By Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, a former KGB and CIA, the author of the White House Special Handbook, Espionage and Counterespionage Handbook.
The law of the strongest is the only international law.
Chapter 1. Commmander-in “Chief.
The president loves war, not peace, because:
a) Successful military engagement enhances presidential popularity. All five
Presidents who have run for re-election during a war have won.
b) A quick war improves the electoral fortunes of the presidents political
c) War is good business, at least if you win, and at least if it does not
drag on too long. It stimulates demand for a variety of manufactured goods
and services (even if they are all destined to go down the drain) and is a
powerful stimulus to all fields of scientific endeavor.
d) War provides opportunities to direct lucrative contracts to companies and
individuals who helped get the President elected, or who can help in the
future; and to the constituents of select Senators and Congressmen for the
e) War usually pleases the Joint Chiefs (and their full support is important
f) War keeps down the unemployment figures.
g) War is just one detail in a vast ongoing game of international strategy
for domination; it is as much a financial operation as anything else.
h) War unifies the country, and keeps the publicâ€™s attention away from
issues that might be controversial.
i) War provides a rationale for the implementation of tighter legislation and
the removal of certain freedoms that would never be tolerated in peacetime
At the same time, war is limited by political decisions and by public
opinion. Initially the use of US forces spurs a â€œrally around the flagâ€
effect that lifts the Presidentâ€™s popularity and builds up support for the
troops. But the American people are casualty averse and the positive effect
lasts only until the number of casualties and the length of the engagement
begin to wear on the public. Continued military action will then have a
deleterious effect on presidential approval ratings as the war becomes
In the long run, the destruction of such vast quantities of resources, and
the diversion of so much of the nationâ€™s productive capacity away from
actual goods and services for the real economy, are obviously immensely
deleterious. Eventually, these downside effects will begin to dawn on even
the best-manipulated electorate.
Duties of the Commander-in-Chief
1. As President you are Commander-in-Chief, but your job is political
decision making, not war management. You:
– lead all federal and state armed forces
– lead the US defense policy
– suggest a budget for the armed forces
– choose the leaders of the armed forces
– decide where the armed forces will be in the world
– abide by all laws about armed forces
– direct all war efforts
– protect the lives of Americans living in other countries
During wartime you have special powers and Congress must agree to any
actions president takes, including:
– placing limits on prices
– limiting the sale of food, clothes and other items
– having a control on war-related businesses
– limiting freedoms for the period of war
SIOP or Presidential nuclear command
The most classified business you will be briefed on about after youâ€™re
elected is the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which contains the
possible US nuclear responses to a variety of attacks. Hereâ€™s the procedure
of Presidential nuclear command:
If the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) detects evidence of a
possible nuclear attack against the United States, NORAD, the Strategic Air
Command (SAC), the Pentagonâ€™s National Military Command Center and the
Alternative National Military Command Center begin procedural steps to verify
the authenticity of the attack. If NORAD and other units determine that the
attack is real, you are informed of the attack and its characteristics. Then
you have to consult with the Defense Secretary and Joint Chiefs of Staff and
consider SIOP options. If a nuclear attack option is chosen, you have to
transmit the launch codes that unlock the nuclear weapons and assure the
officers in charge of the weapons that the launch order is authentic. You may
also give authority to launch nuclear weapons to the Secretary of Defense.
Chapter 2. Strategy and Tactics.
2. 1 Strategy
Strategy is the planning of campaigns, selecting the aims and solving the
logistics problems connected with moving men and resources to their battle
positions. Actually, strategy is how you use battles to win a war, while a
tactic is how you use troops to win a battle. There's only one grand
strategy to win the war; and the President is very important here as a
politician â€” he gives the orders to freeze the enemys' assets in American
(and allies) banks and he builds up the international coalition. American
military strategy in the 21st century has to be a global strategy, which
means coalition building. We will not discuss nuclear strategy and tactics in
depth, because we all hope that for the next 25 years at least the practical
use of nuclear weapons will remain a matter of science fiction, something to
hint at and suggest as a threat, but not to actually try. Please do not prove
2. 2 Tactics
Military tactics rest on fourteen elements:
1. Identification or selection and maintenance of aim (ability to define and
locate the opponent). Tactics should be directed to achieve a particular
outcome such as the capture of a bridge or a hill. Once an aim is
identified, time, resources and effort are expended to achieve it; therefore,
these are wasted if the aim is frequently changed.
