WORLD WAR III TECHNOLOGY. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky

Монография / Политика
Аннотация отсутствует

By Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, a former KGB and CIA, the author of the White House Special Handbook, Espionage and Counterespionage Handbook.  

prof777prof@yahoo. com  

New York  



The law of the strongest is the only international law.  

Mikhail Kryzhanovsky  


Chapter 1. Commmander-in “Chief.  


The president loves war, not peace, because:  


a) Successful military engagement enhances presidential popularity. All five  

Presidents who have run for re-election during a war have won.  

b) A quick war improves the electoral fortunes of the presidents political  


c) War is good business, at least if you win, and at least if it does not  

drag on too long. It stimulates demand for a variety of manufactured goods  

and services (even if they are all destined to go down the drain) and is a  

powerful stimulus to all fields of scientific endeavor.  

d) War provides opportunities to direct lucrative contracts to companies and  

individuals who helped get the President elected, or who can help in the  

future; and to the constituents of select Senators and Congressmen for the  

same reasons.  

e) War usually pleases the Joint Chiefs (and their full support is important  


f) War keeps down the unemployment figures.  

g) War is just one detail in a vast ongoing game of international strategy  

for domination; it is as much a financial operation as anything else.  

h) War unifies the country, and keeps the public’s attention away from  

issues that might be controversial.  

i) War provides a rationale for the implementation of tighter legislation and  

the removal of certain freedoms that would never be tolerated in peacetime  



At the same time, war is limited by political decisions and by public  

opinion. Initially the use of US forces spurs a “rally around the flag”  

effect that lifts the President’s popularity and builds up support for the  

troops. But the American people are casualty averse and the positive effect  

lasts only until the number of casualties and the length of the engagement  

begin to wear on the public. Continued military action will then have a  

deleterious effect on presidential approval ratings as the war becomes  

increasingly unpopular.  


In the long run, the destruction of such vast quantities of resources, and  

the diversion of so much of the nation’s productive capacity away from  

actual goods and services for the real economy, are obviously immensely  

deleterious. Eventually, these downside effects will begin to dawn on even  

the best-manipulated electorate.  


Duties of the Commander-in-Chief  


1. As President you are Commander-in-Chief, but your job is political  

decision making, not war management. You:  

– lead all federal and state armed forces  

– lead the US defense policy  

– suggest a budget for the armed forces  

– choose the leaders of the armed forces  

– decide where the armed forces will be in the world  

– abide by all laws about armed forces  

– direct all war efforts  

– protect the lives of Americans living in other countries  


During wartime you have special powers and Congress must agree to any  

actions president takes, including:  

– placing limits on prices  

– limiting the sale of food, clothes and other items  

– having a control on war-related businesses  

– limiting freedoms for the period of war  


SIOP or Presidential nuclear command  


The most classified business you will be briefed on about after you’re  

elected is the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which contains the  

possible US nuclear responses to a variety of attacks. Here’s the procedure  

of Presidential nuclear command:  


If the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) detects evidence of a  

possible nuclear attack against the United States, NORAD, the Strategic Air  

Command (SAC), the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center and the  

Alternative National Military Command Center begin procedural steps to verify  

the authenticity of the attack. If NORAD and other units determine that the  

attack is real, you are informed of the attack and its characteristics. Then  

you have to consult with the Defense Secretary and Joint Chiefs of Staff and  

consider SIOP options. If a nuclear attack option is chosen, you have to  

transmit the launch codes that unlock the nuclear weapons and assure the  

officers in charge of the weapons that the launch order is authentic. You may  

also give authority to launch nuclear weapons to the Secretary of Defense.  




Chapter 2. Strategy and Tactics.  


2. 1 Strategy  


Strategy is the planning of campaigns, selecting the aims and solving the  

logistics problems connected with moving men and resources to their battle  

positions. Actually, strategy is how you use battles to win a war, while a  

tactic is how you use troops to win a battle. There's only one grand  

strategy to win the war; and the President is very important here as a  

politician — he gives the orders to freeze the enemys' assets in American  

(and allies) banks and he builds up the international coalition. American  

military strategy in the 21st century has to be a global strategy, which  

means coalition building. We will not discuss nuclear strategy and tactics in  

depth, because we all hope that for the next 25 years at least the practical  

use of nuclear weapons will remain a matter of science fiction, something to  

hint at and suggest as a threat, but not to actually try. Please do not prove  

me wrong.  


2. 2 Tactics  


Military tactics rest on fourteen elements:  


1. Identification or selection and maintenance of aim (ability to define and  

locate the opponent). Tactics should be directed to achieve a particular  

outcome such as the capture of a bridge or a hill. Once an aim is  

identified, time, resources and effort are expended to achieve it; therefore,  

these are wasted if the aim is frequently changed.  

2. Administration (planning and analysis). Ask what (type of operation), when  

(time), where (the assigned area), how (the use of assigned assets), why  

(the purpose). Mission analysis includes : mission, enemy(intelligence),  

terrain (and weather), troops, time available between receiving the mission  

and the deadline for having completed it (time is the most critical resource,  

especially during daylight hours), deception, civilian considerations.  

3. Concentration of efforts (against the enemy, where he is known to be  

weakest). Remember, he who defends everything defends nothing, he who attacks  

everywhere will capture nothing.  

4. Security (intelligence and counter-intelligence)  

5. Economy of force (to make the best use of all resources and in order to  

create and maintain a reserve).  

6. Force protection (dispersing, camouflage, deception, electronic counter  

measures, use of fortifications entrenchments, over head protection,  

foxholes, revetting, vanguard). Dispersal of force is a very necessary  

practice in modern warfare where firepower is precise and overwhelming.  

Camouflage is not just special uniform; outlines have to be broken up,  

textures disguised and reflective surfaces dulled. Camouflage techniques  

also extend beyond the visible spectra that the human eye normally uses, as  

the same principles now need to work in infrared light, against starlight  

scopes and radar frequencies. Also you have to use terrain, natural (river)  

and man made obstacles and barriers, like wire anti-vehicle ditches and  

berms (knife edges).  

7. Isolation (when the opponent is denied the ability to gain outside  

resources and assistance).  

8. Suppression (the process of denying the opponent the freedom of movement  

and ultimately maneuver)  

9. Maneuver (combination of movement and firepower to achieve a position of  

advantage which means the placing of strength against an opponent’s  


10. Flexibility (a capability to react to changing circumstances, especially  

by mobility, the rapid switching of fire-power and arrangement of sufficient  

resources). Don’t forget to keep about a quarter of the forces back in  

reserve to exploit new opportunities, or react quickly to reverses and  

unexpected developments – a battalion might keep a company back, the  

brigade might keep a battalion back. Here I would also talk about exploiting  

prevailing weather (bad weather cut down on the chance of detection) and  

exploiting night using night vision equipment.  

11. Cooperation (with allies through secure links)  

12. Offensive action (to win the initiative and throw an enemy off balance)  

13. Destruction (physical destruction of resources or destruction of the  

opponent's will)  

14. Troops motivation.  



2. 3 The U. S. principles of military art:  


1. Objective (direct every military operation towards a clearly defined,  

decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is  

the destruction of the enmy’s ability and will to fight).  

2. Offensive (seize, retain and exploit initiative. Offensive action is the  

most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective.  

Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds  

the initiative while mainaining freedom of action and achieving decisive  

results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war).  

3. Mass (concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.  

Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive  

effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to chieve mass. Massing  

effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior  

forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire).  

4. Economy of force ( employ all combat power available in the most effective  

way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.  

Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No  

part of the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of  

available combat power to such tasks as limited ttacks, defense, delays,  

eception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to ahieve mass  

elsewhere at the decisive pont and time of battlefield).  

5. Maneuver (place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the  

flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in  

relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps  

the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit  

successes, to preserve freedom of action, an to reduce vulnerability. It  

continually poses new problems for the enemy y rendering his actions  

ineffective, eventually leading to defeat).  

6. Unity of command (for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one  

responsible commander. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in  

a maner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of  

command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are  

under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the  

requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose).  

7. Security (never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.  

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a  

commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy  

strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning  

of adequate security measures).  

8. Surprise (strike the enemy at a time, at a place or in a manner for which  

he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power.  

By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the  

effort expended. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or  

location of main effort and timing. Deception can aid the probability of  

achieving surprise).  

9. Simplicity (prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders  

to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but  

simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not  

difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and  

clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors  

bing equal, parsimony is to be prefered).  


2. 4 The Russian principles of military art:  


1. Combat readiness.  

2. Surprise.  

3. Aggressivnes and decisiveness.  

4. Persistence and nitiative.  

5. Combined arms oordination and joint operations.  

6. Decisive concentration of forces.  

7. Deep battle or dep operations.  

8. Informatin warfare.  

9. Exploitation of moral-political factors.  

10. Firm and continuous command and control.  

11. Comprehensive comat support.  

12. Timely restoration of reserves and combat potential.  


2. 5 Chinese principles of military art.  


Because the military doctrines of the Poples Liberation Army are in a  

state of flux, it is difficult to give a capsule summary of a single doctrine  

which is expounded with the PLA. Rather the PLA is currently influenced by  

three doctrinal schools which both conflict and complement each other. These  

three schools are:  

1. People's war ( derived from the Maoist notion of warfare as a war in  

which the entire society is mobilized.  

2. Regional war (envisions future wars to be limited in scope and confined to  

the Chinese border).  

3. Revolution in military affairs ( a school of thought which believes that  

technology is transforming the basis of warfare and that these technological  

changes present both extreme dangers and possibilities for the Chinese  



In recent years, local war under high-tech conditions” has been  



Chapter 3. Staying Alive  



There is no and there will be no such creature as the “soldier of  

tomorrow” loaded with computers who doesn’t have to be skillful on his  

own; this is a fantasy of smart idiots wasting federal money, who never have  

been under fire amidst the hell of actual combat. Of course, technology has  

changed the character of modern war, but as the insurgents in Iraq have  

taught us, the rest of the world doesn't have to reach our level in  

military technology to fight — they can conduct urban guerilla warfare with  

whatever is at hand.  

For a hundred years to come the best way to survive will still be to dig up  

a big, deep trench. The best computer is a loaded submachine gun, and the  

best techniques are:  

– Firepower + Speed = Low Casualties  

– the minor tactic of infantry: fire and movement firing and  

moving, often in pairs, when one soldier fires to suppress or neutralize the  

enemy whilst the other moves either toward the enemy or to a more favorable  


– basic drill (if you are under “effective fire”): run five-six steps,  

drop to the ground or into cover, crawl a few yards (or move under cover),  

observe, shoot identified targets within effective range, move, observe and  

shoot until you get another order;  

– “overwatch”: one small unit supports another while they execute fire  

and movement patrolling: reconnaissance patrol (used to collect information  

by observing the enemy and working with informants, fighting patrol (to raid  

or ambush a specific enemy not holding the ground; you need a platoon for a  

fighting patrol), clearing patrol (to ensure that newly occupied defensive  

position is secure), standing patrol (to provide early warning, security or  

to piquet some geographical feature such as dead ground).  



3. 1 How to fight in :  



Successful desert operations require adaptation to heat and lack of water as  

temperatures may vary 136 degrees Fahrenheit in the deserts of Mexico and  

Libya to the bitter cold of winter in the Gobi (East Asia). Terrain varies  

from mountain and rocky plateau to sandy or dune terrain. The key to success  

in desert operations is mobility, though movement can easily be detected  

because of sand and dust signatures left due to the loose surface material  

(in an actual engagement, this may not be all that bad because a unit is  

obscured from direct fire while advancing, but the element of surprise may be  

lost). Moving at night is the best choice.  

Attack helicopters are extremely useful there due to their ability to  

maneuver and apply firepower over a large battlefield in a short time.  

Suppression of enemy air defense has a high priority during offensive  

operations. The destruction of enemy antitank capabilities must also have a  

high priority due to the shock potential of armor in the desert.  

No panic, no smoking, no alcohol (it dehydrates the body). Don’t drink much  

liquid. Keep the gun clean from sand. Kill anybody for water and watch for  

water signs, like animal tracks and the birds flight patterns.  



In the jungle you'll fight, most probably, guerrilla, not conventional  

forces. In general, jungle enemies can be expected to follow these tactical  

principles: maintain the offensive, stay close to the enemy to reduce the  

effects of his firepower, infiltrate at every opportunity, operate during  

periods of limited visibility, use surprise tactics (see Special Forces).  

Remember that trees and foliage reduce the effective range of your weapons.  


In Latin America the most likely threat for the US are insurgent leftist  

movements. In Africa many of the conflicted factions struggle among  

themselves, due to political or ancient tribal differences, differences that  

may be stirred up by rival leaders in the modern political state, who  

in turn may be working (knowingly or not) in the interests of other, more  

developed, powers who benefit from the chaos. (These factions consist  

primarily of heavily armed with mortars and artillery guerrilla groups. There  

are active guerrilla movements in Southeast Asia, too).  

The worst things (often exaggerated) in jungle combat are fear,  

malaria-carrying mosquitoes and snakes; also heat, thick vegetation and  

rugged terrain, especially for those who carry heavy weapons. If bitten by a  

snake, follow these steps: remain calm but act swiftly, and chances of  

survival are good; immobilize the affected part in a position below the level  

of the heart; place a lightly constricted band 5 to 10 cm (2 to 4 inches)  

closer to the heart than the site of the bite (reapply the constricting band  

ahead of the swelling if it moves up the arm or leg). The constricting band  

should be placed tightly enough to halt the flow of blood in surface vessels,  

but not so tight as to stop the pulse; do not attempt to cut open the bite or  

suck out venom; seek medical help (if possible, the snake’s head with 5 to  

10 cm of its body should be taken to the medics for identification and a  

proper choice of anti venom).  

The thick foliage and few rods make ambush a constant danger, and that’s  

why point, flank and rear security teams have to keep a force from being  

ambushed. These teams must be far enough away from the main body that if they  

make contact the whole force will not be engaged (use dogs, too). Successful  

jungle attacks usually combine dispersion and concentration. For example, a  

rifle company may move out in a dispersed formation so that it can find the  

enemy. Once contact is made, its platoons close on the enemy from all  

directions. Remember, jungle areas are ideal for infiltration because dense  

vegetation and rugged terrain limit the enemy's ability to detect movement.  

On the other side, it’s difficult to detect the approach of an attacking  

enemy for the same reason. In the jungle the key weapons are infantry small  

arms, mortars and artillery. Do not use insect repellant when on ambush,  

because the enemy can smell you before he hits the killing zone. Have each  

soldier make field expedient aiming stakes for the ambush site – this will  

keep distribution of ire even throughout the killing zone. Do not wera  

helmets: they degrade your hearing and reduce your peripheral vision. Take  

listening halts at least 15 minutes every hour. Patrol 500 meters in front of  

the unit. Carry iodine tablets.  

Due to the limited visibility of the jungle, the hasty attack is the most  

likely scenario. React quickly with every weapon that you can bring to bear  

as soon as you contact the enemy. Gain immediate fire superiority and keep  

it. Do not wait for a clear visual target to open fire; fire at smoke, muzzle  

flashes, or by sound, use grenades immediately, otherwise, the enemy will  

gain the superiority.  

Be aware of stay-behind snipers as you approach the objective. Night raids  

are generally not practical.  


Far North  

Be ready for long hours of daylight and dust in summer, long nights and the  

extreme cold in winter, and the mud and morass of the transition periods of  

spring and autumn. The disrupting effects of natural phenomena, the scarcity  

of roads and railroads, the vast distances and isolation, and occasionally  

the lack of current maps combine to affect adversely but not totally restrict  

mobility, fire power, and communications.  

