political power. In many cases, public utilities can be disrupted and the government may appear to have lost control of the situation. The concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small area provides cover for the guerrilla. However, the insurgent may find support only in a certain areas of a town or a city. Anyway, the urban guerrilla lives in a community that is friendly to him or is too frightened to withhold its support or betray him. In a city the snipers and explosive devices can be placed everywhere. The availability of large numbers of people ensures that crowds can be assembled and demonstrations manipulated easily. The presence of women and children restricts counter-guerrilla force reactions, and excessive force may ensure a major incident that provides the guerrilla with propaganda. Publicity is easily achieved in an urban area because no majorincident can be concealed from the local population even if it is not widely reported by the news media. Every explosion may be exploited to discredit the ability of the government to provide protection and control.  

Urban guerrilla tactics:  

– disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage  

– generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the counter-guerrilla force  

– creating incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the counter-guerrilla into a trap  

– provoking the counter-guerrilla force in the hope that it may overreact (to provide hostile propaganda after that)  

– fomenting interfactional strife  

– sniping at roadblocks, outposts and sentries  

– attacking buildings with rockets and mortars  

– planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or indiscriminately, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public morale  

–ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters  

COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE  

1. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, you must focus your efforts on providing physical and economic  

security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.  

2. There must be a clear political program that can neutralize the guerrilla program this can range from granting political autonomy to economic development measures in the affected region + an aggressive media campaign.  

3. You have to clean and re-build all levels of the government structure usually insurgents talk about corrupted politicians a lot and that’s why they have support from population.  

4. You don’t have to overreact to guerrilla actions, because this is what they are looking for.  

5. Use big military operations only to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups.  

6. Keep insurgents on run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches. Intelligence and  

recruitment of informants is the key to success. (KGB in post WWII period used bogus guerrilla groups in Western Ukraine that helped reveal real insurgents).  

7. An ink spot clear and hold strategy must be used to divide the conflict area into sectors and assign priorities between them. Control must  

expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.  

8. Mass forces, including village self-defense groups and citizen militias organized for community defense can be useful in providing civic mobilization and local security.  

9. Use special units and hunter-killer patrols.  

10. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for  

victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper taking over the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the stream of dead foreigners mounts. Such scenario occurred with United States in Vietnam and  

since 2003 in Iraq.  

11. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict, which wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time, but the counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done.  

Tactical counter-guerrilla operations  

1. Encirclement, which is designed to cut off all ground routes for escape and reinforcement of the encircled force (darkness recommended) combined with combined with air assault, artillery and airborne troops. And it’s good to divide the enemy while encircling.  

Encirclement offers the best chance to fix guerrilla forces in position and achieve decisive results. The battalion and larger units will usually plan and conduct encirclements. The company and smaller units normally do not have the manpower and command and control capability to execute encirclements except as part of a larger force. Encirclements require accurate intelligence on the location of guerrilla elements. Since it requires a major portion of the counterguerrilla force to execute this maneuver, it is usually targeted against large guerrilla forces or guerrilla base complexes, a series of smaller base camps clustered within area. Planning, preparation and execution are aimed at encircling the guerrilla force rapidly. Maximum security and surprise can be gained by occupying the initial encirlclement positions during darkness. In large operations, air assault and airborne troops add speed and surprise to the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneously in order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not possible, probable escape routes are covered first. Initial occupation is the most critical period of the operation. When the guerrillas become aware that they are being encircled, they will probably probe for gaps or attack weak points and attempt to break out.  

Encircling units provide strong combat patrols far to their front to give early warning of attempted breakouts. Mobile reserves are positioned to counter a breakout and to reinforce difficult areas such as broken terrain or areas with caves, tunnels or fortification complexes. Indirect fire support can serve to cloak an encirclement by gaining and holding the guerrillas attention. Fires are planned in detail to support the encirclement. Following completion of the encirclement, the circle is contracted to capture or destroy the guerrilla force. AS the circle is contracted, units may be removed from the line and added to the reserve. Against small guerrilla forces, the encircled area may be cleared by contraction and a final sweep. Against larger guerrilla forces, however, at some point, some action other than contraction will be required. One technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide it and then destroying the guerrillas in each subarea. Another technique, employed after some degree of contraction, is to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeter while the remainder of the encircling force drives the guerrillas against blocking force. Either element may accomplish the actual destruction.  

The technique is effective when the blocking force can be located on, or immediately in the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.  