2. Administration (planning and analysis). Ask what (type of operation), when
(time), where (the assigned area), how (the use of assigned assets), why
(the purpose). Mission analysis includes : mission, enemy(intelligence),
terrain (and weather), troops, time available between receiving the mission
and the deadline for having completed it (time is the most critical resource,
especially during daylight hours), deception, civilian considerations.
3. Concentration of efforts (against the enemy, where he is known to be
weakest). Remember, he who defends everything defends nothing, he who attacks
everywhere will capture nothing.
4. Security (intelligence and counter-intelligence)
5. Economy of force (to make the best use of all resources and in order to
create and maintain a reserve).
6. Force protection (dispersing, camouflage, deception, electronic counter
measures, use of fortifications entrenchments, over head protection,
foxholes, revetting, vanguard). Dispersal of force is a very necessary
practice in modern warfare where firepower is precise and overwhelming.
Camouflage is not just special uniform; outlines have to be broken up,
textures disguised and reflective surfaces dulled. Camouflage techniques
also extend beyond the visible spectra that the human eye normally uses, as
the same principles now need to work in infrared light, against starlight
scopes and radar frequencies. Also you have to use terrain, natural (river)
and man made obstacles and barriers, like wire anti-vehicle ditches and
berms (knife edges).
7. Isolation (when the opponent is denied the ability to gain outside
resources and assistance).
8. Suppression (the process of denying the opponent the freedom of movement
and ultimately maneuver)
9. Maneuver (combination of movement and firepower to achieve a position of
advantage which means the placing of strength against an opponentâ€™s
10. Flexibility (a capability to react to changing circumstances, especially
by mobility, the rapid switching of fire-power and arrangement of sufficient
resources). Donâ€™t forget to keep about a quarter of the forces back in
reserve to exploit new opportunities, or react quickly to reverses and
unexpected developments â€“ a battalion might keep a company back, the
brigade might keep a battalion back. Here I would also talk about exploiting
prevailing weather (bad weather cut down on the chance of detection) and
exploiting night using night vision equipment.
11. Cooperation (with allies through secure links)
12. Offensive action (to win the initiative and throw an enemy off balance)
13. Destruction (physical destruction of resources or destruction of the
14. Troops motivation.
2. 3 The U. S. principles of military art:
1. Objective (direct every military operation towards a clearly defined,
decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is
the destruction of the enmyâ€™s ability and will to fight).
2. Offensive (seize, retain and exploit initiative. Offensive action is the
most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective.
Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds
the initiative while mainaining freedom of action and achieving decisive
results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war).
3. Mass (concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive
effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to chieve mass. Massing
effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior
forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire).
4. Economy of force ( employ all combat power available in the most effective
way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No
part of the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of
available combat power to such tasks as limited ttacks, defense, delays,
eception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to ahieve mass
elsewhere at the decisive pont and time of battlefield).
5. Maneuver (place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the
flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in
relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps
the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit
successes, to preserve freedom of action, an to reduce vulnerability. It
continually poses new problems for the enemy y rendering his actions
ineffective, eventually leading to defeat).
6. Unity of command (for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one
responsible commander. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in
a maner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of
command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are
under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the
requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose).
7. Security (never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a
commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy
strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning
of adequate security measures).
8. Surprise (strike the enemy at a time, at a place or in a manner for which
he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power.
By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the
effort expended. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or
location of main effort and timing. Deception can aid the probability of
9. Simplicity (prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders
to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but
simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not
difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and
clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors
bing equal, parsimony is to be prefered).