Navigation is tricky in the Arctic. You're near the magnetic pole, so  

compass readings may be erratic:take more than one, and average them out. Use  

the shadow tip method or use the sun and stars to show you in which direction  

north and other points of the compass lie. Nature gives you some clues, too:  

-a solitary evergreen tree will always have more growth on its south side  

– bark on poplar and birch trees will always be lighter in colour on the  

south-facing side  

– trees and bushes will be bent in the direction that the wind normally  

blows, so if you know the direction of the prevailing wind you can work out  

north and south  

– the snow on the south side of the ridges tends to be more granular than on  

the north  

– snowdrills usually are on the downwind side of protruding objects like  

rocks, trees of high banks. By determining the cardinal points of the compass  

and from them the direction of the drifts, the angle at which you cross them  

will serve as a check point in maintaining a course. In the southern  

hemisphere the opposite polarity applies.  

Crossing thin ice: one man at a time; take your hands out of the loops on  

your ski poles; put your equipment over one shoulder only, so you can shrug  

it off; loosen your bindings on your skis or snowshoes; think about  

distributing your weight by lying flat and crawling; bear in mind thicknesses  

of ice snd their corresponding loadbearing capabilities: 2 inches support 1  

man, 4 inches 2 men side by side, 10 inches a half-ton vehicle.  

The most suitable time for ground operations is from midwinter to early  

spring before the breakup of the ice. Early winter, after the formation of  

ice, is also favorable. Tracks in the snow, and fog created by a heat source,  

complicate the camouflage of positions. The blending of terrain features,  

lack of navigational aids, fog and blowing snow all combine to make land  

navigation extremely difficult. And donâ't eat the snow, and don’t put  

weapons on the snow (especially after shooting).  



Mountain campaigns are characterized by a series of separately fought  

battles for the control of dominating ridges and heights that overlook roads,  

trails, and other potential avenues of approach. Operations generally focus  

on smaller-unit tactics of squad, platoon, company, and battalion size.  

Attacks in extremely rugged terrain are often dismounted, with airborne and  

air assaults employed to seize high ground or key terrain and to encircle or  

block the enemy’s retreat. The mountainous terrain usually offers greater  

advantage to the defender and frontal attacks, even when supported by heavy  

direct and indirect fires, have a limited chance of success (the best thing  

is to use the envelopment). Infantry is the basic maneuver force in  

mountains. Mechanized infantry is confined to valleys and foothills, but  

their ability to dismount and move on foot enables them to reach almost  

anywhere in the area. The objective in mountainous areas of operations is  

normally to dominate terrain from which the enemy can be pinned down and  


If you're not a sniper, you have nothing to do there. Use grenades  

carefully (in winter time there’s too much snow around). Keep in mind that  

low atmospheric pressure considerably increases the evaporation of water in  

storage batteries and vehicle cooling systems, and impairs cylinder breathing  

(consequently, vehicles expand more fuel and lubricant, and engine power is  

reduced by four to six percent for every 1, 000-meters (3, 300 ft) increase in  

elevation above sea level. You have to be used to the lack of oxygen. And  

don’t drink or smoke while climbing. Be always ready to shoot. Watch open  

places and roads. Go parallel course when you chase the enemy. Shoot first if  

you see cut trees on your way.  


3. 2 Wounds  


Don’t eat before the assault; if there's food in your system, you'll  

die if wounded in the belly.  


If you or another soldier is wounded, first aid must be given at once and the  

first step is to apply the four life-saving measures:  

1. Clear the airway, check and restore breathing and heartbeat. If he is not  

breathing, place him on his back and kneel beside his head, clear his airway  

and start mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and if necessary start external heart  


2. Stop the bleeding. Look for both entry and exit wounds, as a bullet  

usually makes a smaller wound where it enters than where it exits.  

3. Prevent shock. Warning signs of shock are restlessness, thirst, pale skin  

and rapid heartbeat. Loosen the casualty’s clothing at the neck, waist and  

wherever it restricts circulation. Keep him warm. Reassure him by being calm  

and self-confident. Put him in a comfortable position.  

4. Dress and bandage the wound.  


Attention: majority of the soldiers with serious wounds demonstrate the  

symptoms of posttraumatic stress syndrome, like re-experiencing the combat  

through vivid memories and flashbacks, feeling “emotionally numb”,  

diminished interest in performing military tasks, crying  

uncontrollably, isolating himself from friends, relying increasingly on  

alcohol or drugs to get  

through the day, feeling extremely moody, irritable, angry, suspicious or  

frightened, having  

difficulty falling or staying asleep, sleeping too much and experiencing  

nightmares, feeling  

guilty about surviving the combat while many other soldiers were killed,  

feeling fear and  

sense of doom about the future. To cope with the syndrome the soldier has to  

recognize his  

feelings about the situation and talk to others about his fears, be willing  

to listen to other soldiers, who coped with the syndrome, and to understand  

that these feelings are a normal temporary response to an abnormal situation.  



Chapter 4. Small unit tactics  


4. 1 Four Fs  


Find and locate the enemy  

Fix and pin them down with suppressing fire  

Flank – send soldiers to the enemy's sides ( not the rear, as your troops  

will then fire upon each other).  

Finish eliminate all enemy combatants  


4. 2. Overwatch.  


Overwatch is the state of one small unit or military vehicle supporting  

another unit, while they are executing fire and movement tactics. An  

overwatching or supporting unit has to take a position where it can observe  

the terrain ahead, especially likely enemy positions, and this allows to  

provide effective covering fire for advancing friendly units. An ideal  

overwatch position provides cover for the unit and unobstructed lines of  

fire. It may be on a height of the ground or at the top of a ridge, where a  

vehicle may be able to adopt a hull-down position. If the overwatching unit  

is in a position to fire over advancing friendly units, great care must be  

taken not to let fire fall short. The friendly units should be within tracer  

burnout (the range at which tracer rounds are visible). Overwatch can be  

performed by platoons during company fire and movement, by individual armored  

vehicles (especially, tanks) or infantry sections, in platoon fir and  

movement, or even by fireteams or individual soldiers, in the final stages of  

assault. Overwatch tactics and firing at the short halt were especially  

important in armored warfare before modern tank gun stabilizers were  

developed, since moving tanks were unlikely to hit any target. Even in the  

most modern tanks, however, the crews can locate and hit targets better when  

at halt.  

Bounding overwatch, also known as leapfrogging or simply bounding, is the  

military tactic of alternating movement of coordinated units to allow, if  

necessary, suppressive fire in support of offensive forward movent or  

defensive disengagement. As members of a unit take an overwatch posture,  

other members advance to cover; these two groups continually switch roles as  

they close with the enemy. This process may be done by leapfrogging by  

fireteams, but is usually done within fireteams along a squad/platoon battle  

line to simulate an overwhelming movement towards the enemy and make it more  

difficult for the enemy to distinguish specific targets.  

Example: A squad (2 fireteams) in an urban combat zone must advance to a  

building 100 feet away, crossing an intersection they believe might be in  

enemy rifle sights from elevated buildings. If the team simply made a  

run-for-it, they expose themselves to potential enemy fire without  

protection. So, one fireteam takes an overwatch position while the other  

team bounds ( a bond is a 3-5 second rush) to a new covered position. This  

way there is always an overwatch team that can react instantaneously to enemy  

fire (the bounding team would have to stop, take over, locate the enemy and  

aim before they could return fire). Once the covered position is reached by  

the bounding team, they take up overwatch positions and the other team then  

becomes the bounding team. By using bounding overwatch, this unit is able to  

move effectively through a hostile urban street and intersection, without  

unnecessary exposing themselves to enemy fire. If enemy contact is made, the  

overwatch team opens fire and the unit takes up a process called “fire and  

maneuver” which is very like bounding overwatch in that teams alternate  

firing and maneuvering. During fire and movement maneuver, the commander  

takes more direct control of team movements and positions.  


4. 3 Center peel  


Center peel or “peel” tactic is specifically designed for situations  

where smaller groups of infantry withdraw from engagement of a much larger  

force; it’s a sloped or diagonal retreat from the enemy, a trick designed  

with human psychology in mind. It begins with an infantry unit facing off  

with a large force of enemies. Once the command is called, the soldiers  

implement a battle line formation facing into the enemy's midst. The  

soldiers then begin to use suppressing fire to delay the enemy’s attack and  

advance. Depending on the direction of the retreat, the second to last  

soldier on the farmost end, opposite the retreating direction, calls out,  

“Peel 1”. Now, the infantryman next to him, on the end of the line,  

ceases fire, works his way behind the line towards the other side, takes a  

position one meter diagonally back from the farmost soldier on this side, and  

resumes suppressing fire. Then, the process repeats with the commands being  

simplified to the 1 only there to signify the actual start of  

the tactic, and continues until the party has safely disengaged the target.  

The slanting motion of the tactic gives the impression of increasing numbers  

of infantry joining the battle, a psychological move designed to demoralize  

the opposition. The slanting motion also has the benefit of keeping open  

one’s field of fire. Retreating directly backwards would put the soldier  

too closely behind his own men, severely limiting his field of fire.  


4. 4 Patrolling  


Patrolling is another tactic. Small groups or individual units are deployed  

from a larger formation to achieve a specific objective and then return. The  

tactic of patrolling may be applied to ground troops, armored units and  

combat aircraft. The duration of a patrol will vary from few hours to several  

weeks depending on the nature of the objective and the type of units  

involved. The most common objective is to collect information by carrying out  

a reconnaissance patrol. Such a patrol remains covert and observe an enemy  

without being detected. Other reconnaissance patrols are overt, especially  

those that interact with the civilian population. A fighting patrol is a  

group with sufficient size (platoon or company) and resources to raid or  

ambush a specific enemy. It primarily differs from an attack in that the aim  

is not to hold ground.  

A clearing patrol is a brief patrol around a newly occupied defensive  

position in order to ensure that the immediate area is secure. Clearing  

patrols are often undertaken on the occupation of a location and during stand  

to in the transition from night to day routine and vice versa. A standing  

patrol is a small static patrol intended to provide early warning, security  

or to piquet some geographical feature, such as dead ground. A reconnaissance  

patrol is a small patrol, whose main mission is the gathering of  




Chapter 5. Sniper  


Military snipers are usually deployed in two-men sniper teams consisting of a  

shooter and spotter – they take turns in order to avoid eye fatigue. Sniper  

missions include reconnaissance and surveillance, counter-sniper, killing  

enemy commanders, selecting targets of opportunity and destruction of  

military equipment.  


5. 1 Common mistakes  

The sniper has a tendency to watch the target instead of his aiming point. He  

may jerk or flinch at the moment his weapon fires because he thinks he must  

fire now ( this can be overcome through practice on a live-fire range). He  

may hurry and thus forget to apply wind as needed. Windage must be calculated  

for moving targets just as for stationary targets, and failure to do so when  

squiring a lead will result in a miss. NEVER fire from the edge of a wood  

line, you should fire from a position inside the wood line (in the shade  

of shadows). DO NOT cause overhead movement of trees, bushes or tall grasses  

by rubbing against them; move very slowly. Do not use trails, roads or  

footpaths, avoid built-up and populated areas and areas of heavy enemy  

guerrilla activity.  


5. 2 Position selection  

Your position must match the following requirements: maximum fields of fire  

and observation of the target area, concealment from enemy observation,  

covered routes into and out of the position, located no closer than 300  

meters from the target area, a natural or man-made obstacle between the  

position and the target area. Avoid positions that are on a point or crest of  

prominent terrain features, close to isolated objects, at bends or ends of  

roads, trails or streams, in populated areas, unless it's required. Your  

location must appear to the enemy to be the least likely place you are in (  

under logs in a deadfall area, tunnels bored from one side of a knoll to the  

other, swamps, deep shadows, inside rubble piles.  

Urban terrain is perfect for a sniper, and positions can range from inside  

attics to street-level positions in basements. Shooting through loopholes in  

barricaded windows are preferred. Positions in attics are also effective, and  

you have to remove the shingles and cuts out of loopholes in the roof. DO NOT  

locate positions against contrasting background or in prominent buildings  

that automatically draw attention. Never fire close to a loophole, always  

back away from the hole as far as possible to hide the muzzle flash and to  

scatter the sound of the weapon when it fires. You may stay in a different  

room than the loophole; you can make a hole through a wall to connect the  

rooms and fire from inside one room. Do not fire from one position, and try  

to construct more than one position. Inside the room cover the windows with  

carpets or blankets to avoid silhouetting. Make escape routes through the  

holes knocked into the floor or ceiling; carpet or furniture placed over  

escape holes or replaced ceiling tiles will conceal them until needed. Firing  

from inside the attic around a chimney or other structure helps prevent enemy  

observation and fire.  

The second floor of a building is usually the best location for the  

position, as it presents minimal dead space but provides you more protection  

since passerby can't easily locate it.  


5. 3 Key targets.  

Snipers ( your #1 target), dog tracking teams ( shoot the dog's  

handler first and that confuses the dog a lot), officers, vehicle commanders  

and drivers, communications personnel, weapon crews, optics on vehicles,  

communication and radar equipment, weapon computer-guided systems.  


5. 4 Range estimation.  

An object of regular outline, such as a house, appears closer than one of  

irregular outline, such as a clump of trees. A target that contrasts with its  

background appears to be closer than it actually is. A partly exposed target  

appears more distant that it actually is. Distant targets are usually  

overestimated. Observing over smooth terrain, such as sand, water or snow  

causes the observer to underestimate distant targets. Looking downhill, the  

target appears father away; looking uphill, the target appears closer. The  

more clear a target can be seen, the closer it appears. When the sun is  

behind you, the target appears to be closer. When the sun is behind the  

target, it's more difficult to see it and it appears to be farther away.  


5. 5 Target indicators.  

Sound. Most noticeable at night and caused by movement, equipment rattling, or talking. Small noises may be dismissed as natural, but talking not.  

Movement. Most noticeable at daytime. Quick or jerky movement will be  

detected faster than slow movement. The human eye is attracted to movement.  

Improper camouflage. Shine, outline, contrast with the ground. Disturbance of  



5. 6 "Golden" rules  


1. Train your muscles to snap to the standard position for shooting, to  

squeeze the trigger straight back with the ball of your finger to avoid  

jerking the gun sideways.  

Train yourself to shoot while you stand, sit, lie, walk, run, jump, fall  

down; shoot at voices, shoot in a dark room, different weather and distance,  

day and night; shoot one object and a group; use one gun, two guns, gun and  

submachine gun (some doctrines train a sniper to breathe deeply before  

shooting, then hold their lungs empty while he lines up and takes his shot;  

other go further, teaching a sniper to shoot between heartbeats to minimize  

barrel motion)  

2. Camouflage yourself ten times before you make a single shot. Position  

yourself in a building (no rooftops or churches! ), which offers a long-range  

fields of fire and all-round observation. Don’t stay in places with heavy  

traffic! Use unusual angles of approach and frequent slow movement to prevent  

accurate counter-attacks.  

3. Move slowly to prevent accurate counter-attack, don’t be a mark yourself  

4. Kill officers and military leaders first (Attention, officers: don’t  

walk in front of your soldiers! )  

5. Use suppressive fire to cover a retreat  

6. Use rapid fire when the squad attempts a rescue  

7. Shoot helicopters, turbine disks of parked jet fighters, missile guidance  

packages, tubes or wave guides of radar sets  

8. At distances over 300 m attempt body shots, aiming at the chest; at lesser  

distances attempt head shots (the most effective range is 300 to 600 meters).  

Police snipers who generally engage at much shorter distances may attempt  

head shots to ensure the kill (in instant-death hostage situations they shoot  

for the cerebellum, a part of the brain that controls voluntary movement that  

lies at the base of the skull).  