2. Search (of a village), which might be done in different ways:  

– assemble inhabitants in a central location (if they are hostile) and then start the operation  

– restrict inhabitants to their homes or control the heads of households (and take other family members to a central location) and then start the convoy security operation, which is one of your top priorities.  

Think about ambushes and mines on the route all the time and place a strong attack element at the rear of the convoy where it has maximum flexibility in  

moving forward to attack guerrillas attempting to ambush the head or center of the convoy. At the first indication of an ambush vehicles have to move out of the killing zone (do not drive to roadsides or shoulders, which may be mined). A security team immediately returns fire from inside vehicles to cover dismounting personnel (if you have to stop) and then dismounts last under cover of the fire by those who dismounted first. Upon dismounting, personnel caught in a killing zone open fire and immediately assault toward the ambush force. Any movements of the troops and supplies are planned and conducted as tactical operations with effective front, flank and rear security.  

Search techniques in built-up areas are required when you search either a few isolated huts or buildings, or for searching well-developed urban sections.  

Procedure :  

a) divide the area to be searched into zones, and assign a search party to each. A search party consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a security element (to encircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to secure open areas), and a reserve element (to assist, as required). Then the search element conducts the mission assigned for the operation. Normally it is organized into special teams. The security element surrounds the area while the search element moves in. Members of the security element orient primarily upon evaders from the populated area; however, they can cut off any insurgents trying to reinforce. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established. Subsurface routes of escape, such as subways and sewers, must be considered when operating in cities. The reserve element is a mobile force within a nearby area. Its specific mission is to assist the other two elements should they meetresistance they cannot handler. In addition, it is capable of replacing or reinforcing either of the other two elements should the need arise.  

b)consider any enemy material found, including propaganda signs and leaflets, to be booby-trapped until inspection proves it is safe.  

c) thoroughly search underground and underwater areas. Any freshly excavated ground can be a hiding place. Use mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater.  

d) deploy rapidly, especially when a guerrilla force is still in the area to be searched. The entire area to be searched is surrounded simultaneously. If this is not possible, observed fire must cover that portion not covered by soldiers.  

3. Ambush.  

An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or temporary halted target. Ambushes give the counter-guerrilla force several advantages:  

a) an ambush does not require ground to be seized or held  

b) smaller forces with limited weapons and equipment can harass or destroy larger, better armed forces  

c) guerrillas can be forced to engage in decisive combat at unfavorable times and places  

d) guerrillas can be denied freedom of movement and deprived of weapons and equipment that are difficult to replace.  

Well-planned and well-executed ambushes is the most successful operational technique employed against guerrillas. It is an effective technique to interdict movement guerrilla forces within an area. Selection of the site is a key step in developing a well-organized ambush.  

Ambushes are executed to reduce the guerrillas overall combat effectiveness. Destruction is the primary purpose of an ambush since guerrillas killed or captured, and equipment and supplies destroyed or captured, critically affect the guerrilla force. Harassment, the secondary purpose, diverts guerrillas from other missions. A series of successful ambushes causes the guerrilla force to be less aggressive and more defensive, to be apprehensive and overly cautious, and to be reluctant to go on patrols and move in convoys or in small groups.  

There are three types of ambushes.  

A point ambush involves patrol elements deployed to support the attack of a single killing zone. An area ambush involves patrol elements deployed as multiple, related, point ambushes. An ambush is categorized as either hasty or deliberate.  

A hasty ambush is an immediate action drill, an action of a combat patrol with little or no information. When information does not permit detailed planning required for a deliberate ambush, a hasty ambush is planned. In this case, ambush patrol plans and prepares to attack the first suitable guerrilla force. A deliberate ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target. Detailed information of the guerrilla force is required: size, nature, organization, armament, equipment, route and direction of movement, and time the force will reach or pass certain points on its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned when reliable information is received on the intended movement of a specific force; patrols, convoys, carrying parties or similar forces establish patterns of size, time and movement sufficient to permit detailed planning for the ambush.  

Basic elements of an ambush are:  

1. Surprise. It has to be achieved or else the attack is not an ambush. Surprise, which distinguishes an ambush from other forms of attack, allows  

the ambush force to seize and retain control of the situation. Surprise is achieved by careful planning, preparation and execution. Guerrillas are attacked in a manner they least expect.  