2. 4 The Russian principles of military art:
1. Combat readiness.
3. Aggressivnes and decisiveness.
4. Persistence and nitiative.
5. Combined arms oordination and joint operations.
6. Decisive concentration of forces.
7. Deep battle or dep operations.
8. Informatin warfare.
9. Exploitation of moral-political factors.
10. Firm and continuous command and control.
11. Comprehensive comat support.
12. Timely restoration of reserves and combat potential.
2. 5 Chinese principles of military art.
Because the military doctrines of the Poples Liberation Army are in a
state of flux, it is difficult to give a capsule summary of a single doctrine
which is expounded with the PLA. Rather the PLA is currently influenced by
three doctrinal schools which both conflict and complement each other. These
three schools are:
1. People's war ( derived from the Maoist notion of warfare as a war in
which the entire society is mobilized.
2. Regional war (envisions future wars to be limited in scope and confined to
the Chinese border).
3. Revolution in military affairs ( a school of thought which believes that
technology is transforming the basis of warfare and that these technological
changes present both extreme dangers and possibilities for the Chinese
In recent years, local war under high-tech conditionsâ€ has been
Chapter 3. Staying Alive
There is no and there will be no such creature as the â€œsoldier of
tomorrowâ€ loaded with computers who doesnâ€™t have to be skillful on his
own; this is a fantasy of smart idiots wasting federal money, who never have
been under fire amidst the hell of actual combat. Of course, technology has
changed the character of modern war, but as the insurgents in Iraq have
taught us, the rest of the world doesn't have to reach our level in
military technology to fight â€” they can conduct urban guerilla warfare with
whatever is at hand.
For a hundred years to come the best way to survive will still be to dig up
a big, deep trench. The best computer is a loaded submachine gun, and the
best techniques are:
– Firepower + Speed = Low Casualties
– the minor tactic of infantry: fire and movement firing and
moving, often in pairs, when one soldier fires to suppress or neutralize the
enemy whilst the other moves either toward the enemy or to a more favorable
– basic drill (if you are under â€œeffective fireâ€): run five-six steps,
drop to the ground or into cover, crawl a few yards (or move under cover),
observe, shoot identified targets within effective range, move, observe and
shoot until you get another order;
– â€œoverwatchâ€: one small unit supports another while they execute fire
and movement patrolling: reconnaissance patrol (used to collect information
by observing the enemy and working with informants, fighting patrol (to raid
or ambush a specific enemy not holding the ground; you need a platoon for a
fighting patrol), clearing patrol (to ensure that newly occupied defensive
position is secure), standing patrol (to provide early warning, security or
to piquet some geographical feature such as dead ground).
3. 1 How to fight in :
Successful desert operations require adaptation to heat and lack of water as
temperatures may vary 136 degrees Fahrenheit in the deserts of Mexico and
Libya to the bitter cold of winter in the Gobi (East Asia). Terrain varies
from mountain and rocky plateau to sandy or dune terrain. The key to success
in desert operations is mobility, though movement can easily be detected
because of sand and dust signatures left due to the loose surface material
(in an actual engagement, this may not be all that bad because a unit is
obscured from direct fire while advancing, but the element of surprise may be
lost). Moving at night is the best choice.
Attack helicopters are extremely useful there due to their ability to
maneuver and apply firepower over a large battlefield in a short time.
Suppression of enemy air defense has a high priority during offensive
operations. The destruction of enemy antitank capabilities must also have a
high priority due to the shock potential of armor in the desert.
No panic, no smoking, no alcohol (it dehydrates the body). Donâ€™t drink much
liquid. Keep the gun clean from sand. Kill anybody for water and watch for
water signs, like animal tracks and the birds flight patterns.
In the jungle you'll fight, most probably, guerrilla, not conventional
forces. In general, jungle enemies can be expected to follow these tactical
principles: maintain the offensive, stay close to the enemy to reduce the
effects of his firepower, infiltrate at every opportunity, operate during
periods of limited visibility, use surprise tactics (see Special Forces).
Remember that trees and foliage reduce the effective range of your weapons.
In Latin America the most likely threat for the US are insurgent leftist
movements. In Africa many of the conflicted factions struggle among
themselves, due to political or ancient tribal differences, differences that
may be stirred up by rival leaders in the modern political state, who
in turn may be working (knowingly or not) in the interests of other, more
developed, powers who benefit from the chaos. (These factions consist
primarily of heavily armed with mortars and artillery guerrilla groups. There
are active guerrilla movements in Southeast Asia, too).