9. Shoot from flanks and rear  

10. Never approach the body until you shoot it several times  

11. Careful: the object could be wearing a bulletproof vest  

12. It’s important to get to the place, but it's more important to get  

out alive  

13. Remember, in hot weather bullets travel higher, in cold — lower; a  

silencer reduces the maximum effective range of the weapon. Wind poses the  

biggest problem – the stronger the wind, the more difficult it is to hold  

the rifle steady and gauge how it will affect the bullets trajectory. (You  

must be able to classify the wind and the best method is to use the clock  

system. With you at the center of the clock and the target at 12 o’clock,  

the wind is assigned into three values: full, half and no value. Full value  

means that the force of the wind will have a full effect on the flight of the  

bullet, and these winds come from 3 and 9 o’clock. Half value means that a  

wind at the same speed, but from 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 oclock, will  

move the bullet only half as much as a full-value wind. No value means that a  

wind from 6 or 12 oclock will have little or no effect on the flight of  

the bullet). Shooting uphill or downhill can require more adjustment due to  

the effects of gravity. For moving targets, the point of aim is in front of  

the target ( it's called Leading the target, where the amount of lead  

depends on the speed and angle of the target's movement. For this  

technique, holding over is the preferred method. Anticipating the behavior of  

the target is necessary to accurately place the shot).  

14. If you work in terrain without any natural support, use your rucksack,  

sandbag, a forked stick, or you may build a field-expedient bipod or tripod.  

The most accurate position though is prone, with a sandbag supporting the  

stock, and the stock’s cheek-piece against the cheek.  

15. The key to sniping is consistency, which applies to both the weapon and  

the shooter. While consistency does not necessarily ensure accuracy (which  

requires training), sniping cannot be accurately carried out without it. The  

need for consistency is highest when a sniper is firing the first shot  

against an enemy unaware of the sniper’s presence. At this point,  

high-priority targets such as snipers, officers and critical equipment are  

most prominent and can be more accurately targeted. Once the first shot has  

been fired, any surviving enemy will attempt to take cover or locate the  

sniper, and attacking strategic targets becomes more difficult or impossible.  


5. 6 Counter-sniper tactics  


1. Active: direct observation by posts equipped with laser protective glasses  

and night vision devices; patrolling with military working dogs; calculating  

the trajectory; bullet triangulation; using decoys to lure a sniper; using  

another sniper; UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles); directing artillery or  

mortar fire onto suspected sniper positions, the use of smoke-screens;  

emplacing tripwire-operated munitions, mines, or other booby-traps near  

suspected sniper positions( you can improvise booby-traps by connecting  

trip-wires to fragmentation hand grenades, smoke grenades or flares. Even  

though these may not kill the sniper, they will reveal his location. Booby  

–traps devices should be placed close to likely sniper hides or along the  

probable routes used into and out of the sniper’s work area). If the squad  

is pinned down by sniper fire and still taking casualties, the order may be  

given to rush the sniper’s position. If the sniper is too far for a direct  

rush, a “rush to cover” can also be used. The squad may take casualties,  

but with many moving targets and a slow-firing rifle, the losses are usually  

small compared to holding position and being slowly picked off. If the  

sniper’s position is known, but direct retaliation is not possible, a pair  

of squads can move through concealment (cover) and drive the nipper toward  

the group containing the targets. This decreases the chances that the sniper  

will find a stealthy, quick escape route.  


2. Passive: limited exposure of the personnel (use concealed routes, avoid  

plazas and intersections, stay away from doorways and windows, move along the  

side of the street and not down the center, move in the shadows, move  

dispersed, avoid lighted areas at night, move quickly across open areas,  

avoid wearing obvious badges of rank, adapt screens on windows, use armored  

vehicles); use Kevlar helmet and bulletproof vest.  


3. Locating an enemy sniper  


1. Recon by fire. If a few possible sniper positions are visible, the squad  

can offer limited fire into each while the sniper’s spotter watches for  

signs of retaliation. In situations with heavy cover, the friendly sniper can  

fire a tracer round into the location to direct heavier fire from the squad.  

2. Mad minute. If there are too many possible positions for a recon by fire, each likely enemy position is assigned to one or more friendly soldiers,  

and upon receiving the signal, all simultaneously fire a specific number of  


3. Reserve azimuth. If a sniper’s bullet enters a stationary object,  

inserting a straight rod into the hole can reveal both the direction and arc  

of the bullet, and can also be used to estimate range or elevation. This  

technique is risky without cover, as it often involves entering the  

sniper’s current field of fire.  

4. Triangulation. Technique at two or more locations can identify more  

accurately identify the position of a sniper at the time of firing.  

5. Sound delay (“crack-bang”). The enemy’s supersonic bullets produce  

a sonic boom, creating a “crack” sound as they pass by. If the enemy’s  

bullet speed is known, his range can be estimated by measuring the delay  

between the bullet’s passing and the sound of the rifle shot, then  

comparing it to a table of values. This is only effective at distances of up  

to 450 meters; beyond this, the delay continus to increase, but ar a rate  

too small for humans to accurately distinguish.  

6. Decoys. As more shots are fired, the chances of locating or directly  

observing the enemy sniper increase. Decoys help to increase the number of  

shots without taking human losses, and may include attractive targets such as  

valuable (but unusable) equipment. Provocative signage (designed to offend  

/insult the sniper) may even work if an enemy sniper is unwise, aggressive,  

or does not know of the friendly presence in the area. Most trained snipers  

are specifically trained to take as few shots as possible, be patient and  

disciplined to circumvent this.  

7. Detector. The sniper detector system, named Boomerang, can determine the  

bullet type, trajectory and point of fire of unknown shooter location. The  

system uses microphone sensors to detect both the muzzle blast and the sonic  

shock wave that emanate from a high-speed bullet. Sensors detect, classify,  

localize nd display the results on a map immediately after the shot.  



Chapter 6. Military tricks  


1. Use rapid dominance: technology + speed + information domination.  

2. Use artillery preparation. It is the artillery fire delivered before an  

attack to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy’s defense and to  

disrupt communications and disorganize the enemy’s defense.  

3. Use deception especially before the first strike (air strike + artillery).  

Deception plays a key part in offensive operations and has two objectives:  

the first objective is to weaken the local defense by drawing reserves to  

another part of the battlefield. This may be done by making a small force  

seem larger than it is. The second objective is to conceal the avenue of  

approach and timing of the main attack.  

5. Imitate assault to make the enemy expose his positions and fire system.  

6. Mines, mines, mines. There are four types of minefield : the tactical  

large-area minefield, usually laid by engineers, for tactical use on the  

battlefield(i. e. to canalize the enemy into killing areas); the protective  

minefield, the sort that you will plant in front of your position for  

defensive purposes; the nuisance minefield, designed to hamper and disrupt  

enemy movement ; and the dummy minefield – a wired off area suitably marked  

can be as effective as the real thing.  

7. Don’t touch anything in the places the enemy just left — check for  

mines first. A minefield is a mortal surprise and you have to know how to  

breach and cross it: remove your helmet, rucksack, watch, belt, and anything  

else that may hinder movement or fall off, leave your rifle and equipment  

with another soldier in the team, get a wooden stick about 30 cm (12 in) long  

for a probe and sharpen one of the ends (do not use a metal probe), place the  

unsharpened end of the probe in the palm of one hand with your fingers  

extended and your thumb holding the probe, and probe every 5 cm (2 in) across  

a 1-meter area in front of you and push the probe gently into the ground at  

an angle less than 45 degrees, kneel (or lie down) and feel upward and  

forward with your free hand to find tripwires and pressure prongs before  

starting to probe, put enough pressure on the probe to sink it slowly into  

the ground and if the probe does not go into the ground, pick or chip the  

dirt away with the probe and remove it by hand, stop probing when a solid  

object is touched, remove enough dirt from around the object to find out what  

it is. If you found a mine, remove enough dirt around it to see what type of  

mine it is, mark it and report its exact location to your leader. Once a  

footpath has been probed and the mines marked, a security team should cross  

the minefield to secure the far side. After the far side is secure, the rest  

of the unit should cross.  

8. Visual indicators. Pay attention to the following indicators : trip  

wires, signs of road repair (new fill or paving, road patches, ditching),  

dead animals, damaged vehicles, tracks that stop unexplainably, wires leading  

away from the side of the road (they may be firing wires that are partially  

buried), mounds of dirt, change of plants color,, pieces of wood or othr  

debris on a road. Remember, mined areas, like other obstacles are often  

covered by fire. Keep also in mind, that local civilians try to avoid certain  

(mined) areas.  

9. Use phony minefields to simulate live minefields. For example, disturb the  

ground so that it appears that mines have been emplaced and mark boundaries  

with appropriate warnings.  

10. Make a real minefield appear phony, or camouflage it. For example, once a  

real minefield is settled, a wheel or a specially made circular wooden tank  

track marker can be run through the field, leaving track or tire marks to  

lure the enemy onto live mines. Antipersonnel mines should not be sown in  

such a field until the track marks have been laid. Another method is to leave  

gaps in the mechanically laid field, run vehicles through the gaps, and then  

close them with hand-laid mines without disturbing the track marks.  

11. Use feint attack to draw defensive action towards the point under assault  

(it’s usually used as a diversion and to force the enemy to concentrate  

more manpower in a given area so that the opposing force in another area is  


12. Issue false orders over the radio, imitate a tanks’, fighters’ and  

bombers’ assault while preparing to retreat.  

13. Use dummy units and installations, phony radio traffic, movement and  

suppressive fires in other areas timed to coincide with the real attack  

14. Use force multiplication by using decoy vehicles and use small convoys to  

generate dust clouds. Move trucks into and out of the area giving it the  

appearance of being a storage facility or logistic base.  

15. Simulate damage to induce the enemy to leave important targets alone. For  

example, ragged patterns can be painted on the walls and roof of a building  

with tar and coal dust, and covers placed over them.  

16. Stack debris nearby and wire any unused portions for demolition. During  

an attack, covers are removed under cover of smoke generators, debris  

scattered and demolitions blown. Subsequent enemy air photography will  

disclose a building that is too badly damaged to be used.  

17. Change positions at night time only.  

18. Use dispersal to relocate and spread out forces to increase their chances  

of survival.  

19. Imitate fake ballistic missiles divisions and military headquarters to  

entrap enemy’s intelligence and sabotage groups.  

20. Use “sack” strategy (“cutting” enemy’s army into separate  


21. Use strategic bombing (the massive attack on cities, industries, lines of  

communication and supply).  

22. Simulate bombing of minor objects and attack important ones.  

23. Use counter-battery fire (detecting with counter-battery radars the  

source of incoming artillery shells and firing back), using mobile artillery  

pieces or vehicles with mounted rocket launchers to fire and then move before  

any counter-battery fire can land on the original position.  

24. Use airborne operations, when helicopters transport troops into the  

battle and provide fire support at battle sites simultaneously with artillery  

fire, keeping enemy off guard.  

25. Helicopters are extremely important as they can be sent everywhere: to  

kill tanks and other helicopters, for aerial mine laying, for electronic  

warfare, for naval operations (anti-submarine and anti-ship patrols), to  

correct artillery and tactical fighters fire, for reconnaissance, command,  

control and communications, to insert special forces, to evacuate casualties  

(this helps maintain the morale of the troops), to carry supplies (missile  

systems, ammunition, fuel food, to escort convoys, for navigational help, to  

destroy battlefield radars, communications and radio relay systems, to seal  

gaps and protect flanks, for rear-area security, counter — penetration,  

rapid reinforcement of troops under pressure, raids and assaults behind enemy  

lines, air assault in offensive and defensive operations, to strengthen  

anti-tank defenses by inserting infantry anti-tank teams. Helicopters offer a  

strong tactical surprise and take a ground conflict into the third dimension,  

making the enemy’s ground maneuvers impossible.  

26. When fighting an insurgency: once you get intelligence, you have to bomb  

the area to “soften” insurgents and then send helicopters with special  

forces teams right away. Helicopters suppress and cut-off by fire insurgents  

trying to escape and the teams clear-up the remains. Transport helicopters  

must bring in troops rapidly from different bases and build-up numerically  

superior force which insurgents cannot match.  

27. Use joint bombers/fighters flights to bomb transportation, supply,  

bridges, railroads, highways, antiaircraft and radar sites. To gain surprise, attack with the sun behind you. Remember, enemy will try to saturate the  

airspace through which the aircraft will fly with fire.  

28. Watch out for tank ambushes!  


Chapter 7 Storming the City  


7. 1 Procedure  


1. Effective intelligence is 90% of success. Use sources like agents among  

the enemy’s high ranking officers, prisoners of war, captured documents and  

maps, enemy’s activity, local civilians (agents). Use intelligence and  

sabotage groups (through them you can deliver your fake plans and maps). You  

must know how the enemy usually defends a built-up area and the approaches to  

it, critical objectives within the built-up area that provide decisive  

tactical advantages, tactical characteristics of the built-up area and its  

structure. Information about the population will assist in determining where  

to attack, what firepower restrictions may be imposed, and what areas within  

the urban complex must be avoided to minimize destruction of life-support  

facilities and civilian casualties.  

2. Make the enemy attack you if possible, because if you attack first the  

victims calculation is 5:1.  

3. Train your troops to storm this certain city.  

4. Blockade the city completely.  

5. Attack the city from different points ( flanks and rear! ) at the same  

time after intense artillery fire and bombing (that’s a very strong  

psychological blow. Its intensity is determined by the strength of defensive  

forces, the type of building construction, and the density of fires required  

to suppress observation and fires. You must destroy command posts, heavy  

weapons positions, communications, troop emplacements, tall structures that  

permit observation. Then engineers move forward under the cover of smoke and  

high explosives to neutralize barriers and breach minefields on routes into  

the city). Field artillery, attack helicopters and offense air support must  

disrupt the enemy command and control network and destroy his support units (  

field artillery mostly creates breaches in buildings, walls and barricades.  

Mortars cover avenues of enemy troop movements, such as street intersections  

and alleys; mortars firing positions are placed behind walls or inside  

buildings close to their targets). A hasty attack is conducted when the  

enemy has not established strong defensive positions and attacking forces can  

exploit maneuver to overwhelm the defense – locate a weak spot or gap in  

enemy defenses, fix forward enemy elements, rapidly move through or around  

the gap or weak spot to be exploited. A deliberate attack is necessary  

when enemy defenses are extremely prepared, when the urban obstacle is  

extremely large or severely congested., or when the advantage of surprise has  

been lost. It’s divided into three basic phases: isolation from  

reinforcement and resupply by securing dominating terrain and utilizing  

direct and indirect fires; assault to rupture the defenses and secure a  

foothold on the perimeter of the built-up area from which attacks to clear  

the area may be launched (an envelopment, assaulting defensive weaknesses on  

the flanks or rear of the built-up area, is preferred, however, a  

penetration may be required; and clearance, a systematic  

building-by-building, block-by-block advance through the entire area..  

6. Target vital bridges, transportation facilities that are required to  

sustain future combat operations, strategic industrial or vital  

communications facilities. Attacks against built-up areas will be avoided  

when the area is not required to support future operations, bypassing is  

tactically feasible, the built-up area has been declared an “open city”  

to preclude civilian casualties or to preserve cultural or historical  

facilities, sufficient combat forces are not available to seize and clear the  

built-up area.  

7. Don’t use tanks on narrow streets! Tanks can be decisive in city  

fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy  

machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are  

especially vulnerable in urban combat. It’s much easier for enemy infantry  

to sneak behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is vulnerable. In  

addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the soft  

upper turret armor and even basic weapons like Molotov cocktails, if aimed at  

the engine air intakes, can disable a tank.  

8. Use 3 groups at each point.  

1st. A “dead” group plus tanks moves fast to the center, again, after  

intense artillery fire and bombing (otherwise you’ll have heavy  


2nd. The group follows the first one and inside the city goes like a  

“fan” in all directions enveloping the defender’s flanks and rear.  