2. Coordinated fires. All weapons, including mines and demolitions, are positioned, and all direct and indirect fires are coordinated to achieve  

isolation of the kill zone to prevent escape or reinforcement; surprise delivery of a large volume of concentrated fires into the kill zone to inflict maximum damage so the target can be assaulted and destroyed.  

3. Control. Close control is maintained during movement to, occupation of, and withdrawal from the ambush site. The ambush commander’s control of all  

elements is critical at the time of target approach. Control measures provide for early warning of target approach, withholding fire until the target moves into the kill zone, opening fire a the proper time, initiating appropriate actions if the ambush is prematurely detected, lifting or shifting supporting fires when the ambush includes assault of the target, timely and orderly withdrawal to an easily recognized rallying point.  

Planning  

Planning provides for simplicity, type of ambush and deployment. The attack may be by fire only (harassing ambush) or may include assault of the target (destruction ambush). The force is tailored for its mission. Two men may be adequate for a harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require the entire unit (squad, platoon, company).  

An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as other combat patrols to include headquarters, an assault element, a support element and a security element. The assault and support are the attack force; the security element is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is further organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site is to be occupied for an extended period, double ambush forces may be organized. One ambush force occupies the site while the other rests, eats and tends to personal needs at the objective rallying point or other concealed location. They alternate after a given time, which is usually 8 hours. If the waiting period is over 24 hours, three ambush forces may be organized.  

The selection of equipment and supplies needed is based on the mission, size of guerrilla force, means of transportation, distance and terrain, weight and bulk of equipment. A primary route is planned which allows the unit to enter the ambush site from the rear. The kill zone is not entered if entry can be avoided. If the kill zone must be entered to place mines or explosives, care is taken to remove any tracks or signs that might alert the guerrillas and compromise the ambush. If mines, mantraps or explosives are to be placed on the far side, or if the appearance of the site might cause the guerrillas to check it, then a wide detour around the killing zone is made. Here, too, care is taken to remove any traces which might reveal the ambush.  

Also, an alternate route from the ambush site is planned.  

Maps and aerial photos are used to analyze the terrain. As far as possible, so-called ideal ambush sites are avoided. Alert guerrillas are suspicious of these areas, avoid them and increase vigilance and security when they must be entered. Considering this, an ambush site must provide fields of fire, concealed positions, canalization of the guerrillas into the killing zone, covered routes of withdrawal ( to enable the ambush force to break contact and avoid pursuit), no-exit route for the guerrilla force.  

Ambush force, as a rule occupies the ambush site at the latest possible time permitted by the tactical situation and the amount of site preparation required. This not only reduces the risk of discovery but also reduces the time that soldiers must remain still and quiet in position.  

The unit moves into the ambush site from the rear. Security elements are positioned first to prevent surprise while the ambush is being established.  

Automatic weapons are then positioned so that each can fire along the entire killing zone. If this is not possible, they are given overlapping sectors of  

fire so the entire killing zone is covered. The unit leader then selects his position, located where he can see when to initiate the ambush. Claymore mines, explosives and grenade launchers may be used to cover any dead space left by the automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to provide mutual support. The unit leader sets a time by which positions are to be prepared. The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All men work at top speed during the allotted time. Camouflage is very important each soldier must be hidden from the target and each one has to secure his equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions are prepared with minimal change in the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting from preparation of positions is concealed. Movement is kept to a minimum and the number of men moving at a time is closely controlled. Light discipline is rigidly enforced at night.  

Point ambush  

A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, is positioned along the expected route of approach of the guerrilla force.  

Formation is important because, to a great extent, it determines whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of highly concentrated fire necessary to isolate, trap and destroy the guerrillas. The formation to be used is determined by carefully considering possible formations and theadvantages and disadvantages of each in relation to terrain, conditions of visibility, forces, weapons and equipment ease or difficulty of control, force to be attacked and overall combat situation.  

1. Line formation.  

The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the guerrilla forces route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions the attack element parallel to the long axis of the killing zone and subjects the guerrilla force to heavy flanking fire. The size of the force that can be trapped in the killing zone is limited by the area which the attack element can effectively cover with highly concentrated fire. The force is trapped in the killing zone by natural obstacles, mines, demolitions, and direct and indirect fires. A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that lateral dispersion of the force may be too big for effective coverage. The line formation is appropriate in close terrain that restricts guerrilla maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is restricted by mines, demolitions or mantraps. Similar obstacles can be placed between the attack element and the killing zone to provide protection from guerrilla counter-ambush measures. When a destruction ambush is deployed in this manner, access lanes are left so that the force in the killing zone can be assaulted. The line formation can be effectively used by a rise from the ground ambush in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush. An advantage of the line formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of visibility.  