The worst things (often exaggerated) in jungle combat are fear,
malaria-carrying mosquitoes and snakes; also heat, thick vegetation and
rugged terrain, especially for those who carry heavy weapons. If bitten by a
snake, follow these steps: remain calm but act swiftly, and chances of
survival are good; immobilize the affected part in a position below the level
of the heart; place a lightly constricted band 5 to 10 cm (2 to 4 inches)
closer to the heart than the site of the bite (reapply the constricting band
ahead of the swelling if it moves up the arm or leg). The constricting band
should be placed tightly enough to halt the flow of blood in surface vessels,
but not so tight as to stop the pulse; do not attempt to cut open the bite or
suck out venom; seek medical help (if possible, the snakeâ€™s head with 5 to
10 cm of its body should be taken to the medics for identification and a
proper choice of anti venom).
The thick foliage and few rods make ambush a constant danger, and thatâ€™s
why point, flank and rear security teams have to keep a force from being
ambushed. These teams must be far enough away from the main body that if they
make contact the whole force will not be engaged (use dogs, too). Successful
jungle attacks usually combine dispersion and concentration. For example, a
rifle company may move out in a dispersed formation so that it can find the
enemy. Once contact is made, its platoons close on the enemy from all
directions. Remember, jungle areas are ideal for infiltration because dense
vegetation and rugged terrain limit the enemy's ability to detect movement.
On the other side, itâ€™s difficult to detect the approach of an attacking
enemy for the same reason. In the jungle the key weapons are infantry small
arms, mortars and artillery. Do not use insect repellant when on ambush,
because the enemy can smell you before he hits the killing zone. Have each
soldier make field expedient aiming stakes for the ambush site â€“ this will
keep distribution of ire even throughout the killing zone. Do not wera
helmets: they degrade your hearing and reduce your peripheral vision. Take
listening halts at least 15 minutes every hour. Patrol 500 meters in front of
the unit. Carry iodine tablets.
Due to the limited visibility of the jungle, the hasty attack is the most
likely scenario. React quickly with every weapon that you can bring to bear
as soon as you contact the enemy. Gain immediate fire superiority and keep
it. Do not wait for a clear visual target to open fire; fire at smoke, muzzle
flashes, or by sound, use grenades immediately, otherwise, the enemy will
gain the superiority.
Be aware of stay-behind snipers as you approach the objective. Night raids
are generally not practical.
Be ready for long hours of daylight and dust in summer, long nights and the
extreme cold in winter, and the mud and morass of the transition periods of
spring and autumn. The disrupting effects of natural phenomena, the scarcity
of roads and railroads, the vast distances and isolation, and occasionally
the lack of current maps combine to affect adversely but not totally restrict
mobility, fire power, and communications.
Navigation is tricky in the Arctic. You're near the magnetic pole, so
compass readings may be erratic:take more than one, and average them out. Use
the shadow tip method or use the sun and stars to show you in which direction
north and other points of the compass lie. Nature gives you some clues, too:
-a solitary evergreen tree will always have more growth on its south side
– bark on poplar and birch trees will always be lighter in colour on the
– trees and bushes will be bent in the direction that the wind normally
blows, so if you know the direction of the prevailing wind you can work out
north and south
– the snow on the south side of the ridges tends to be more granular than on
– snowdrills usually are on the downwind side of protruding objects like
rocks, trees of high banks. By determining the cardinal points of the compass
and from them the direction of the drifts, the angle at which you cross them
will serve as a check point in maintaining a course. In the southern
hemisphere the opposite polarity applies.
Crossing thin ice: one man at a time; take your hands out of the loops on
your ski poles; put your equipment over one shoulder only, so you can shrug
it off; loosen your bindings on your skis or snowshoes; think about
distributing your weight by lying flat and crawling; bear in mind thicknesses
of ice snd their corresponding loadbearing capabilities: 2 inches support 1
man, 4 inches 2 men side by side, 10 inches a half-ton vehicle.