3rd. The group is on reserve in case the enemy counterattacks.  


The first phase of the attack should be conducted when visibility is poor.  

Troops can exploit poor visibility to cross open areas, gain access to  

rooftops, infiltrate enemy areas and gain a foothold. If the attack must be  

made when visibility is good, units should consider using smoke to conceal  

movement. The formation used in attack depends on the width and depth of the  

zone to be cleared, the character of the area, anticipated enemy resistance,  

and the formation adopted by the next higher command. Lead companies may have  

engineers attached for immediate support. Tasks given to engineers may  

include preparing and using explosives to breach walls and obstacles, finding  

and exploding mines in place or helping remove them, clearing barricades and  

rubble, cratering roads.  

9. Use paratroopers to capture important objects (airport, government  

buildings, military headquarters, port, railway station).  

10. Capture high buildings and place machine gunners and snipers on upper  

floors (buildings provide excellent sniping posts for defenders, too).  

11. Get all important cross-roads to maneuver troops and tanks.  

12. Block highways!  

13. Watch out — there are mines everywhere (alleys and rubble-filled  

streets are ideal for planting booby traps). Be alert for boobytraps in  

doors, windows, halls, stairs, and concealed in furniture.  

14. Watch underground communications — the enemy could stay in subway  

tunnels, sewage system.  

15. Don’t waste time storming the buildings — blow up the walls and move  


16. Soldiers in an urban environment are faced with ground direct fire danger  

in three dimensions — not just all-round fire but also from above  

(multi-story buildings) and from below (sewers and subways) and that’s why,  

here, the most survivable systems, like tanks, are at great risk. Also, there  

are increased casualties because of shattered glass, falling debris, rubble,  

ricochets, urban fires and falls from heights. Difficulty in maintaining  

situational awareness also contributes to this problem because of increased  

risk of fratricide. Stress-related casualties and non-battle injuries  

resulting from illnesses or environmental hazards, such as contaminated  

water, toxic industrial materials also increase the number of casualties.  

17. In the streets use artillery and mortars to “soften” the enemy up  

before assault.  


7. 2 House clearing.  


Don’t spare your grenades (avoid throwing grenades at upper windows or  

upstairs; they may bounce back), move fast from room to room. Machinegunners  

from outside have to help the assault group with intense fire on upper  

floors. The assault group always has to enter from the top floor. Shoot  

ceilings and floors, furniture and other hiding places. Avoid stairways  

whenever possible. Use flame weapons.  


7. 3 Seizure of a bridge.  


1. Clear the near bank. The first step in seizing the bridge is to clear the  

buildings on the clear bank that overwatch the bridge and the terrain on the  

far side. The commander must find out which buildings dominate the  

approaches to the bridge. Buildings that permit him to anti-tank weapons,  

machine guns and riflemen are cleared while supporting fire prevents the  

enemy from reinforcing his troops on the fart bank and keeps enemy demolition  

parties away from the bridge.  

2. Suppress. You have to suppress enemy weapons on the far bank with direct  

and indirect fire (tanks, TOWs and machine guns). In suppressing the  

enemy’s positions on the far bank, priority is given to those positions  

from which the enemy can fire directly down the bridge. Use screening smoke  

to limit enemy observation.  

3. Assault. Seize a bridgehead (buildings that overwatch and dominate the  

bridge) on the far bank by an assault across the bridge. The objectives of  

the assaulting platoons are buildings that dominate the approaches to the  

bridge on the far side. One or two platoons assault across the bridge using  

all available cover while concealed by smoke. In addition to a frontal  

assault across the bridge, other routes should be considered. They are  

supported by the rest of the company and any attached forces. Once on the  

other side, they call for the shifting of supporting fire and start clearing  

buildings. When the first buildings are cleared, supporting fire is lifted  

and/or shifted again and the assault continues until all the buildings in the  

objective area are cleared.  

4. Clear the bridge. Secure a perimeter around the bridge so that the  

engineers can clear any obstacles and remove demolitions from the bridge. The  

company commander may expend his perimeter to prepare for counterattack. Once  

the bridge is cleared, tanks and other support vehicles are brought across to  

the far bank.  


7. 4 Seizure of a traffic circle.  


A company may have to seize a traffic circle either to secure it for friendly  

use or to deny it top the enemy. This operation consists of seizing and  

clearing the buildings that control their traffic circle, and bringing  

direct-fire weapons into position to cover it.  


7. 5 Search.  


You are not done even if the storm was a success, because right away you have  

to search the houses and buildings in the following way: divide the area to  

be searched into zones, and assign a search team to each. A team usually  

consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a security element (to  

encircle the area) and a reserve area (to assist, as required). Then search  

the buildings, underground and underwater areas using mine detectors. And  

it’s necessary to establish checkpoints and roadblocks around the area.  

Building clearing assault team.  

The direction each man moves in should not be preplanned unless the exact  

room layout is known. Each man should go in a direction opposite the man in  

front of him. Every team member must know the sectors and duties of erach  

position. The first man (rifleman) enters the room and eliminates the  

immediate threat. He has the option of going left or right, normally moving  

along the path of least resistance to one of two corners. When using a  

doorway as the point of entry, the path of least resistance is determined  

initially based on the way the door opens; if the door opens inward he plans  

to move away from the hinges. If the door opens outward, he plans to move  

toward the hinged side. Upon entering, the size of the room, enemy situation,  

and furniture or other obstacles that hinder or channel movement become  

factors that influence the number 1 soldier’s direction of movement. As the  

first man goes through the entry point, he can usually see into the far  

corner of the room. He eliminates any immediate threat and continues to move  

along the wall if possible and to the first corner, where he assumes a  

position of domination facing into the room.  

The second man (team leader), entering almost simultaneously with the first,  

moves in the opposite direction, following the wall and staying out of the  

center. The second man must clear the entry point, clear the immediate threat  

area, clear his corner, and move to a dominating position on his side of the  


The third man (grenadier) simply goes opposite of the second man inside the  

room at least one meter from the entry point and moves to a position that  

dominates his sector.  

The fourth man (SAW gunner) moves opposite of the third man and moves to a  

position that dominates his sector.  


Stairwells and staircases are comparable to doorways in that they create a  

fatal funnel; however, the danger is intensified by the three-dimensional  

aspect of additional landings. The ability of the squad or team to conduct  

the movement depends upon which direction they are travelling and the layout  

of the stairs. The clearing technique follows a basic format: the squad  

leader designates an assault element to clear the stairs; the squad or team  

maintains 360-degree, three-dimensional security in the vicinity of the  

stairs; the squad leader then directs the assault team to locate, mark,  

bypass and clear any obstacles or booby traps that may be blocking access to  

the stairs. ; the assault element moves up (or down) the stairways by using  

either the two-, three-, or four-man flow technique, providing overwatch up  

and down the stairs while moving.  


7. 6 How to move and how to fire  


Moving from building to building or between buildings present a problem to  

units conductive offensive operations. Most casualties can be expected during  

movement from building to building and down streets. You must consider which  

buildings must be isolated, suppressed and obscured, as well as using armored  

assets as shields for maneuver elements. In movement down narrow streets, or  

down wider streets with narrow paths through the debris, infantry should move  

ahead of tanks, clearing the buildings on each side. Personnel movement  

across open areas must be planned with specific destination in mind. Street  

intersections should be avoided, since they are normally used as engagement  

areas. Suppression of enemy positions and smoke to cover infantry movement  

should also be included in the fire support plan. When needed, tanks move up  

to places secured by the infantry to hit suitable targets. When an area is  

cleared, the infantry again moves forward to clear the next area. Tanks and  

infantry should use the traveling overwatch movement technique and  

communicate with tank crews by using arm-and-hand signals and radio. For  

movement down wider streets, infantry platoons normally have a section of  

attached tanks with one tank on each side of the street. Single tanks should  

not be employed. Other tanks of the attached tank platoon should move behind  

the infantry and fire at targets in upper stories of the buildings. In wide  

boulevards, you can employ a tank platoon secured by one or more infantry  

platoons. The infantry can secure the forward movement of the lead tanks,  

while the trailing tanks overwatch the movement of the lead units. Tanks may  

drive inside buildings or behind walls for protection from enemy antitank  

missile fire where feasible. Buildings are cleared by the infantry first.  

Ground floors are checked to ensure they support the tank and there is no  

basement into which tank could fall. When moving, all bridges and overpasses  

are checked for mines, booby traps and load capacity.  

When moving from position to position, each soldier must be ready to cover  

the movement of other members of his fire team or squad. He must use his new  

position effectively and fire his weapon from either shoulder depending on  

the position. The most common errors a soldier makes when firing from a  

position are firing over the top of his cover and silhouetting himself  

against the building to his rear. Both provide the enemy an easy target. The  

correct technique for firing from a covered position is to fire around the  

side of the cover, which reduces exposure to the enemy. Another common error  

is for a right-handed shooter to fire from the right shoulder around the left  

corner of a building. Firing left-handed around the left corner of a building  

takes advantage of the corner afforded by the building. Right-handed and  

left-handed soldiers should be trained to adapt cover and concealment to fit  

their manual orientation. A common mistake when firing around corners is a  

firing from the standing position. You expose yourself at the height the  

enemy would expect a target to appear. When firing from behind the walls, you  

must fire around cover and not over it.  

In an urban area, windows provide convenient firing ports. Avoid firing  

from the standing position since it exposes most of the body to return fire  

from the enemy and could silhouette you against a light-colored interior  

beyond the window. This is an obvious sign of the soldier’s position,  

especially at night when the muzzle flash can easily be observed. In using  

the proper method of firing from a window, be well back into the room and  

kneel to limit exposure. When no cover is available, reduce exposure by  

firing from the prone position, from shadows and by presenting no silhouette  

against buildings.  

The area around a corner must be observed before you move. The most common  

mistake is allowing your weapon to extend beyond the corner exposing your  

position (flagging the weapon). A special clearing technique is used when  

speed is required (the pie-ing method) – this procedure is done by aiming  

the weapon beyond the corner into the direction of travel (without flagging)  

and side-stepping around the corner in a circular fashion with the muzzle as  

the pivot point.  

Doorways should not be used as entrances or exits since they are normally  

covered by enemy fire. If you must use a doorway as an exit, you should move  

quickly to your next position, staying as low as possible to avoid  

silhouetting yourself. Pre-selection of positions, speed, a low silhouette  

and the use of covering fires must be emphasized in exiting doorways.  

Use double tap – it is a shooting technique where two shots are fired  

quickly at the same target. In the double tap technique, after the first  

round is fired, the trigger is quickly pulled again while maintaining the  

same point of aim. Ideally, both rounds should strike anywhere within the  

centre of the target, causing two sites of trauma and maximizing shock. The  

technique is meant to both impose restraint and fire control on the users of  

any weapon while maximizing the potential of both hitting and incapacitating  

the target. Extensive tests show that after the third round of sustained  

fire, accuracy drops off sharply, as aim is thrown off by gun recoil. Using  

the double tap technique maintains target accuracy without wasting ammunition  

and decreases the probability of damage to non-targets. Furthermore, since  

single rounds tend to have poor terminal ballistics characteristics, a pair  

of bullets traversing through a target in close track (eg. the double tap)  

increases the probability of incapacitating a target. Also, since the center  

of mass is the most desirable target for a sidearm, firing two rounds helps  

compensate for the possibility that the first round might be deflected by  

heavy bone or miss a vital organ. Against armored targets, the double-tap is  

sometimes the only way to penetrate armored protection. While appropriate  

soft armor can stop almost any pistol-caliber round once, two rounds impcting  

the same spot will almost certainly penetrate the armor. Likewise with hard  

armor, two rounds from a higher-powered weapon stand a much better chance of  

penetrating the armor if the rounds strike closely.  


7. 7 Reasons for not-defending urban areas  


1. The location of the urban area does not support the overall defensive plan.  

If the urban area is too far forward or back in a unit’s defensive sector,  

is isolated, or is not astride an enemy’s expected avenue of approach, the  

commander may choose not to defend it  

2. Nearby terrain allows the enemy to bypass on covered or uncovered routes.  

Some urban areas, mainly smaller ones, are bypassed by main road and highway  


3. Structures within the urban area do not adequately protect the defenders.  

Extensive areas of lightly built or flammable structures offer little  

protection. Urban areas near flammable or hazardous industrial areas, such as  

refineries or chemical plants, should not be defended because of increased  

danger of fire to the defenders.  

4. Dominating terrain is close to the urban area. If the urban area can be  

dominated by an enemy force occupying this terrain, the commander may choose  

to defend from there rather than the urban area. This applies mainly to small  

urban areas such as village.  

5. Better fields of fire exist outside the urban area. The commander may  

choose to base all or part of his defense on long-range fields of fire  

outside an urban area. This applies mainly to armor-heavy forces defending  

sectors with multiple, small urban areas surrounded by open terrain, such as  

agricultural areas with villages.  

6. The urban area has cultural, religious or historical significance. The  

area may have been declared an “open city” in which case by international  

law, it is demilitarized and must be neither defended nor attacked. The  

attacking force must assume civil administrative control and treat the  

civilians as noncombatants in an occupied country. The defender must  

immediately evacuate and cannot arm the civilian population. A city can be  

declared open only before it is attacked. The presence of large numbers of  

noncombatants, hospitals or wounded personnel may also affect the  

commander’s decision not to defend an urban area.  


7. 8 Reasons for defending urban areas  


1. Certain urban areas contain strategic industrial, transportation or  

economic complexes that must be defended. Capital and cultural centers may be  

defended for strictly psychological or national morale purposes even when  

they do not offer a tactical advantage to the defender. Because of the sprawl  

of such areas, significant combat power is required for their defense. The  

decision to defend these complexes is made by political authorities or the  

theatre commander.  

2. The defender’s need to shift and concentrate combat power, and to move  

large amounts of supplies over a wide battle area may require retention of  

vital transportation centers. Since most transportation centers serve large  

areas, the commander must defend the urban area to control such centers.  

3. Most avenues of approach are straddled by small towns every few kilometers  

and must be controlled by defending forces. These areas can be used as battle  

positions or strongpoints. Blocked streets covered by mortar and/or artillery  

fire can canalize attacking armor into mined areas or zones covered by  

anti-armor fire. If an attacker tries to bypass an urban area, he may  

encounter an array of tank-killing weapons. To clear such an area, the  

attacker must sacrifice speed and momentum, and expend many resources. A city  

or town can easily become a major obstacle.  

4. Aerial photography, imagery and sensory devices cannot detect forces  

deployed in cities.  


Chapter 8. Special forces.  


Maximum damage, minimum loss.  


8. 1 Special military operations have special requirements.  


1. Detailed planning and coordination that allow the special unit to discern  

and exploit the enemy’s weakness while avoiding its strength.  

2. Decentralized execution, individual and unit initiative.  

3. Surprise, achieved through the unit’s ability to move by uncommon means,  

along unexpected routes, over rough terrain, during poor weather and reduced  

visibility. Survivability, achieved by rapid mission accomplishment and a  

prompt departure from the objective area.  

4. Mobility, speed, and violence of execution (the speed at which events take  

place confuses and deceives the enemy as to the intent of the unit, and  

forces the enemy to react rather than to take the initiative).  