2. L-formation.  

The L-formation is a variation of the line formation. The long side of the attack element is parallel to the killing zone and delivers flanking fire.  

The short side of the attack element is at the end of, and at right angles to, the killing zone and delivers enfilading fire that interlocks with fire from the other leg. This formation is flexible. It can be established on a straight stretch of a trail or stream or at a sharp bend in a trail or  

stream. When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to parallel the long leg if the guerrilla force attempts to assault or escape in the opposite direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape in that direction or reinforcement from that direction.  

3. Z-formation.  

The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the L-formation. The attack force is deployed as in the L-formation but with an additional side so that the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side may serve to engage a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the guerrillas, restrict a flank, prevent envelopment (of the ambush force), seal the end of the killing zone.  

4. T-formation.  

The attack element is deployed across, and at right angles to, the route of movement of the hostile force so that the attack element and the target form  

the letter T. This formation can be used day or night to establish a purely harassing ambush, and at night to establish an ambush to interdict movement through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies). A small unit can use the T-formation to harass, slow and disorganize a larger force. When the lead guerrilla elements are engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver right or left to close with the ambush force. Mines, mantraps and other obstacles  

placed to the flanks of the killing zone slow the guerrillas movement and permit the unit to deliver heavy fire and then withdraw without becoming decisively engaged. The T-formation can be used to interdict small groups attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the attack element may be deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second member facing in the opposite direction. The attack of a force approaching from either direction requires only that every second member shift to the opposite side of the dike. Each member fires only to his front and only when the target is at a close range. Attack is by fire only, and each member keeps the guerrilla force under fire as long as it remains to his front. If the force attempts to  

escape in either direction along the dike, each member takes it under fire as it comes into his vicinity. The T-formation is effective at halting infiltration. It has one chief disadvantage: there is a possibility that while spread out the ambush will engage a superior force. Use of this formation must, therefore, fit the local enemy situation.  

5. V-formation.  

The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the guerrilla route of movement so that it forms a V. Care is taken to ensure that neither group (or leg) fires into the other. This formation subjects the guerrilla to both enfilading and interlocking fire. The V-formation is suited for fairly open terrain but can also be used in the jungle. When established in the jungle, the legs of the V close in as the lead elements of the guerrilla force approach the apex of the V, elements then open fire from close range. Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and fire is carefully coordinated and controlled to ensure that the fire of one leg does not endanger the other. Wider separation of the elements makes this formation difficult to control, and there are fewer sites that favor its use. Its main advantage is that it is difficult for the guerrilla to detect the ambush until well into the killing zone.  

6. Triangle formation.  

Closed triangle. The attack element is deployed in 3 groups, positioned so they form a triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each  

point of the triangle and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to interlock with either of the others. Elements are positioned so that their fields of fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small unit strongpoint which is used to interdict night movement through open areas, when guerrilla approach is likely to be from any direction. The formation provides all-round security, and security elements are deployed only when they can be positioned so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will not compromise the ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is allowed to approach within close range before the ambush force opens fire. Advantages include ease of control, all-round security, and guerrillas approaching from any direction can be fired on by at least two automatic weapons. Disadvantages include the requirement for an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the danger of being overturn by a guerrilla force; one or more legs of the triangle may come under guerrilla enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion, particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla mortar fire.  

Open triangle (harassing ambush).  

This variation of the triangle ambush is designed to enable a small unit to harass, slow, and inflict heavy casualties upon a larger force without being decisively engaged. The attack group is deployed in 3 elements, positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a triangle containing the killing zone. When the guerrillas enter the killing zone, the element to the guerrillas front opens fire on the lead guerrillas. When the guerrillas counterattack, the element withdraws and an assault element to the flank opens fire. When this group is attacked, the element to the opposite flank opens fire. This process is repeated until the guerrillas are pulled apart. Each element reoccupies its position, if possible, and continues to inflict maximum damage without becoming decisively engaged.  

Open triangle (destruction ambush).  