The most suitable time for ground operations is from midwinter to early
spring before the breakup of the ice. Early winter, after the formation of
ice, is also favorable. Tracks in the snow, and fog created by a heat source,
complicate the camouflage of positions. The blending of terrain features,
lack of navigational aids, fog and blowing snow all combine to make land
navigation extremely difficult. And donâ't eat the snow, and donâ€™t put
weapons on the snow (especially after shooting).
Mountain campaigns are characterized by a series of separately fought
battles for the control of dominating ridges and heights that overlook roads,
trails, and other potential avenues of approach. Operations generally focus
on smaller-unit tactics of squad, platoon, company, and battalion size.
Attacks in extremely rugged terrain are often dismounted, with airborne and
air assaults employed to seize high ground or key terrain and to encircle or
block the enemyâ€™s retreat. The mountainous terrain usually offers greater
advantage to the defender and frontal attacks, even when supported by heavy
direct and indirect fires, have a limited chance of success (the best thing
is to use the envelopment). Infantry is the basic maneuver force in
mountains. Mechanized infantry is confined to valleys and foothills, but
their ability to dismount and move on foot enables them to reach almost
anywhere in the area. The objective in mountainous areas of operations is
normally to dominate terrain from which the enemy can be pinned down and
If you're not a sniper, you have nothing to do there. Use grenades
carefully (in winter time thereâ€™s too much snow around). Keep in mind that
low atmospheric pressure considerably increases the evaporation of water in
storage batteries and vehicle cooling systems, and impairs cylinder breathing
(consequently, vehicles expand more fuel and lubricant, and engine power is
reduced by four to six percent for every 1, 000-meters (3, 300 ft) increase in
elevation above sea level. You have to be used to the lack of oxygen. And
donâ€™t drink or smoke while climbing. Be always ready to shoot. Watch open
places and roads. Go parallel course when you chase the enemy. Shoot first if
you see cut trees on your way.
3. 2 Wounds
Donâ€™t eat before the assault; if there's food in your system, you'll
die if wounded in the belly.
If you or another soldier is wounded, first aid must be given at once and the
first step is to apply the four life-saving measures:
1. Clear the airway, check and restore breathing and heartbeat. If he is not
breathing, place him on his back and kneel beside his head, clear his airway
and start mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and if necessary start external heart
2. Stop the bleeding. Look for both entry and exit wounds, as a bullet
usually makes a smaller wound where it enters than where it exits.
3. Prevent shock. Warning signs of shock are restlessness, thirst, pale skin
and rapid heartbeat. Loosen the casualtyâ€™s clothing at the neck, waist and
wherever it restricts circulation. Keep him warm. Reassure him by being calm
and self-confident. Put him in a comfortable position.
4. Dress and bandage the wound.
Attention: majority of the soldiers with serious wounds demonstrate the
symptoms of posttraumatic stress syndrome, like re-experiencing the combat
through vivid memories and flashbacks, feeling â€œemotionally numbâ€,
diminished interest in performing military tasks, crying
uncontrollably, isolating himself from friends, relying increasingly on
alcohol or drugs to get
through the day, feeling extremely moody, irritable, angry, suspicious or
difficulty falling or staying asleep, sleeping too much and experiencing
guilty about surviving the combat while many other soldiers were killed,
feeling fear and
sense of doom about the future. To cope with the syndrome the soldier has to
feelings about the situation and talk to others about his fears, be willing
to listen to other soldiers, who coped with the syndrome, and to understand
that these feelings are a normal temporary response to an abnormal situation.
Chapter 4. Small unit tactics
4. 1 Four Fs
Find and locate the enemy
Fix and pin them down with suppressing fire
Flank – send soldiers to the enemy's sides ( not the rear, as your troops
will then fire upon each other).
Finish eliminate all enemy combatants
4. 2. Overwatch.