5. Shock effect, which is a psychological advantage achieved by the combining  

of speed and violence. The special unit strives to apply its full combat  

power at he decisive time and place, and at the point of the greatest enemy  


6. Multiple methods of insertion and attack, trying not to repeat operations  

thus decreasing the chance the enemy will detect a pattern. Deception,  

achieved by feints, false insertions, electronic countermeasures, and dummy  


7. Audacity, achieved by a willingness to accept a risk.  


Any special team member has to have experience in sniping, underwater  

swimming, conducting high-altitude, low-opening parachute operations,  

demolition, using all kinds of weapons, including man-portable air-defense  

system weapons. And there are some limitations, like limited capability  

against armored or motorized units in open terrain and no casualty evacuation  



8. 2 Use special forces for:  


a) establishing a credible American presence in any part of the world  

b) conducting limited combat operations under conditions of chemical, nuclear  

or biological contamination  

c) surveillance and intelligence gathering using recruited agents too (local  

citizens who support your war or just work for money). To get to the area you  

have to use infiltration, the movement into the territory occupied by enemy  

troops, the contact is avoided.  

d) raids on the enemy’s defense system  

Raids are normally conducted in the following phases: the team inserts or  

infiltrates into the objective area; the objective area is sealed off from  

outside support or reinforcement, to include the enemy air threat; any enemy  

force at or near the objective is overcome by surprise and violent attack,  

using all available firepower for shock effect; the mission is accomplished  

quickly before any surviving enemy can recover or be reinforced; the ranger  

force quickly withdraws from the objective area and is extracted. (The team  

can land on or near the objective and seize it before the enemy can react.  

Thus you avoid forced marches over land carrying heavy combat loads. If there  

is no suitable landing area near the objective, or the enemy has a strong  

reaction force nearby, the team has to land unseen far from the objective. It  

then assembles and moves to the objective).  

e) ambush.  

Depending on terrain ambushes are divided into near (less than 50 meters, in  

jungle or heavy woods) and far (beyond 50 meters, in open terrain).  

Raids consist of clandestine insertion, brief violent combat, rapid  

disengagement, swift deceptive withdrawal. The raid is used mostly to destroy  

command posts, communication centers and supply dumps, shipyards, electrical  

generation facilities, water pumping stations, phone lines, oil or natural  

gas pipelines, radio and TV stations, mountain passes or routes in restricted  

terrain, capture supplies and personnel, rescue friendly forces, distract  

attention from other operations, steal plans and code books, rescue prisoners  

of war, create havoc in the enemy’s rear areas, blow railroads and bridges.  

By blowing bridges you block and delay the movement of personnel and supplies  

and by making railroads and certain routes temporary useless you change  

enemy’s movement on to a small number of major roads and railway lines  

where it is more vulnerable to attack by other forces (especially air  



Stages of an ambush:  


1. Planning. You have to identify a suitable killing zone (a place where the  

ambush will be laid). It’s a place where enemy units are expected to pass  

and which gives reasonable cover for the deployment execution and extraction  

phases of the ambush patrol. Ambush includes 3 main elements: surprise,  

coordinated fire of all weapons to isolate the killing zone and to inflict  

maximum damage and control (early warning of target approach, opening fire at  

the proper time, timely and orderly withdrawal). You can also plan a  

mechanical ambush, which consists of the mines set in series. Preparation.  

You have to deploy into the area covertly, preferably at night and establish  

secure and covert positions overlooking the killing zone. Then you send two  

or more cut off groups a short distance from the main ambushing group into  

similarly covert positions — they have to give you early warning of  

approaching enemy by radio and, when the ambush is initiated, to prevent any  

enemy from escaping. Another group will cover the rear of the ambush position  

and thus give all-round defense to the ambush patrol. No smoking! Attention:  

you have to occupy the ambush site as late as possible — this reduces the  

risk of discovery. (While choosing and ambush site pay attention to natural  

cover and concealment for your team, routes of entry and withdrawal, good  

observation and fields of fire, harmless-looking terrain, few enemy escape  

routes, terrain that will canalize enemy into the killing zone, and natural  

obstacles to keep him there).  

2. Execution. You must give a clear instruction for initiating the ambush. It  

should be initiated with a mass casualty producing weapon (mortars and  

machine guns) to produce a maximum shock effect and break the enemy’s  

spirit to fight back (shock effect can cover unexpected defects in ambush,  

like ambushing a much larger force that expected). Then, after the firefight  

has been won, the ambush patrol has to clear the zone by checking bodies for  

intelligence and taking prisoners. After that you have to leave the area as  

soon as possible, by a pre-determined route.  

3. Disruption of the government functions: recruitment of informants; terror  

and murders of political leaders and federal and local government chiefs,  

provoking strikes and mass disobedience; publishing illegal newspapers and  

literature; anti-government propaganda through illegal radio stations;  

involving locals in the guerrilla campaign.  

4. Counter-guerrilla.  


Chapter 9. Guerrilla warfare.  


Guerrilla warfare is the unconventional warfare and combat with which a  

small group use mobile tactics (ambushes, raids, etc) to fight a larger and  

less mobile regular army. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY WRONG – they sabotage the rear! Same mistake Soviet guerrillas did during World War II, though Chechnya is  

an example.  

Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence, ambush, deception, sabotage,  

undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. A  

guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation above what  

the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrillas  

may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even  

combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle.  

These tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale  

of the guerrillas. In many cases, a small force holds off a much larger and  

better equipped army for a long time, as in Russia’s Second Chechen War.  

Guerrilla operations include attacks on transportation routes, individual  

groups of police and military, installations and structures, economic  

enterprises and targeted civilians, politicians included. Attacking in small  

groups, using camouflage and captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla  

force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers,  

while still allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of  

such attacks is not only military but political, aiming to demoralize target  

populations or governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the  

population to take sides for or against the guerrillas. Ambushes on key  

transportation routes are a hallmark of guerrilla operations, causing both  

economic and political disruption.  

Whatever the particular tactics used, the guerrillas primarily fight to  

preserve his forces and political support, not capture or hold specific  

territory as a conventional force would.  

Guerrilla warfare resembles rebellion, yet it is a different concept.  

Guerrilla organization ranges from small, local, rebel groups of a few dozen  

guerrillas, to thousands of fighters, deploying from cells to regiments. In  

most cases, the leaders have clear political aims for the warfare they wage.  

Typically, the organization has political and military wings, to allow the  

political leaders “plausible denial” for military attacks. Guerrillas  

operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to conventional  

formations. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed bases and  

depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and  

destroy. Mobility and speed are the keys and wherever possible, the guerrilla  

must live off the land, or draw support from the civilian population in which  

he is embedded. Financing of operations ranges from direct individual  

contributions (voluntary or not), and actual operation of business  

enterprises by insurgent operatives, to bank robberies, kidnappings and  

complex financial networks based on kin, ethnic and religious affiliation  

(such as used by Jihad organizations). Permanent and semi-permanent bases  

form part of the guerilla logistical structure, usually located in remote  

areas or in cross-border sanctuaries sheltered by friendly regimes.  

Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting (mujahedeen and  

Taliban in Afghanistan, the Contras of Nicaragua). Guerrillas however  

successfully operate in urban settings (as in Jerusalem, Israel or Baghdad,  

Iraq). Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of  

cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas.  

Urban guerrillas blend into the population and are also dependent on a  

support base among the people.  


Intelligence is very important; collaborators and sympathizers will usually  

provide a steady flow of information.  


Public sources of information and Internet serve very well, too.  

Intelligence is concerned also with political factors such as occurrence of  

an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy  


Able to choose the time and place to strike, guerrillas possess the  

tactical initiative. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear  

numerical superiority can be achieved in the target area. Individual suicide  

bomb attacks offer another pattern, involving only one individual bomber and  

his support team. Whatever approach is, guerrillas hold the initiative and  

can prolong their survival through varying the intensity of combat. This  

means that attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to  

years. During interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply, train,  

provide propaganda indoctrination, gather intelligence, infiltrate into army,  

police, political parties and community organizations,  


Relationships with civil population are influenced by whether the  

guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly  

population is of huge importance to guerrillas, providing shelter, supplies,  

financing, intelligence and recruits. Popular mass support in a confined  

local area or country however is not always strictly necessary. Guerrillas  

can still operate using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing  

supplies, weapons, intelligence, local security and diplomatic cover. The  

Al-Qaeda is an example of the latter type, drawing sympathizers and support  

primarily from the wide-ranging Arab world.  

Foreign support (soldiers, weapons, sanctuary or statements of sympathy for  

the guerrillas can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory.  

Foreign diplomatic support may bring the guerrilla cause to international  

attention, putting pressure on local opponents to make concessions, or  

garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries  

can add heavily to guerrilla chances, furnishing weapons, supplies, materials  

and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law,  

particularly if the sponsoring government is successful in concealing its  

support and in claiming “plausible denial” for attacks by operatives  

based on its territory. Al-Qaeda, for example, made effective use of remote  

territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, to plan and  

execute its operations.  

Terror is used by guerrillas to focus international attention on the  

guerrilla cause, kill opposition leaders, extort money from targets,  

intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers  

and potential defectors in line. Such tactics may backfire and cause the  

civil population to withdraw its support, or to back countervailing forces  

against the guerrillas. Such situations occurred in Israel, where suicide  

bombings encouraged most Israeli opinion to take a harsh stand against  

Palestinian attackers, including general approval of “targeted  

killings” to kill enemy cells and leaders. Civilians may be attacked or  

killed for alleged collaboration, or as a policy of intimidation and coercion  

– operations are sanctioned by the guerrilla leaders if they see a  

political benefit. Attacks may be aimed to weaken civilian morale so that  

support for the guerrilla opponents decreases. The use of attacks against  

civilians to create atmosphere of chaos ( and thus political advantage where  

the atmosphere causes foreign occupiers to withdraw or offer concessions), is  

well established in guerrilla and national liberation struggles.  

Examples of successful guerrilla warfare against a native regime include  

the Cuban Revolution, Chinese Civil War, Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua.  

Many coups and rebellions in Africa reflect guerrilla warfare, with various  

groups having clear political objectives and using the above mentioned  

tactics (Uganda, Liberia). In Asia, native or local regimes have been  

overthrown by guerrilla warfare (Vietnam, China, Cambodia). Unsuccessful  

examples include Portuguese Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau),  

Malaysia (then Malaya), Bolivia, Argentina and the Philippines. The  

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, fighting for an independent homeland in the  

north and east of Sri Lanka, achieved significant military successes against  

the Sri Lankan military and the government itself for twenty years. It was  

even able to use these tactics effectively against the peace keeping force  

sent by India.  






1. Leadership  

Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and  

focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision,  

guidance, coordination and organizational coherence. The leaders of the  

insurgency must make their cause known to people. They must gain popular  

support, and their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the  

government and to establish their movement’s credibility. They must replace  

the government’s legitimacy with that of their own. Their education,  

background, family, social connections and experience shape how they think,  

what they want, and how they fulfill their goals. Leadership is both a  

function of organization and of personality. Some organizations de-emphasize  

individual personalities and provide mechanisms for rebundancy and  

replacement in decision making; these mechanisms produce collective power and  

do not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. They are  

easier to penetrate but more resilient to change. Other organizations may  

depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a  

rallying point for the movement. Leadership organized in this way can  

produce decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, nut it is vulnerable to  

disruption if key personalities are removed or co-opted.  


2. Ideology.  

To win, insurgency must have a program that justifies its actions and  

explains what is wrong with society. It must promise great improvement after  

the government is overthrown. Ideology guides the insurgents in offering  

society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for  

ease of focus. The insurgent leader can use ideology to justify the use of  

violence and extralegal action in challenging the current social order, and  

to form a framework of the program for the future. Ideology identifies those  

sectors of society which the insurgency targets. Ideology may suggest  

probable objectives and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgent’s  

perception of his environment. The combination of the insurgent’s ideology  

and his perception of his environment shapes the movement’s organizational  

and operational methods.  


3. Objectives.  

The strategic objective is the insurgent’s desired end state – that is, how the insurgent will use power once he has it.  

Operational objectives are those which the insurgents pursue as part of the  

overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively  

establishing their desired end state. The following are examples of  

operational objectives:  

-isolation of the government from diplomatic and material support, and  

increased international support for the insurgency  

–destruction of the self-confidence of the government’s leaders, cadre and  

armed forces, causing them to abdicate or withdraw  

-establishment of civil cervices and administration ion areas under insurgent  


-capture of the support (or neutrality) of critical segments of the  



Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, for example,  

the dissemination of a psychological operation product or the attack and  

seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives which  

lead to operational goals.  


4. External support.  


There are four types of external support:  

– moral – acknowledgement of the insurgent cause as just and admirable  

– political – active promotion of the insurgents strategic goals in  

international forums  

– resources – money, weapons, food, advisors, training  

– sanctuary – secure training, operational and logistic bases  


5. Organizational and operational patterns.  




Subversive insurgents penetrate the political structure to control it and  

use it for their own purposes. They seek elective and appointed offices. They  

employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, disrupt  

and discredit the government. Violence shows the system is incompetent. It  

may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response which  

further undermines its legitimacy. A subversive insurgency most often appears  

in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal  

and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal  

party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law.  

Subversive insurgencies can quickly shift to the “critical-cell” pattern  

when conditions dictate. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930s is an example of  

this model. Subversive insurgencies primarily present a problem for police  

and counter-intelligence.  




In the critical-cell, the insurgents also infiltrate government  

institutions. Their object is to destroy system from within. The “moles”  

operate both covertly and overtly. Normally, the insurgents do not reveal  

their affiliation or program. They seek to undermine institutional legitimacy  

and convince or coerce others to assist them. Their violence remains covert  

until the institutions are so weakened that the insurgency’s superior  

organization seizes power, supported by armed force. The Russian October,  

1917 revolution followed this pattern.  

There are variations of the critical-cell pattern, too. The first is the  

co-opting of an essentially leaderless, mass popular revolution. The  

Sandinistas’ takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution is a case of point. The  

insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing  

government. The insurgent movement then emerges, activating its cells to  

guide reconstruction under its direction. It provides a disciplined structure  

to control the former bureaucracy. The mass popular revolution then coalesces  

around the structure.  

A second variation of the critical-cell pattern is the foco (or Cuban  

model) insurgency. A foco is a single, armed cell which emerges from hidden  

strong holds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this  

cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents  

erect new institutions and establish control on the basis of that support.  

The foco insurgencies are often made up predominantly of guerrilla fighters  

operating initially from remote enclaves. The Cuban revolution occurred in  

this manner. The Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative  

revolutionary attempts patterned on it, principally in Latin America and  

Africa – they all failed, but that does not discredit foco theory. It does  

emphasize the importance of a particular set of circumstances to this model.  

Legitimacy must be near total collapse, timing is critical. The Nicaraguan  

insurgency for example, combined the foco with a broad-front political  



c)Mass oriented.  


The mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed  

mobilization of a large popular movement. They emphasize creating a political  

and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system  

and then destroy or supplant it. These insurgents patiently build a large  

armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base  

of active and passive political supporters. They plan a protracted campaign  

of increasing violence to destroy the governments and its institutions from  

the outside. They organize in detail. Their political leadership normally is  

distinct from their military leadership. Their movement establishes a rival  

government which openly proclaims its own legitimacy. They have a  

well-developed ideology and decide on their own objectives only after careful  

analysis. Highly organized and using propaganda and guerrilla action, they  

mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the  

government. Once established, mass-oriented insurgencies are extremely  

resilient because of their great depth of organization. Examples of this  

model include the communist revolution in China, the Vietcong insurgency, the  

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru.  




The traditional insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances and  

initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, radical, religious or  

other similarly identifiable groups. These insurgents perceive that the  

government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to  

establish or restore them. The frequently seek withdrawal from government  

control through autonomy or semi-autonomy. They seldom seek specifically to  

overthrow the government or to control the whole society. They generally  

respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from  

strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. These  

insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgents’  

demands. The concessions of insurgents’ demands, however, are usually so  

great that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them. Examples  

of this model include the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Ibo revolt in  

Nigeria (Biafra), the Tami separatists in Sri Lanka.  


No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively.  