The attack group is again deployed in 3 elements, positioned so that each element is a point of the triangle, 200 to 300 meters apart. The killing zone is the area within the triangle. The guerrillas are allowed to enter the killing zone; the nearest element attacks by fire. As the guerrillas attempt to maneuver or withdraw, the other elements open fire. One or more assault elements, as directed, assault or  

maneuver to envelop or destroy the guerrillas. As a destruction ambush, this formation is suitable for platoon-size or larger units; a unit smaller than a platoon would be in danger of being overrun. Also, control in assaulting or maneuvering is difficult. Close coordination and control are necessary to ensure that assaulting or maneuvering elements are not fired by another party; and the ambush site must be a fairly level, open area that provides (around its border) concealment for the ambush elements (unless it is a rise from the ground ambush).  

7. Box formation.  

This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush. The unit is deployed in 4 elements positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a square or rectangle containing the killing zone. It can be used as a harassing ambush or a destruction ambush in the same manner as the two variations of the open triangle ambush.  

Area ambush  

Killing zone. A point ambush is established at a site having several trails or other escape routes leading away from it. The site may be a water hole, guerrilla campsite, or known rendezvous point, or a frequently traveled trail. This site is the central killing zone.  

Area ambush multiple point.  

Point ambushes are established along the trails or other escape routes leading away from the central killing zone. The guerrilla force, whether a single group or several parties approaching from different directions, is permitted to move to the central killing zone. Outlying ambushes do not attack (unless discovered). The ambush is initiated when the guerrillas move into the central killing zone. When the guerrillas break contact and attempt to disperse, escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying ambushes. The multiple point ambush increases casualties and harassment and produces confusion.  

This version of the area ambush is best suited in terrain where movement is largely restricted to trails. It provides best results when established as a deliberate ambush. When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate ambush, an area ambush of opportunity (hasty ambush) may be established. The outlying ambushes are permitted to attack guerrillas approaching the central killing zone, if the guerrilla force is small. If it is too large for the particular outlying ambush, the guerrillas are allowed to continue and they are attacked in the central killing zone.  

Area ambush: baited trap.  

A variation of the area ambush. A central killing zone is established along the guerrillas route of approach. Point ambushes are established along the routes over which units relieving or reinforcing the guerrilla will have to approach. The guerrilla force in the central killing zone serves as a bait to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill zones of the outlying ambushes. A friendly force can also be used as the bait. The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to destroy their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes that delay, disorganize and cause casualties by successive contacts.  

This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as bait to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the killing zone to overcome the installation or may use it as a ruse. These variations are best suited for situations where routes of approach for relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units are limited to those favorable for ambush.  

Unusual ambush techniques  

Spider hole ambush.  

This point ambush is designed for open areas that lack cover and concealment and other features normally desirable in a good ambush site. The attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to the overall situation. The attack element is concealed in the spider hole type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and positions camouflaged. When the ambush is initiated, the attack element members throw back the covers and rise from the ground to attack. This ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrols and other units, to relax in areas that do not appear to favor ambush. The chief advantage is that the ambush element is vulnerable if detected prematurely.  

Demolition ambush.  

Dual primed, electrically detonated mines or demolition charges are planted in the area over which a guerrilla force is expected to pass. This may be a portion of as road or trail, an open field, or any area that can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are run to a concealed observation point sufficiently distant to ensure safety of the ambush element. As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine the area. The ambush element remains to fire the charges, other personnel return to the unit. When a guerrilla force enters the mined area (killing zone), the element on site detonates the explosives and withdraws immediately to avoid detection and pursuit.  

Special ambush situation.  

Attacks against columns protected by armored vehicles depend on the type and location of armored vehicles in a column, and the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or disabled by fire or antitank weapons, landmines and Molotov cocktails, or by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize armored vehicles at a point where they are unable to give protection to the rest of the convoy and where they will block the route of other supporting vehicles. In alternate bounds, all except the first two vehicles keep their relative places in the column. The first two vehicles alternate as lead vehicles on each bound. Each covers the bound of the other. This method  

provides more rapid advance than movement by successive bounds but is less secure it doers not allow soldiers in the second vehicle enough time to thoroughly observe the terrain to the front before passing the first vehicle. Security is obtained by the vehicle commander who assigns each soldier a direction of observation: to the front, flank(s) or rear. This provides each vehicle with some security against surprise fire from every direction and provides visual contact with vehicles to the front and rear. For maximum observation, all canvas is removed from the vehicles.  

Action at danger areas.  

The commander of the leading vehicle immediately notifies the unit leader when he encounters an obstacle or other danger area.  