Overwatch is the state of one small unit or military vehicle supporting
another unit, while they are executing fire and movement tactics. An
overwatching or supporting unit has to take a position where it can observe
the terrain ahead, especially likely enemy positions, and this allows to
provide effective covering fire for advancing friendly units. An ideal
overwatch position provides cover for the unit and unobstructed lines of
fire. It may be on a height of the ground or at the top of a ridge, where a
vehicle may be able to adopt a hull-down position. If the overwatching unit
is in a position to fire over advancing friendly units, great care must be
taken not to let fire fall short. The friendly units should be within tracer
burnout (the range at which tracer rounds are visible). Overwatch can be
performed by platoons during company fire and movement, by individual armored
vehicles (especially, tanks) or infantry sections, in platoon fir and
movement, or even by fireteams or individual soldiers, in the final stages of
assault. Overwatch tactics and firing at the short halt were especially
important in armored warfare before modern tank gun stabilizers were
developed, since moving tanks were unlikely to hit any target. Even in the
most modern tanks, however, the crews can locate and hit targets better when
Bounding overwatch, also known as leapfrogging or simply bounding, is the
military tactic of alternating movement of coordinated units to allow, if
necessary, suppressive fire in support of offensive forward movent or
defensive disengagement. As members of a unit take an overwatch posture,
other members advance to cover; these two groups continually switch roles as
they close with the enemy. This process may be done by leapfrogging by
fireteams, but is usually done within fireteams along a squad/platoon battle
line to simulate an overwhelming movement towards the enemy and make it more
difficult for the enemy to distinguish specific targets.
Example: A squad (2 fireteams) in an urban combat zone must advance to a
building 100 feet away, crossing an intersection they believe might be in
enemy rifle sights from elevated buildings. If the team simply made a
run-for-it, they expose themselves to potential enemy fire without
protection. So, one fireteam takes an overwatch position while the other
team bounds ( a bond is a 3-5 second rush) to a new covered position. This
way there is always an overwatch team that can react instantaneously to enemy
fire (the bounding team would have to stop, take over, locate the enemy and
aim before they could return fire). Once the covered position is reached by
the bounding team, they take up overwatch positions and the other team then
becomes the bounding team. By using bounding overwatch, this unit is able to
move effectively through a hostile urban street and intersection, without
unnecessary exposing themselves to enemy fire. If enemy contact is made, the
overwatch team opens fire and the unit takes up a process called â€œfire and
maneuverâ€ which is very like bounding overwatch in that teams alternate
firing and maneuvering. During fire and movement maneuver, the commander
takes more direct control of team movements and positions.
4. 3 Center peel
Center peel or â€œpeelâ€ tactic is specifically designed for situations
where smaller groups of infantry withdraw from engagement of a much larger
force; itâ€™s a sloped or diagonal retreat from the enemy, a trick designed
with human psychology in mind. It begins with an infantry unit facing off
with a large force of enemies. Once the command is called, the soldiers
implement a battle line formation facing into the enemy's midst. The
soldiers then begin to use suppressing fire to delay the enemyâ€™s attack and
advance. Depending on the direction of the retreat, the second to last
soldier on the farmost end, opposite the retreating direction, calls out,
â€œPeel 1â€. Now, the infantryman next to him, on the end of the line,
ceases fire, works his way behind the line towards the other side, takes a
position one meter diagonally back from the farmost soldier on this side, and
resumes suppressing fire. Then, the process repeats with the commands being
simplified to the 1 only there to signify the actual start of
the tactic, and continues until the party has safely disengaged the target.
The slanting motion of the tactic gives the impression of increasing numbers
of infantry joining the battle, a psychological move designed to demoralize
the opposition. The slanting motion also has the benefit of keeping open
oneâ€™s field of fire. Retreating directly backwards would put the soldier
too closely behind his own men, severely limiting his field of fire.
4. 4 Patrolling
Patrolling is another tactic. Small groups or individual units are deployed
from a larger formation to achieve a specific objective and then return. The
tactic of patrolling may be applied to ground troops, armored units and
combat aircraft. The duration of a patrol will vary from few hours to several
weeks depending on the nature of the objective and the type of units
involved. The most common objective is to collect information by carrying out
a reconnaissance patrol. Such a patrol remains covert and observe an enemy
without being detected. Other reconnaissance patrols are overt, especially
those that interact with the civilian population. A fighting patrol is a
group with sufficient size (platoon or company) and resources to raid or
ambush a specific enemy. It primarily differs from an attack in that the aim
is not to hold ground.