Typical missions which guerrillas conduct to accomplish their goals include:  

destroying or damaging vital installations, equipment or supplies; capturing  

supplies, equipment, or key governmental or military personnel; diverting  

government forces from other operations; creating confusion and weakening  

government morale. Remember: guerrilla is a political war, and asymmetric  


Guerrillas are not normally organized or equipped for stand-and-fight type  

defensive operations. They prefer to defend themselves by moving, by  

dispersing into small groups, or by diverting the opponent’s attention  

while they withdraw. Whenever possible, these operations are accomplished by  

offensive operations against the opponent’s flank or rear. One of the most  

important needs of guerrilla forces is support, which can come from different  

sources — food can be stolen or supplied by political sympathizers, weapons  

can be gathered from raids on government installations or provided by a  

foreign power (as well as secret training and indoctrination).  


Guerrillas strength:  


– highly motivated leadership and simple organization. The basic guerrilla  

organization is an independent three- to five-men cell. The cells can be  

brought together for larger operations and dispersed later. Guerrillas are  

organized into cells for two reasons: first, it’s security, second, it’s  

for support (guerrillas must live off the land to a large degree, and small  

cells easier support themselves).  

– strong belief in a political, religious, or social cause (most of them are  


– ability to blend with local population and perfect knowledge of environment  

– strong discipline  

– effective intelligence through penetration into the government agencies  

– limited responsibilities (the guerrillas usually don’t have the  

responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society)  

– the ability to utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage  

through conventional warfare. They don’t hesitate to use bombings,  

kidnappings, murders, torture, blackmail to press local authorities or  

provoke overreaction on the part of the government forces, so that the  

population will be alienated by the government forces actions (it happens  

when they target government leaders). In cities guerrillas can disrupt public  

utilities and services by sabotage and the government may lose control of the  

situation; they can widely use snipers and explosives there. They can  

generate widespread disturbances, attack government offices, create incidents  

or massing crowds in order to lure the government forces into a trap.  

– mobility. Guerrillas usually disperse during their movements and unite near  

the target area. The most common techniques employed by them are the ambush,  

raid and small-scale attacks against security posts, small forces, facilities  

and lines of communication, using mining, booby trapping and sniping. Targets  

are selected by the guerrilla based on an analysis of how much the  

elimination of the target will disrupt the government, what the effect on the  

populace will be, the risk of being killed or captured, and the amount of  

weapons or supplies which can be used (this analysis calls for timely  

intelligence, which is gained by active patrolling).  


Guerrilla Weaknesses:  


– mental and physical stress, caused by long periods of isolation in an  

unstable environment  

– fear of criminal prosecution by the government, or of reprisals against  

friends and family  

– feeling of numerical and technological inferiority of counter-guerrilla  


– limited personnel and resources, and uncertain public base of support  

– security problems about their base camps (they are usually not more than  

one day march from a village or town). If guerrillas receive support from  

external sources, they are faced with a problem of security for supply lines,  

transport means and storage facilities. Besides, you have to know their  

organization and plans, resources (arms, ammunition, food and medicine  

supply), leaders and their personalities, lines of communications, relations  

with civilian population, vulnerabilities. (Again, recruit, recruit and  

recruit! ). You have to evaluate also the effects of terrain (including  

landing and pickup zones) and the weather effect on men, weapons, equipment,  

visibility and mobility.  


Urban guerrilla warfare has its own peculiarities. Cities and towns are  

vulnerable to urban guerrilla because they are the focus of economic and  

political power. In many cases, public utilities can be disrupted and the  

government may appear to have lost control of the situation. The  

concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small area provides  

cover for the guerrilla. However, the insurgent may find support only in a  

certain areas of a town or a city. Anyway, the urban guerrilla lives in a  

community that is friendly to him or is too frightened to withhold its  

support or betray him. In a city the snipers and explosive devices can be  

placed everywhere. The availability of large numbers of people ensures that  

crowds can be assembled and demonstrations manipulated easily. The presence  

of women and children restricts counter-guerrilla force reactions, and  

excessive force may ensure a major incident that provides the guerrilla with  

propaganda. Publicity is easily achieved in an urban area because no major  

incident can be concealed from the local population even if it is not widely  

reported by the news media. Every explosion may be exploited to discredit the  

ability of the government to provide protection and control.  


Urban guerrilla tactics:  

– disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage  

– generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the  

counter-guerrilla force  

– creating incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the counter-guerrilla  

into a trap  

– provoking the counter-guerrilla force in the hope that it may overreact (to  

provide hostile propaganda after that)  

– fomenting interfactional strife  

– sniping at roadblocks, outposts and sentries  

– attacking buildings with rockets and mortars  

– planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or  

indiscriminately, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public  


-ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters  





1. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter,  

financing, you must focus your efforts on providing physical and economic  

security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and  


2. There must be a clear political program that can neutralize the guerrilla  

program – this can range from granting political autonomy to economic  

development measures in the affected region + an aggressive media campaign.  

3. You have to “clean” and re-build all levels of the government  

structure – usually insurgents talk about corrupted politicians a lot and  

that’s why they have support from population.  

4. You don’t have to overreact to guerrilla actions, because this is what  

they are looking for.  

5. Use big military operations only to break up significant guerrilla  

concentrations and split them into small groups.  

6. Keep insurgents on run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids,  

ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches. Intelligence and  

recruitment of informants is the key to success. (KGB in post WWII period  

used bogus guerrilla groups in Western Ukraine that helped reveal real  


7. An “ink spot” clear and hold strategy must be used to divide the  

conflict area into sectors and assign priorities between them. Control must  

expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and  

eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to  

the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions  

elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.  

8. Mass forces, including village self-defense groups and citizen militias  

organized for community defense can be useful in providing civic mobilization  

and local security.  

9. Use special units and “hunter-killer” patrols.  

10. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully  

used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and  

technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops  

can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for  

victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper “taking over” the  

local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the  

guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the stream of dead  

foreigners mounts. Such scenario occurred with United States in Vietnam and  

since 2003 – in Iraq.  

11. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict,  

which wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces.  

Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time, but the  

counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done.  





1. Encirclement, which is designed to cut off all ground routes for escape and  

reinforcement of the encircled force (darkness recommended) combined with  

combined with air assault, artillery and airborne troops. And — it’s good  

to divide the enemy while encircling.  


Encirclement offers the best chance to fix guerrilla forces in position and  

achieve decisive results. The battalion and larger units will usually plan  

and conduct encirclements. The company and smaller units normally do not have  

the manpower and command and control capability to execute encirclements  

except as part of a larger force. Encirclements require accurate intelligence  

on the location of guerrilla elements. Since it requires a major portion of  

the counterguerrilla force to execute this maneuver, it is usually targeted  

against large guerrilla forces or guerrilla base complexes, a series of  

smaller base camps clustered within area. Planning, preparation and execution  

are aimed at encircling the guerrilla force rapidly. Maximum security and  

surprise can be gained by occupying the initial encirlclement positions  

during darkness. In large operations, air assault and airborne troops add  

speed and surprise to the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneously in  

order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not possible, probable  

escape routes are covered first. Initial occupation is the most critical  

period of the operation. When the guerrillas become aware that they are being  

encircled, they will probably probe for gaps or attack weak points and  

attempt to break out.  


Encircling units provide strong combat patrols far to their front to give  

early warning of attempted breakouts. Mobile reserves are positioned to  

counter a breakout and to reinforce difficult areas such as broken terrain or  

areas with caves, tunnels or fortification complexes. Indirect fire support  

can serve to cloak an encirclement by gaining and holding the guerrillas’  

attention. Fires are planned in detail to support the encirclement. Following  

completion of the encirclement, the circle is contracted to capture or  

destroy the guerrilla force. AS the circle is contracted, units may be  

removed from the line and added to the reserve. Against small guerrilla  

forces, the encircled area may be cleared by contraction and a final sweep.  

Against larger guerrilla forces, however, at some point, some action other  

than contraction will be required. One technique consists of driving a wedge  

through the guerrilla force to divide it and then destroying the guerrillas  

in each subarea. Another technique, employed after some degree of  

contraction, is to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the  

perimeter while the remainder of the encircling force drives the guerrillas  

against blocking force. Either element may accomplish the actual destruction.  

The technique is effective when the blocking force can be located on, or  

immediately in the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.  


2. Search (of a village), which might be done in different ways:  

– assemble inhabitants in a central location (if they are hostile) and then  

start the operation  

– restrict inhabitants to their homes or control the heads of households (and  

take other family members to a central location) and then start the convoy  

security operation, which is one of your top priorities.  


Think about ambushes and mines on the route all the time and place a strong  

attack element at the rear of the convoy where it has maximum flexibility in  

moving forward to attack guerrillas attempting to ambush the head or center  

of the convoy. At the first indication of an ambush vehicles have to move out  

of the killing zone (do not drive to roadsides or shoulders, which may be  

mined). A security team immediately returns fire from inside vehicles to  

cover dismounting personnel (if you have to stop) and then dismounts last  

under cover of the fire by those who dismounted first. Upon dismounting,  

personnel caught in a killing zone open fire and immediately assault toward  

the ambush force. Any movements of the troops and supplies are planned and  

conducted as tactical operations with effective front, flank and rear  



Search techniques in built-up areas are required when you search either a  

few isolated huts or buildings, or for searching well-developed urban  

sections. Procedure :  


a)divide the area to be searched into zones, and assign a search party to  

each. A search party consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a  

security element (to encircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to  

secure open areas), and a reserve element (to assist, as required). Then the  

search element conducts the mission assigned for the operation. Normally it  

is organized into special teams. The security element surrounds the area  

while the search element moves in. Members of the security element orient  

primarily upon evaders from the populated area; however, they can cut off any  

insurgents trying to reinforce. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established.  

Subsurface routes of escape, such as subways and sewers, must be considered  

when operating in cities. The reserve element is a mobile force within a  

nearby area. Its specific mission is to assist the other two elements should  

they meet resistance they cannot handler. In addition, it is capable of  

replacing or reinforcing either of the other two elements should the need  


b)consider any enemy material found, including propaganda signs and leaflets,  

to be booby-trapped until inspection proves it is safe.  

c) thoroughly search underground and underwater areas. Any freshly excavated  

ground can be a hiding place. Use mine detectors to locate metal objects  

underground and underwater.  

d) deploy rapidly, especially when a guerrilla force is still in the area to  

be searched. The entire area to be searched is surrounded simultaneously. If  

this is not possible, observed fire must cover that portion not covered by  



3. Ambush.  


An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or  

temporary halted target. Ambushes give the counter-guerrilla force several  



a) an ambush does not require ground to be seized or held  

b) smaller forces with limited weapons and equipment can harass or destroy  

larger, better armed forces  

c) guerrillas can be forced to engage in decisive combat at unfavorable times  

and places  

d) guerrillas can be denied freedom of movement and deprived of weapons and  

equipment that are difficult to replace.  


Well-planned and well-executed ambushes is the most successful operational  

technique employed against guerrillas. It is an effective technique to  

interdict movement guerrilla forces within an area. Selection of the site is  

a key step in developing a well-organized ambush.  

Ambushes are executed to reduce the guerrilla’s overall combat  

effectiveness. Destruction is the primary purpose of an ambush since  

guerrillas killed or captured, and equipment and supplies destroyed or  

captured, critically affect the guerrilla force. Harassment, the secondary  

purpose, diverts guerrillas from other missions. A series of successful  

ambushes causes the guerrilla force to be less aggressive and more defensive,  

to be apprehensive and overly cautious, and to be reluctant to go on patrols  

and move in convoys or in small groups.  

There are two types of ambushes. A point ambush involves patrol elements  

deployed to support the attack of a single killing zone. An area ambush  

involves patrol elements deployed as multiple, related, point ambushes. An  

ambush is categorized as either hasty or deliberate. A hasty ambush is an  

immediate action drill, an action of a combat patrol with little or no  

information. When information does not permit detailed planning required for  

a deliberate ambush, a hasty ambush is planned. In this case, ambush patrol  

plans and prepares to attack the first suitable guerrilla force. A deliberate  

ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target. Detailed  

information of the guerrilla force is required: size, nature, organization,  

armament, equipment, route and direction of movement, and time the force will  

reach or pass certain points on its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned  

when reliable information is received on the intended movement of a specific  

force; patrols, convoys, carrying parties or similar forces establish  

patterns of size, time and movement sufficient to permit detailed planning  

for the ambush.  


Basic elements of an ambush are:  


1. Surprise. It has to be achieved or else the attack is not an ambush.  

Surprise, which distinguishes an ambush from other forms of attack, allows  

the ambush force to seize and retain control of the situation. Surprise is  

achieved by careful planning, preparation and execution. Guerrillas are  

attacked in a manner they least expect.  

2. Coordinated fires. All weapons, including mines and demolitions, are  

positioned, and all direct and indirect fires are coordinated to achieve  

isolation of the kill zone to prevent escape or reinforcement; surprise  

delivery of a large volume of concentrated fires into the kill zone to  

inflict maximum damage so the target can be assaulted and destroyed.  

3. Control. Close control is maintained during movement to, occupation of, and  

withdrawal from the ambush site. The ambush commander’s control of all  

elements is critical at the time of target approach. Control measures provide  

for early warning of target approach, withholding fire until the target moves  

into the kill zone, opening fire a the proper time, initiating appropriate  

actions if the ambush is prematurely detected, lifting or shifting supporting  

fires when the ambush includes assault of the target, timely and orderly  

withdrawal to an easily recognized rallying point.  



Planning provides for simplicity, type of ambush and deployment. The attack  

may be by fire only (harassing ambush) or may include assault of the target  

(destruction ambush). The force is tailored for its mission. Two men may be  

adequate for a harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require the entire  

unit (squad, platoon, company).  

An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as other combat patrols to  

include headquarters, an assault element, a support element and a security  

element. The assault and support are the attack force; the security element  

is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is further  

organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site is to be occupied  

for an extended period, double ambush forces may be organized. One ambush  

force occupies the site while the other rests, eats and tends to personal  

needs at the objective rallying point or other concealed location. They  

alternate after a given time, which is usually 8 hours. If the waiting period  

is over 24 hours, three ambush forces may be organized.  

The selection of equipment and supplies needed is based on the mission,  

size of guerrilla force, means of transportation, distance and terrain,  

weight and bulk of equipment. A primary route is planned which allows the  

unit to enter the ambush site from the rear. The kill zone is not entered if  

entry can be avoided. If the kill zone must be entered to place mines or  

explosives, care is taken to remove any tracks or signs that might alert the  

guerrillas and compromise the ambush. If mines, mantraps or explosives are to  

be placed on the far side, or if the appearance of the site might cause the  

guerrillas to check it, then a wide detour around the killing zone is made.  

Here, too, care is taken to remove any traces which might reveal the ambush.  

Also, an alternate route from the ambush site is planned.  

Maps and aerial photos are used to analyze the terrain. As far as possible,  

so-called “idea” ambush sites are avoided. Alert guerrillas are  

suspicious of these areas, avoid them and increase vigilance and security  

when they must be entered. Considering this, an ambush site must provide  

fields of fire, concealed positions, canalization of the guerrillas into the  

killing zone, covered routes of withdrawal ( to enable the ambush force to  

break contact and avoid pursuit), no-exit route for the guerrilla force.  

Ambush force, as a rule occupies the ambush site at the latest possible time  

permitted by the tactical situation and the amount of site preparation  

required. This not only reduces the risk of discovery but also reduces the  

time that soldiers must remain still and quiet in position.  

The unit moves into the ambush site from the rear. Security elements are  

positioned first to prevent surprise while the ambush is being established.  