Designated soldiers reconnoiter these places under cover of the weapons in the vehicle. Obstacles are bypassed, if possible. When they cannot be bypassed, they are cautiously removed. Side roads intersecting the route of advance are investigated. Soldiers from one vehicle secure the road junction; one or two vehicles investigate the side road. The amount of reconnaissance of side roads is determined by the patrol leaders knowledge of the situation. Men investigating side roads do not, however, move past supporting distance of the main body of the patrol. Bridges, road junctions, defiles and curves (that deny observation beyond the turn) are danger areas. Soldiers dismount and take advantage of available cover and concealment to investigate these areas. The vehicle is moved off the road into a covered or concealed position; weapons from the vehicle cover the advance of the investigating personnel.  

Ambush during darkness is difficult to control, bur darkness increases the security of the ambush party and the confusion of those being ambushed.  

4. Roadblocks and checkpoints.  

Element of the checkpoint force has to be positioned and concealed at appropriate distance from the checkpoint to prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back.  

It’s necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggling of controlled items. Since checkpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it’s important that the civil population understands that checkpoints are a preventive and not a punitive measure. Checkpoints may be deliberate or hasty. The deliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the open country, often on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. The hasty checkpoint is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country. The actual location of the hasty checkpoint is designed to achieve quick success.  

Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible. The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges or deep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the checkpoint in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweight the advantages of such positions. A scarcity of good roads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint. A checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise by a guerrilla force.  

5. Patrols.  

Used to saturate areas of suspected guerrilla activity, control critical roads, maintain contact between villages and units, interdict guerrilla routes of supply and communication, provide internal security in rural and urban areas, locate guerrilla units and base camps. A patrol is a  

detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance operation. Patrolling is used when limited (or no) intelligence on guerrilla activity is available. Routes are planned carefully and coordinated with higher, lower and adjacent units, to include air and ground fire support elements and reserve forces. There are three key principles to successful patrolling: detailed planning, thorough reconnaissance, all-round security.  

It often happens that the patrol has to break the contact with a larger enemy (to break contact use the clock system. the direction the patrol moves is  

always 12 o’clock. When contact is made, the leader shouts a direction and distance to move (such as 7 o’clock, 400 meters. The leader can also use the system to shift or direct fire at a certain location).  

Saturation patrolling is extremely effective patrols are conducted by many lightly armed, small, fast-moving units and provide thorough area coverage. Patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which are engaged frequently to avoid establishing patterns. Use of saturation patrolling results in the sustained denial of an area to guerrilla forces as they seek to avoid contact with the counter-guerrilla units. In addition to harassment and discovery of guerrilla tactical forces, this technique provides an opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of operations; a form of reassurance to the local population that the government is concerned about their protection and security; a means by which information about the guerrilla can be obtained.  

Watch out: guerillas usually try to cut the lines of communications by mining roads, waterways and railways, or by ambushes located adjacent to them, blow up bridges and tunnels.  

Tracking  

Footprints. You can read the following by footprints:  

– the direction and rate of movement of a party  

– the number of persons in a party  

– whether or not heavy loads are carried  

– the sex of the members of the party  

– whether the members of a party know they are being followed  

If the footprints are deep and the pace is long, the party is moving rapidly. Very long strides and deep prints, with toe prints deeper than heel prints, indicate the party is running. If the prints are deep, short and widely spaced, with signs of scuffing or shuffling, a heavy load is probably being carried by the parson who left the prints. You can also determine a person’s sex by studying the size and position of the footprints. Women generally tend to be pigeon-toed, while men usually walk with their feet pointed straight ahead or slightly to the outside. Womens’ prints are usually smaller than mens’, and their strides usually shorter. If a party knows it is being followed, it may attempt to hide its tracks. Persons walking backward have a short, irregular stride. The prints have and unusually deep toe. The soil will be kicked in the direction of movement. The last person in a group usually leaves the clearest footprints. Therefore, use his prints as the key set.  

Use the box method to count the number of persons in the group. Up to 18 persons can be counted. Use it when the key prints can be determined. To use this method, identify a key print on a trail and draw line from its heel across the trail. Then move forward to the key print of the opposite foot and draw a line through its instep. This should form a box with the edges of the trail forming two sides, and the drawn lines forming the other two sides.  

Next, count every print of partial print inside the box to determine the number of persons. Any person walking normally would have stepped in the box  

at least one time. Count the key prints as one. Also, you can track paying attention to such things as foliage, moss, vines, sticks or rocks moved from their original places; stones and sticks that are turned over; grass that is bent or broken in the direction of movement.  

Staining.  