A clearing patrol is a brief patrol around a newly occupied defensive
position in order to ensure that the immediate area is secure. Clearing
patrols are often undertaken on the occupation of a location and during stand
to in the transition from night to day routine and vice versa. A standing
patrol is a small static patrol intended to provide early warning, security
or to piquet some geographical feature, such as dead ground. A reconnaissance
patrol is a small patrol, whose main mission is the gathering of
Chapter 5. Sniper
Military snipers are usually deployed in two-men sniper teams consisting of a
shooter and spotter – they take turns in order to avoid eye fatigue. Sniper
missions include reconnaissance and surveillance, counter-sniper, killing
enemy commanders, selecting targets of opportunity and destruction of
5. 1 Common mistakes
The sniper has a tendency to watch the target instead of his aiming point. He
may jerk or flinch at the moment his weapon fires because he thinks he must
fire now ( this can be overcome through practice on a live-fire range). He
may hurry and thus forget to apply wind as needed. Windage must be calculated
for moving targets just as for stationary targets, and failure to do so when
squiring a lead will result in a miss. NEVER fire from the edge of a wood
line, you should fire from a position inside the wood line (in the shade
of shadows). DO NOT cause overhead movement of trees, bushes or tall grasses
by rubbing against them; move very slowly. Do not use trails, roads or
footpaths, avoid built-up and populated areas and areas of heavy enemy
5. 2 Position selection
Your position must match the following requirements: maximum fields of fire
and observation of the target area, concealment from enemy observation,
covered routes into and out of the position, located no closer than 300
meters from the target area, a natural or man-made obstacle between the
position and the target area. Avoid positions that are on a point or crest of
prominent terrain features, close to isolated objects, at bends or ends of
roads, trails or streams, in populated areas, unless it's required. Your
location must appear to the enemy to be the least likely place you are in (
under logs in a deadfall area, tunnels bored from one side of a knoll to the
other, swamps, deep shadows, inside rubble piles.
Urban terrain is perfect for a sniper, and positions can range from inside
attics to street-level positions in basements. Shooting through loopholes in
barricaded windows are preferred. Positions in attics are also effective, and
you have to remove the shingles and cuts out of loopholes in the roof. DO NOT
locate positions against contrasting background or in prominent buildings
that automatically draw attention. Never fire close to a loophole, always
back away from the hole as far as possible to hide the muzzle flash and to
scatter the sound of the weapon when it fires. You may stay in a different
room than the loophole; you can make a hole through a wall to connect the
rooms and fire from inside one room. Do not fire from one position, and try
to construct more than one position. Inside the room cover the windows with
carpets or blankets to avoid silhouetting. Make escape routes through the
holes knocked into the floor or ceiling; carpet or furniture placed over
escape holes or replaced ceiling tiles will conceal them until needed. Firing
from inside the attic around a chimney or other structure helps prevent enemy
observation and fire.
The second floor of a building is usually the best location for the
position, as it presents minimal dead space but provides you more protection
since passerby can't easily locate it.
5. 3 Key targets.
Snipers ( your #1 target), dog tracking teams ( shoot the dog's
handler first and that confuses the dog a lot), officers, vehicle commanders
and drivers, communications personnel, weapon crews, optics on vehicles,
communication and radar equipment, weapon computer-guided systems.
5. 4 Range estimation.
An object of regular outline, such as a house, appears closer than one of
irregular outline, such as a clump of trees. A target that contrasts with its
background appears to be closer than it actually is. A partly exposed target
appears more distant that it actually is. Distant targets are usually
overestimated. Observing over smooth terrain, such as sand, water or snow
causes the observer to underestimate distant targets. Looking downhill, the
target appears father away; looking uphill, the target appears closer. The
more clear a target can be seen, the closer it appears. When the sun is
behind you, the target appears to be closer. When the sun is behind the
target, it's more difficult to see it and it appears to be farther away.
5. 5 Target indicators.