Automatic weapons are then positioned so that each can fire along the entire  

killing zone. If this is not possible, they are given overlapping sectors of  

fire so the entire killing zone is covered. The unit leader then selects his  

position, located where he can see when to initiate the ambush. Claymore  

mines, explosives and grenade launchers may be used to cover any dead space  

left by the automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to  

provide mutual support. The unit leader sets a time by which positions are to  

be prepared. The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All men  

work at top speed during the allotted time. Camouflage is very important –  

each soldier must be hidden from the target and each one has to secure his  

equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions are prepared with  

minimal change in the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting  

from preparation of positions is concealed. Movement is kept to a minimum and  

the number of men moving at a time is closely controlled. Light discipline is  

rigidly enforced at night.  


Point ambush  

A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, is  

positioned along the expected route of approach of the guerrilla force.  

Formation is important because, to a great extent, it determines whether a  

point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of highly concentrated fire  

necessary to isolate, trap and destroy the guerrillas. The formation to be  

used is determined by carefully considering possible formations and the  

advantages and disadvantages of each in relation to terrain, conditions of  

visibility, forces, weapons and equipment ease or difficulty of control,  

force to be attacked and overall combat situation.  


1. Line formation.  

The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the guerrilla  

force’s route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions the attack  

element parallel to the long axis of the killing zone and subjects the  

guerrilla force to heavy flanking fire. The size of the force that can be  

trapped in the killing zone is limited by the area which the attack element  

can effectively cover with highly concentrated fire. The force is trapped in  

the killing zone by natural obstacles, mines, demolitions, and direct and  

indirect fires. A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that  

lateral dispersion of the force may be too big for effective coverage. The  

line formation is appropriate in close terrain that restricts guerrilla  

maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is restricted by mines,  

demolitions or mantraps. Similar obstacles can be placed between the attack  

element and the killing zone to provide protection from guerrilla  

counter-ambush measures. When a destruction ambush is deployed in this  

manner, access lanes are left so that the force in the killing zone can be  

assaulted. The line formation can be effectively used by a “rise from the  

ground ambush” in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush. An advantage of  

the line formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of  



2. L-formation.  

The L-formation is a variation of the line formation. The long side of the  

attack element is parallel to the killing zone and delivers flanking fire.  

The short side of the attack element is at the end of, and at right angles  

to, the killing zone and delivers enfilading fire that interlocks with fire  

from the other leg. This formation is flexible. It can be established on a  

straight stretch of a trail or stream or at a sharp bend in a trail or  

stream. When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to parallel  

the long leg if the guerrilla force attempts to assault or escape in the  

opposite direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape in that  

direction or reinforcement from that direction.  


3. Z-formation.  

The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the L-formation. The attack  

force is deployed as in the L-formation but with an additional side so that  

the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side may serve to engage  

a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the guerrillas, restrict a flank,  

prevent envelopment (of the ambush force), seal the end of the killing zone.  


4. T-formation.  

The attack element is deployed across, and at right angles to, the route of  

movement of the hostile force so that the attack element and the target form  

the letter T. This formation can be used day or night to establish a purely  

harassing ambush, and at night to establish an ambush to interdict movement  

through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies). A small unit can use  

the T-formation to harass, slow and disorganize a larger force. When the lead  

guerrilla elements are engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver right  

or left to close with the ambush force. Mines, mantraps and other obstacles  

placed to the flanks of the killing zone slow the guerrilla’s movement and  

permit the unit to deliver heavy fire and then withdraw without becoming  

decisively engaged. The T-formation can be used to interdict small groups  

attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the attack element  

may be deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second member facing in  

the opposite direction. The attack of a force approaching from either  

direction requires only that every second member shift to the opposite side  

of the dike. Each member fires only to his front and only when the target is  

at a close range. Attack is by fire only, and each member keeps the guerrilla  

force under fire as long as it remains to his front. If the force attempts to  

escape in either direction along the dike, each member takes it under fire as  

it comes into his vicinity. The T-formation is effective at halting  

infiltration. It has one chief disadvantage: there is a possibility that  

while spread out the ambush will engage a superior force. Use of this  

formation must, therefore, fit the local enemy situation.  


5. V-formation.  

The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the guerrilla  

route of movement so that it forms a V. Care is taken to ensure that neither  

group (or leg) fires into the other. This formation subjects the guerrilla to  

both enfilading and interlocking fire. The V-formation is suited for fairly  

open terrain but can also be used in the jungle. When established in the  

jungle, the legs of the V close in as the lead elements of the guerrilla  

force approach the apex of the V, elements then open fire from close range.  

Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and fire is carefully  

coordinated and controlled to ensure that the fire of one leg does not  

endanger the other. Wider separation of the elements makes this formation  

difficult to control, and there are fewer sites that favor its use. Its main  

advantage is that it is difficult for the guerrilla to detect the ambush  

until well into the killing zone.  


6. Triangle formation.  

Closed triangle. The attack element is deployed in 3 groups, positioned so  

they form a triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each  

point of the triangle and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to  

interlock with either of the others. Elements are positioned so that their  

fields of fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When  

deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small unit strongpoint  

which is used to interdict night movement through open areas, when guerrilla  

approach is likely to be from any direction. The formation provides all-round  

security, and security elements are deployed only when they can be positioned  

so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will not compromise the  

ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is allowed to approach within  

close range before the ambush force opens fire. Advantages include ease of  

control, all-round security, and guerrillas approaching from any direction  

can be fired on by at least two automatic weapons. Disadvantages include the  

requirement for an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the  

danger of being overturn by a guerrilla force; one or more legs of the  

triangle may come under guerrilla enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion,  

particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla mortar fire.  


Open triangle (harassing ambush). This variation of the triangle ambush is  

designed to enable a small unit to harass, slow, and inflict heavy casualties  

upon a larger force without being decisively engaged. The attack group is  

deployed in 3 elements, positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a  

triangle containing the killing zone. When the guerrillas enter the killing  

zone, the element to the guerrillas’ front opens fire on the lead  

guerrillas. When the guerrillas counterattack, the element withdraws and an  

assault element to the flank opens fire. When this group is attacked, the  

element to the opposite flank opens fire. This process is repeated until the  

guerrillas are pulled apart. Each element reoccupies its position, if  

possible, and continues to inflict maximum damage without becoming decisively  



Open triangle (destruction ambush). The attack group is again deployed in 3  

elements, positioned so that each element is a point of the triangle, 200 to  

300 meters apart. The killing zone is the area within the triangle. The  

guerrillas are allowed to enter the killing zone; the nearest element attacks  

by fire. As the guerrillas attempt to maneuver or withdraw, the other  

elements open fire. One or more assault elements, as directed, assault or  

maneuver to envelop or destroy the guerrillas. As a destruction ambush, this  

formation is suitable for platoon-size or larger units; a unit smaller than a  

platoon would be in danger of being overrun. Also, control in assaulting or  

maneuvering is difficult. Close coordination and control are necessary to  

ensure that assaulting or maneuvering elements are not fired by another  

party; and the ambush site must be a fairly level, open area that provides  

(around its border) concealment for the ambush elements (unless it is a  

“rise” from the ground” ambush).  


7. Box formation.  

This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush. The unit  

is deployed in 4 elements positioned so that each element becomes a corner of  

a square or rectangle containing the killing zone. It can be used as a  

harassing ambush or a destruction ambush in the same manner as the two  

variations of the open triangle ambush.  


Area ambush  


Killing zone. A point ambush is established at a site having several trails  

or other escape routes leading away from it. The site may be a water hole,  

guerrilla campsite, or known rendezvous point, or a frequently traveled  

trail. This site is the central killing zone.  


Area ambush” multiple point.  


Point ambushes are established along the trails or other escape routes  

leading away from the central killing zone. The guerrilla force, whether a  

single group or several parties approaching from different directions, is  

permitted to move to the central killing zone. Outlying ambushes do not  

attack (unless discovered). The ambush is initiated when the guerrillas move  

into the central killing zone. When the guerrillas break contact and attempt  

to disperse, escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying  

ambushes. The multiple point ambush increases casualties and harassment and  

produces confusion.  


This version of the area ambush is best suited in terrain where movement is  

largely restricted to trails. It provides best results when established as a  

deliberate ambush. When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate  

ambush, an area ambush of opportunity (hasty ambush) may be established. The  

outlying ambushes are permitted to attack guerrillas approaching the central  

killing zone, if the guerrilla force is small. If it is too large for the  

particular outlying ambush, the guerrillas are allowed to continue and they  

are attacked in the central killing zone.  


Area ambush: “baited trap”.  


A variation of the area ambush. A central killing zone is established along  

the guerrilla’s route of approach. Point ambushes are established along the  

routes over which units relieving or reinforcing the guerrilla will have to  

approach. The guerrilla force in the central killing zone serves as a  

“bait” to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill  

zones of the outlying ambushes. A friendly force can also be used as the  

“bait”. The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to destroy  

their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes that delay, disorganize  

and cause casualties by successive contacts.  


This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as “bait” to  

lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the killing zone to  

overcome the installation or may use it as a ruse. These variations are best  

suited for situations where routes of approach for relieving or reinforcing  

guerrilla units are limited to those favorable for ambush.  


Unusual ambush techniques  


Spider hole ambush. This point ambush is designed for open areas that lack  

cover and concealment and other features normally desirable in a “good”  

ambush site. The attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to  

the overall situation. The attack element is concealed in the “spider  

hole” type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and positions  

camouflaged. When the ambush is initiated, the attack element members throw  

back the covers and rise from the ground to attack. This ambush takes  

advantage of the tendency of patrols and other units, to relax in areas that  

do not appear to favor ambush. The chief advantage is that the ambush element  

is vulnerable if detected prematurely.  


Demolition ambush. Dual primed, electrically detonated mines or demolition  

charges are planted in the area over which a guerrilla force is expected to  

pass. This may be a portion of as road or trail, an open field, or any area  

that can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are run to a  

concealed observation point sufficiently distant to ensure safety of the  

ambush element. As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine  

the area. The ambush element remains to fire the charges, other personnel  

return to the unit. When a guerrilla force enters the mined area (killing  

zone), the element on site detonates the explosives and withdraws immediately  

to avoid detection and pursuit.  


Special ambush situation. Attacks against columns protected by armored  

vehicles depend on the type and location of armored vehicles in a column, and  

the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed  

or disabled by fire or antitank weapons, landmines and Molotov cocktails, or  

by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize  

armored vehicles at a point where they are unable to give protection to the  

rest of the convoy and where they will block the route of other supporting  

vehicles. In alternate bounds, all except the first two vehicles keep their  

relative places in the column. The first two vehicles alternate as lead  

vehicles on each bound. Each covers the bound of the other. This method  

provides more rapid advance than movement by successive bounds but is less  

secure’ it doers not allow soldiers in the second vehicle enough time to  

thoroughly observe the terrain to the front before passing the first vehicle.  

Security is obtained by the vehicle commander who assigns each soldier a  

direction of observation: to the front, flank(s) or rear. This provides each  

vehicle with some security against surprise fire from every direction and  

provides visual contact with vehicles to the front and rear. For maximum  

observation, all canvas is removed from the vehicles.  


Action at danger areas. The commander of the leading vehicle immediately  

notifies the unit leader when he encounters an obstacle or other danger area.  

Designated soldiers reconnoiter these places under cover of the weapons in  

the vehicle. Obstacles are bypassed, if possible. When they cannot be  

bypassed, they are cautiously removed. Side roads intersecting the route of  

advance are investigated. Soldiers from one vehicle secure the road junction;  

one or two vehicles investigate the side road. The amount of reconnaissance  

of side roads is determined by the patrol leader’s knowledge of the  

situation. Men investigating side roads do not, however, move past supporting  

distance of the main body of the patrol. Bridges, road junctions, defiles and  

curves (that deny observation beyond the turn) are danger areas. Soldiers  

dismount and take advantage of available cover and concealment to investigate  

these areas. The vehicle is moved off the road into a covered or concealed  

position; weapons from the vehicle cover the advance of the investigating  





Ambush during darkness is difficult to control, bur darkness increases the  

security of the ambush party and the confusion of those being ambushed.  


4. Roadblocks and checkpoints. Element of the checkpoint force has to be  

positioned and concealed at appropriate distance from the checkpoint to  

prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back.  


It’s necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to  

apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggling of controlled items. Since  

checkpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it’s important  

that the civil population understands that checkpoints are a preventive and  

not a punitive measure. Checkpoints may be deliberate or hasty. The  

deliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the open country, often  

on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. The hasty  

checkpoint is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the  

open country. The actual location of the hasty checkpoint is designed to  

achieve quick success.  


Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible. The  

location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a  

vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges or deep cuts may be  

suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that  

drivers do not see the checkpoint in sufficient time to avoid inspection.  

Safety disadvantages may outweight the advantages of such positions. A  

scarcity of good roads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint. A  

checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise by a  

guerrilla force.  


5. Patrols. Used to saturate areas of suspected guerrilla activity, control  

critical roads, maintain contact between villages and units, interdict  

guerrilla routes of supply and communication, provide internal security in  

rural and urban areas, locate guerrilla units and base camps. A patrol is a  

detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance  

operation. Patrolling is used when limited (or no) intelligence on guerrilla  

activity is available. Routes are planned carefully and coordinated with  

higher, lower and adjacent units, to include air and ground fire support  

elements and reserve forces. There are three key principles to successful  

patrolling: detailed planning, thorough reconnaissance, all-round security..  

It often happens that the patrol has to break the contact with a larger enemy  

(to break contact use the clock system. the direction the patrol moves is  

always 12 o’clock. When contact is made, the leader shouts a direction and  

distance to move (such as “7 o’clock, 400 meters”. The leader can also  

use the system to shift or direct fire at a certain location).  


Saturation patrolling is extremely effective – patrols are conducted by  

many lightly armed, small, fast-moving units and provide thorough area  

coverage. Patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which are engaged  

frequently to avoid establishing patterns. Use of saturation patrolling  

results in the sustained denial of an area to guerrilla forces as they seek  

to avoid contact with the counter-guerrilla units. In addition to harassment  

and discovery of guerrilla tactical forces, this technique provides an  

opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of operations; a form  

of reassurance to the local population that the government is concerned about  

their protection and security; a means by which information about the  

guerrilla can be obtained.  


Watch out: guerillas usually try to cut the lines of communications by mining  

roads, waterways and railways, or by ambushes located adjacent to them, blow  

up bridges and tunnels.  




Footprints. You can “read” the following by footprints:  

– the direction and rate of movement of a party  

– the number of persons in a party  

– whether or not heavy loads are carried  

– the sex of the members of the party  

– whether the members of a party know they are being followed  


If the footprints are deep and the pace is long, the party is moving  

rapidly. Very long strides and deep prints, with toe prints deeper than heel  

prints, indicate the party is running. If the prints are deep, short and  

widely spaced, with signs of scuffing or shuffling, a heavy load is probably  

being carried by the parson who left the prints. You can also determine a  

person’s sex by studying the size and position of the footprints. Women  

generally tend to be pigeon-toed, while men usually walk with their feet  

pointed straight ahead or slightly to the outside. Women’s prints are  

usually smaller than men’s, and their strides usually shorter. If a party  

knows it is being followed, it may attempt to hide its tracks. Persons  

walking backward have a short, irregular stride. The prints have and  

unusually deep toe. The soil will be kicked in the direction of movement. The  

last person in a group usually leaves the clearest footprints. Therefore, use  

his prints as the key set.  

Use the box method to count the number of persons in the group. Up to 18  

persons can be counted. Use it when the key prints can be determined. To use  

this method, identify a key print on a trail and draw line from its heel  

across the trail. Then move forward to the key print of the opposite foot and  

draw a line through its instep. This should form a box with the edges of the  

trail forming two sides, and the drawn lines forming the other two sides.  