A good example of staining is the mark left by blood from a bleeding wound. You can determine the location of a wound on a man being followed by studying the bloodstains. If the blood seems to be dripping steadily, it probably came from a wound on his trunk. A wound in the lungs will deposit bloodstains that are pink, bubbly, frothy. A bloodstain deposited from a head wound will appear heavy, wet and slimy, like gelatin. Abdominal wounds often mix blood with digestive juices so that the deposit will have an odor, and the stains will be light in color. Water in footprints in swampy ground may be muddy if the tracks are recent. In time, however, the mud will settle and the water is clear. The clarity of the water can be used to estimate the age of the prints. Normally, the mud will clear in 1 hour, but that will vary with terrain. If a party knows that you are tracking it, it will probably use camouflage to conceal its movements and to slow and confuse you. Remember: a well-defined approach that leads to the enemy will probably be mined, ambushed or covered by snipers.  

6. Aerial search.  

This technique has little value in areas of dense vegetation. Use of search units mounted in armed helicopters should be limited to those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to justify their use and then normally in conjunction with ground operations. In ground search operations, helicopters drop off troops in an area suspected of containing guerrillas. With  

the helicopters overmatching from the air, troops search the area. Troops are then picked up and the process is repeated in other areas.  

7. Raid.  

It is an operation involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, harass the guerrilla or destroy the guerrilla force  

and its installation. Raids are usually targeted against single, isolated guerrilla base camps. To assist in attaining surprise, the raiding force uses inclement weather, limited visibility, or terrain normally considered impassable. If night airborne or air assault raids are conducted, the force must be accurately inserted and oriented on the ground. Air assault forces supported by armed helicopters offer infinite possibilities for conducting raids. This type of force can move in, strike the objective and withdraw without extensive preparation or support from other sources.  

8. Crowd dispersal.  

9. Assassination of the guerrilla leader.  

10. Taking hostages to press guerrillas.  

11. Organization of false guerrilla units.  

Meanwhile the enemy will attempt to engage you in locations where your fire would endanger civilians or damage their property. You have to match the size of the guerrilla unit. Employing a large force to counter a smaller one is inefficient because it compromises the chance of achieving surprise.  

Psychological Operations  

Psychological operations (PSYOP) in foreign internal defense include propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups to support the achievement of national objectives. There are 5 major target groups for PSYOP:  

1. Insurgents.  

The major PSYOP objective here is to discredit the insurgents and isolate them from he population. The most important direction of attack  

is against their morale. Themes should publicize and exploit differences between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other themes might stress lack of support, isolation, homesickness, and hardship. Amnesty programs are often useful in neutralizing insurgents, and they are most effective when they are well publicized, directed against lower ranking members of the insurgency, and offer sufficient reason and benefits for quitting the unit. These programs do, however, have several disadvantages: they recognize the insurgents as a legitimate political force, they forgo punishment of anyone accepting amnesty, and they increase the image of the insurgents threat.  

2. The population supporting the insurgents.  

You have to achieve withdrawal of support for the insurgents and a total defection. Propaganda should highlight the insurgents shortcomings, ultimate government victory, government successes, and the practical advantages of surrendering or of accepting amnesty. Sometimes, displays of military might are used; invading forces may assemble and parade through the streets of conquered towns, attempting to demonstrate the futility of any further fighting. Thesedisplays may also include public executions of enemy soldiers, resistance fighters, and other conspirators. Particularly in antiquity, the death or imprisonment of a popular leader was sometimes enough to bring about a quick surrender. However, this has often had the unintended effect of creating martyrs around which popular resistance can rally.  

3. The uncommitted population.  

The major mission here is to build national morale, unity, and confidence in the government. There should also be a major  

effort to win popular acceptance of the government force, and convince the people that government programs serve their interests, the government forces  

can protect them, ultimate government victory is assured. This may be accomplished through re-education, allowing conquered citizens to participate in their government, or, especially in impoverished or besieged areas, simply by providing food, water and shelter.  

4. Government personnel.  

When targeting government personnel, seek to maintain loyalties and develop policies and attitudes which will result in  

group members who will realize the importance of popular support, promote public welfare and justice, take action to eliminate the basic causes of the  

subversive insurgency, and protect the population. You have to indoctrinate the host country security and military forces regarding the importance of the civilian population support. When government personnel interact with neutral and non-hostile elements of the population, the emphasis should be positive  

and constructive.  