Next, count every print of partial print inside the box to determine the  

number of persons. Any person walking normally would have stepped in the box  

at least one time. Count the key prints as one.  

Also, you can track paying attention to such things as foliage, moss,  

vines, sticks or rocks moved from their original places; stones and sticks  

that are turned over; grass that is bent or broken in the direction of  


Staining. A good example of staining is the mark left by blood from a  

bleeding wound. You can determine the location of a wound on a man being  

followed by studying the bloodstains. If the blood seems to be dripping  

steadily, it probably came from a wound on his trunk. A wound in the lungs  

will deposit bloodstains that are pink, bubbly, frothy. A bloodstain  

deposited from a head wound will appear heavy, wet and slimy, like gelatin.  

Abdominal wounds often mix blood with digestive juices so that the deposit  

will have an odor, and the stains will be light in color.  

Water in footprints in swampy ground may be muddy if the tracks are  

recent. In time, however, the mud will settle and the water is clear. The  

clarity of the water can be used to estimate the age of the prints. Normally,  

the mud will clear in 1 hour, but that will vary with terrain.  

If a party knows that you are tracking it, it will probably use camouflage  

to conceal its movements and to slow and confuse you. Remember: a  

well-defined approach that leads to the enemy will probably be mined,  

ambushed or covered by snipers.  


6. Aerial search. This technique has little value in areas of dense  

vegetation. Use of search units mounted in armed helicopters should be  

limited to those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to  

justify their use and then normally in conjunction with ground operations. In  

ground search operations, helicopters drop off troops in an area suspected of  

containing guerrillas. With the helicopters overmatching from the air, troops  

search the area. Troops are then picked up and the process is repeated in  

other areas.  


7. Raid. It is an operation involving a swift penetration of hostile territory  

to secure information, harass the guerrilla or destroy the guerrilla force  

and its installation. Raids are usually targeted against single, isolated  

guerrilla base camps. To assist in attaining surprise, the raiding force uses  

inclement weather, limited visibility, or terrain normally considered  

impassable. If night airborne or air assault raids are conducted, the force  

must be accurately inserted and oriented on the ground. Air assault forces  

supported by armed helicopters offer infinite possibilities for conducting  

raids. This type of force can move in, strike the objective and withdraw  

without extensive preparation or support from other sources.  


8. Crowd dispersal.  


9. Assassination of the guerrilla leader.  


10. Taking hostages to press guerrillas.  


11. Organization of false guerrilla units.  




Meanwhile the enemy will attempt to engage you in locations where your fire  

would endanger civilians or damage their property. You have to match the size  

of the guerrilla unit. Employing a large force to counter a smaller one is  

inefficient because it compromises the chance of achieving surprise.  


Psychological Operations  


Psychological operations (PSYOP) in foreign internal defense include  

propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes,  

and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups to support the  

achievement of national objectives. There are 5 major target groups for  


1. Insurgents. The major PSYOP objective here is to discredit the insurgents  

and isolate them from he population. The most important direction of attack  

is against their morale. Themes should publicize and exploit differences  

between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other themes  

might stress lack of support, isolation, homesickness, and hardship. Amnesty  

programs are often useful in neutralizing insurgents, and they are most  

effective when they are well publicized, directed against lower ranking  

members of the insurgency, and offer sufficient reason and benefits for  

quitting the unit. These programs do, however, have several disadvantages:  

they recognize the insurgents as a legitimate political force, they forgo  

punishment of anyone accepting amnesty, and they increase the image of the  

insurgents’ threat.  

2. The population supporting the insurgents. You have to achieve withdrawal  

of support for the insurgents and a total defection. Propaganda should  

highlight the insurgents shortcomings, ultimate government victory,  

government successes, and the practical advantages of surrendering or of  

accepting amnesty. Sometimes, displays of military might are used; invading  

forces may assemble and parade through the streets of conquered towns,  

attempting to demonstrate the futility of any further fighting. These  

displays may also include public executions of enemy soldiers, resistance  

fighters, and other conspirators. Particularly in antiquity, the death or  

imprisonment of a popular leader was sometimes enough to bring about a quick  

surrender. However, this has often had the unintended effect of creating  

martyrs around which popular resistance can rally.  

3. The uncommitted population. The major mission here is to build national  

morale, unity, and confidence in the government. There should also be a major  

effort to win popular acceptance of the government force, and convince the  

people that government programs serve their interests, the government forces  

can protect them, ultimate government victory is assured. This may be  

accomplished through re-education, allowing conquered citizens to  

participate in their government, or, especially in impoverished or besieged  

areas, simply by providing food, water and shelter.  

4. Government personnel. When targeting government personnel, seek to  

maintain loyalties and develop policies and attitudes which will result in  

group members who will realize the importance of popular support, promote  

public welfare and justice, take action to eliminate the basic causes of the  

subversive insurgency, and protect the population. You have to indoctrinate  

the host country security and military forces regarding the importance of the  

civilian population support. When government personnel interact with neutral  

and non-hostile elements of the population, the emphasis should be positive  

and constructive.  

5. Foreign audiences. There are two major groups to be addressed: neutral  

nations and hostile nations. For neutral nations, the purpose of  

psychological operations is to achieve friendly neutrality or active support  

for your side. For hostile powers, the major objective of these operations is  

to influence public opinion against involvement in supporting the insurgency.  

Besides, you have to use psychological operations to establish and maintain a  

favorable image of our country. The themes most useful in establishing that  

image are that the US presence is requested by the host country government,  

it is legal and necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory. Intelligence  

operations are facilitated by employing psychological operation media to  

inform the people that they should report to the proper authority information  

pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, and guerrilla activities.  

Posters and leaflets provide definite instruction as to persons and places  

that are available to receive the information (indicate what rewards are  






The Viet Cong used “hit and run” attacks involving a small group,  

usually hiding in ambush and attacking a larger force, only to retreat  

seconds later. This reduced the advantages of the conventional force’s  

advanced weapon systems. It gave an ambushed squad no time to call in  

artillery or air strike. Booby traps ( like simple spikes, incorporated into  

various types of traps, for example, in camouflaged pit into which a man  

might fall) were another common tactic among guerrillas. Grenade traps  

(poised with the pin removed) were also used. Moving them would take the  

pressure off the lever, causing the grenades to explode. Camouflage was very  

important, and fighters travelled in small groups, often wearing civilian  

clothes to make it difficult for American soldiers to know who they were.  

Often, they would in tunnels underground. Tunnels and “spider holes” were  

often used to spring ambushes on American troops. The Vietcong would wait for  

part of American formation to pass before coming out of the ground and  

opening fire. Before the Americans had a chance to realize where the fire  

came from, the Vietcong would duck back into the trenches. This often caused  

fratricide (friendly fire incident) because soldiers who were ambushed would  

fire back behind them, hitting other American patrols. American troops,  

usually assigned to Vietnam for a one-year tour of duty, found themselves  

ill-trained to wage a war against a mostly invisible enemy.  




When the Stinger missile was introduced to Mujahideen, they began to ambush  

Soviet helicopters and fixed wing aircraft at airfields. The Stinger was  

effective only up to 15, 000 feet (4, 600 m), so Mujahideen would attack  

aircraft as they were landing or taking off. Soviets modified their tactics:  

helicopters stayed over friendly forces, fixed wing aircraft began flying  

higher, and armor and electronic defense systems were added to aircraft to  

help protect them from Stinger. Also, Spetsnaz ( Special Forces) were used  

extensively. They would be flown into areas where Mujahideen often passed,  

had been seen or were ambushing someone. Tanks and aircraft were of  

comparatively little use. The only technology with a significant impact on  

Mujahideen were land mines and helicopters. As the Soviets got stalled, they  

began punishing the local population for supporting Mujahideen. It was not  

uncommon for Soviet helicopters to raze an Afghan village in retaliation for  

an attack against Soviet soldiers. They also dropped mines from aircraft in  

fields and pastures and shot livestock with machineguns. Another common  

tactic was to cordon off and search villages for Mujahideen.  


Chechnya (Russia)  


The conflict between Russia and Chechen terrorists has been mostly a  

guerilla war. Most fighting was done with the support of armored vehicles,  

artillery and aircraft, rather than infantry. Russian soldiers were not  

prepared for urban warfare in Grozny (the capital of Chechnya). Terrorists  

would hide on the top floors and basements of buildings armed with small arms  

and anti-tank weapons. The Russians came in with convoys of armored vehicles  

which were unprepared for the tactics the terrorists would use. Chechen  

ambush tactics were planned, and involved destroying the first and the last  

vehicle (armored personnel carrier or a tank) in the column. This was done by  

either rocket propelled grenade(RPG) or improvised explosive device. If the  

initial attack was successful, the rest of the convoy would be trapped in  

between. Later Russians used artillery and airstrikes more extensively.  

Terrorists changed their urban combat tactics and used fire-teams of three  

fighters : a machine gunner, a sniper and a fighter armed with rocket  

propelled grenade. As a result, a very small and mobile fire-team could meet  

any potential sizable threat with great effectiveness. Chechen snipers used  

to wound Russian soldiers and pick off their rescuers. They also shot off  

antennas from the moving armored personnel carriers – since this was often  

the only means of communication with the command center, the troops inside  

would end up isolated and attacked with RPG or by the sniper as they tried to  

repair the antenna. As Russia controlled more area, ambushes gave place to  

roadside bombings, and these usually involved modified mines and improvised  

explosive devices.  


U. S. – Iraq war (2003-present)  


Suicide bombers attack American soldiers at checkpoints, on patrols, on  

their bases and in convoys. Iraqis used the same tactics Chechen terrorists  

used against convoys.  





Abwehr, a German intelligence organization from 1921 to 1944).  


One of the known Abwehr’s successful actions was “Operation Nordpol”,  

which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the  

time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). In  

March 1941, Abwehr forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages  

to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator  

gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did  

not notice that. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch  

operation and for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending  

false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.  

But in general Abwehr was not an effective organization, because much of its  

intelligence deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Then,  

Wilhelm Canaris, the Abwehr Chief, was anti-Nazi – he personally gave false  

information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland and persuaded  

Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade  

Gibraltar; he was involved in July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler.  


The incident which eventually resulted in the dissolution of the Abwehr is  

known as the “Frau Solf Tea Party”, which took place on September  

10, 1943. Frau Johanna Solf, the widow of Dr. Wilhelm Solf, a former Colonial  

Minister and ex-Ambassador to Japan, had been involved in the anti-Nazi  

intellectual movement in Berlin. At a tea party hosted by her, a new member  

was included ith circle, an attractive young Swiss doctor named Reckse (the  

Gestapo agent), who reported to Gestapo on the tea party and turned over  

several incriminating documents. The Solf circle was tipped off and had to  

flee fo their lives, but they were all rounded up on January 12, 1944 and  

executed, except Frau Solf and her daughter, the Countess Lagi Graffin von  

Ballestrem. One of those executed was Otto Kiep, an official in the Foreign  

Office, who had friends in the Abwehr, among whom were Erich Vermehren and  

his wife, the former Countess Elizabeth von Pettenberg, who were stationed as  

agents in Istanbul. Both were summoned to Berlin by the Gestapo in connection  

with the Kiep case. Fearing for their lives, they contacted British and  

defected. It was mistakenly believed in Berlin that the Vermehrens absconded  

with Abwehr’s secret codes and turned them over to the British. Despite the  

efforts of the Abwehr to shift the blame to the RSHA or even to the Foreign  

Ministry, Hitler had had enough of Canaris and he told so Himmler twice. He  

summoned Canaris for a final interview and accused him of allowing the Abwehr  

to “fall into bits” – Canaris agreed that it was “not surprising”  

as Germany was already losing the war. On February 18, 1944 Hitler signed a  

decree that abolished the Abwehr – it’s functions were taken over by the  

RSHA. This action deprived the army of an intelligence service of its own  

and strengthened Himmler’s control over the generals.  


GRU ( Russian Army General Staff MAIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY), Russia  


The undercover residency is one of the basic forms of intelligence set-up  

for the GRU abroad. The minimum number of staff for residency is two – the  

resident and a radio/cipher officer. The resident is the senior  

representative of the GRU in any given place and answerable to the head of  

GRU only. He has the right to send any officer, including his own deputies,  

out of the country immediately. He must have a minimum of three to five years  

of successful work as an operational officer and three to five years as the  

deputy resident before his appointment. A resident in a large residency will  

hold the military rank of major-general, in small residences that of colonel.  

In some very large residencies, and also where there is big activity on the  

part of GRU illegals, there is a position called deputy resident for illegals  

(the undercover residency and the illegal residency are completely separate,  

but often the undercover residency is used to rescue illegals.  

An illegal residency is an intelligence organization comprising a minimum of  

two illegals, usually the resident and a wireless operator, and a small  

number of agents (at least one) working for them. Gradually, as a result of  

recruiting new agents, the residency may increase in size. More illegals may  

be sent out to the resident, one of whom may become his assistant. The GRU  

does not have large residences. Five illegals and eight to ten agents are  

considered the maximum, but usually the residencies are much smaller than  

this. In cases where the recruitment of new agents has gone well the GRU  

divides the residency in two parts. Thereafter any contact between the two  

new residencies is forbidden, so that if one residency is discovered the  

other does not suffer.  


Defense Intelligense Agency (DIA), USA  


DIA is a major producer and manager of military intelligence for the  

Pentagon, with about 8000 people working worldwide. DIA has major operational  

activities at the Pentagon, the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling  

Air Force Base in Washington, D. C., the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence  

Center in Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the Missile and Space Intelligence  

Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The DIA’s mission is to provide timely and  

objective military intelligence to warfighters, policymakers, and force  

planners. To help weapon systems planners and the Defense community, DIA  

plays a major role in providing intelligence on foreign weapon systems.  




Directorate for Human Intelligence  

Defense Attache System  

Strategic Support Branch (linguists, field analysts, case officers,  

interrogation experts, technical specialists, special forces). Defense  

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld created it to bypass the limitations of the CIA  

after 9/11  

Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection  

Collects measurements and signature intelligence which is any intelligence  

that does not fit within the definitions of Signals Intelligence, Imagery  

Intelligence, and Human Intelligence. This includes radar intelligence,  

acoustic intelligence, nuclear intelligence, and chemical and biological  


Directorate for Analysis.  

Analyzes and disseminates finalized intelligence products for the DIA from  

all sources as well as from partner Intelligence Community agencies. Analysts  

focus on the military issues that may arise from political or economic events  

in foreign countries and also analyze foreign military capabilities,  

transportation systems, weapons of mass destruction, and missile systems, and  

contribute to National Intelligence Estimates and to the President’s daily  

briefing. Analysts serve DIA in all of the agency’s facilities as well as  

in the field.  

Directorate for Intelligence Joint Staff.  

Advises and supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military  

intelligence for defense policy and war planning.  

| 216 | 5 / 5 (голосов: 1) | 00:05 22.11.2018


Книги автора

Автор: Kryzhanovsky
Статья / Политика
Аннотация отсутствует
21:30 21.11.2018 | 5 / 5 (голосов: 1)

Автор: Kryzhanovsky
Стихотворение / Политика
Аннотация отсутствует
03:15 13.11.2018 | 5 / 5 (голосов: 1)

Операция "Барак Обама" . Михаил Крыжановский
Автор: Kryzhanovsky
Монография / Политика
Аннотация отсутствует
19:39 10.10.2018 | оценок нет

Автор: Kryzhanovsky
Сценарий / Политика
Аннотация отсутствует
18:01 10.10.2018 | оценок нет

Автор: Kryzhanovsky
Статья / Политика
Аннотация отсутствует
19:39 09.10.2018 | оценок нет

Авторские права на произведения принадлежат авторам и охраняются законом. Перепечатка произведений возможна только с согласия его автора, к которому вы можете обратиться на его авторской странице. 2019