5. Foreign audiences. There are two major groups to be addressed: neutral nations and hostile nations. For neutral nations, the purpose of  

psychological operations is to achieve friendly neutrality or active support for your side. For hostile powers, the major objective of these operations is  

to influence public opinion against involvement in supporting the insurgency. Besides, you have to use psychological operations to establish and maintain a  

favorable image of our country. The themes most useful in establishing that image are that the US presence is requested by the host country government, it is legal and necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory. Intelligence operations are facilitated by employing psychological operation media to inform the people that they should report to the proper authority information  

pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, and guerrilla activities. Posters and leaflets provide definite instruction as to persons and places that are available to receive the information (indicate what rewards are available).  

Vietnam experience  

The Viet Cong used hit and run attacks involving a small group, usually hiding in ambush and attacking a larger force, only to retreat  

seconds later. This reduced the advantages of the conventional forces advanced weapon systems. It gave an ambushed squad no time to call in artillery or air strike. Booby traps ( like simple spikes, incorporated into various types of traps, for example, in camouflaged pit into which a man might fall) were another common tactic among guerrillas. Grenade traps (poised with the pin removed) were also used. Moving them would take the pressure off the lever, causing the grenades to explode. Camouflage was very important, and fighters travelled in small groups, often wearing civilian clothes to make it difficult for American soldiers to know who they were.  

Often, they would in tunnels underground. Tunnels and spider holes were often used to spring ambushes on American troops. The Vietcong would wait for part of American formation to pass before coming out of the ground and opening fire. Before the Americans had a chance to realize where the fire  

came from, the Vietcong would duck back into the trenches. This often caused fratricide (friendly fire incident) because soldiers who were ambushed would  

fire back behind them, hitting other American patrols. American troops, usually assigned to Vietnam for a one-year tour of duty, found themselves  

ill-trained to wage a war against a mostly invisible enemy.  

Afghanistan experience  

When the Stinger missile was introduced to Mujahideen, they began to ambush Soviet helicopters and fixed wing aircraft at airfields. The Stinger was  

effective only up to 15, 000 feet (4, 600 m), so Mujahideen would attack aircraft as they were landing or taking off. Soviets modified their tactics:  

helicopters stayed over friendly forces, fixed wing aircraft began flying higher, and armor and electronic defense systems were added to aircraft to help protectthem from Stinger. Also, Spetsnaz ( Special Forces) were used extensively. They would be flown into areas where Mujahideen often passed,  

had been seen or were ambushing someone. Tanks and aircraft were of comparatively little use. The only technology with a significant impact on  

Mujahideen were land mines and helicopters. As the Soviets got stalled, they began punishing the local population for supporting Mujahideen. It was not  

uncommon for Soviet helicopters to raze an Afghan village in retaliation for an attack against Soviet soldiers. They also dropped mines from aircraft in  

fields and pastures and shot livestock with machineguns. Another common tactic was to cordon off and search villages for Mujahideen.  

Chechnya (Russia) experience  

The conflict between Russia and Chechen terrorists has been mostly a guerilla war. Most fighting was done with the support of armored vehicles,  

artillery and aircraft, rather than infantry. Russian soldiers were not prepared for urban warfare in Grozny (the capital of Chechnya). Terrorists would hide on the top floors and basements of buildings armed with small arms and anti-tank weapons. The Russians came in with convoys of armored vehicles which were unprepared for the tactics the terrorists would use. Chechenambush tactics were planned, and involved destroying the first and the last vehicle (armored personnel carrier or a tank) in the column. This was done by either rocket propelled grenade (RPG) or improvised explosive device. If the initial attack was successful, the rest of the convoy would be trapped in between. Later Russians used artillery and airstrikes more extensively.  

Terrorists changed their urban combat tactics and used fire-teams of three fighters : a machine gunner, a sniper and a fighter armed with rocket propelled grenade. As a result, a very small and mobile fire-team could meet any potential sizable threat with great effectiveness. Chechen snipers used to wound Russian soldiers and pick off their rescuers. They also shot off antennas from the moving armored personnel carriers since this was often the only means of communication with the command center, the troops inside would end up isolated and attacked with RPG or by the sniper as they tried to repair the antenna. As Russia controlled more area, ambushes gave place to roadside bombings, and these usually involved modified mines and improvised explosive devices.  

U. S. – Iraq war experience  

Suicide bombers attack American soldiers at checkpoints, on patrols, on their bases and in convoys. Iraqis used the same tactics Chechen terrorists  

used against convoys.  

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