Sound. Most noticeable at night and caused by movement, equipment rattling, or talking. Small noises may be dismissed as natural, but talking not.
Movement. Most noticeable at daytime. Quick or jerky movement will be
detected faster than slow movement. The human eye is attracted to movement.
Improper camouflage. Shine, outline, contrast with the ground. Disturbance of
5. 6 "Golden" rules
1. Train your muscles to snap to the standard position for shooting, to
squeeze the trigger straight back with the ball of your finger to avoid
jerking the gun sideways.
Train yourself to shoot while you stand, sit, lie, walk, run, jump, fall
down; shoot at voices, shoot in a dark room, different weather and distance,
day and night; shoot one object and a group; use one gun, two guns, gun and
submachine gun (some doctrines train a sniper to breathe deeply before
shooting, then hold their lungs empty while he lines up and takes his shot;
other go further, teaching a sniper to shoot between heartbeats to minimize
2. Camouflage yourself ten times before you make a single shot. Position
yourself in a building (no rooftops or churches! ), which offers a long-range
fields of fire and all-round observation. Donâ€™t stay in places with heavy
traffic! Use unusual angles of approach and frequent slow movement to prevent
3. Move slowly to prevent accurate counter-attack, donâ€™t be a mark yourself
4. Kill officers and military leaders first (Attention, officers: donâ€™t
walk in front of your soldiers! )
5. Use suppressive fire to cover a retreat
6. Use rapid fire when the squad attempts a rescue
7. Shoot helicopters, turbine disks of parked jet fighters, missile guidance
packages, tubes or wave guides of radar sets
8. At distances over 300 m attempt body shots, aiming at the chest; at lesser
distances attempt head shots (the most effective range is 300 to 600 meters).
Police snipers who generally engage at much shorter distances may attempt
head shots to ensure the kill (in instant-death hostage situations they shoot
for the cerebellum, a part of the brain that controls voluntary movement that
lies at the base of the skull).
9. Shoot from flanks and rear
10. Never approach the body until you shoot it several times
11. Careful: the object could be wearing a bulletproof vest
12. Itâ€™s important to get to the place, but it's more important to get
13. Remember, in hot weather bullets travel higher, in cold â€” lower; a
silencer reduces the maximum effective range of the weapon. Wind poses the
biggest problem – the stronger the wind, the more difficult it is to hold
the rifle steady and gauge how it will affect the bullets trajectory. (You
must be able to classify the wind and the best method is to use the clock
system. With you at the center of the clock and the target at 12 oâ€™clock,
the wind is assigned into three values: full, half and no value. Full value
means that the force of the wind will have a full effect on the flight of the
bullet, and these winds come from 3 and 9 oâ€™clock. Half value means that a
wind at the same speed, but from 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 oclock, will
move the bullet only half as much as a full-value wind. No value means that a
wind from 6 or 12 oclock will have little or no effect on the flight of
the bullet). Shooting uphill or downhill can require more adjustment due to
the effects of gravity. For moving targets, the point of aim is in front of
the target ( it's called Leading the target, where the amount of lead
depends on the speed and angle of the target's movement. For this
technique, holding over is the preferred method. Anticipating the behavior of
the target is necessary to accurately place the shot).
14. If you work in terrain without any natural support, use your rucksack,
sandbag, a forked stick, or you may build a field-expedient bipod or tripod.
The most accurate position though is prone, with a sandbag supporting the
stock, and the stockâ€™s cheek-piece against the cheek.
15. The key to sniping is consistency, which applies to both the weapon and
the shooter. While consistency does not necessarily ensure accuracy (which
requires training), sniping cannot be accurately carried out without it. The
need for consistency is highest when a sniper is firing the first shot
against an enemy unaware of the sniperâ€™s presence. At this point,
high-priority targets such as snipers, officers and critical equipment are
most prominent and can be more accurately targeted. Once the first shot has
been fired, any surviving enemy will attempt to take cover or locate the
sniper, and attacking strategic targets becomes more difficult or impossible.
5. 6 Counter-sniper tactics
1. Active: direct observation by posts equipped with laser protective glasses
and night vision devices; patrolling with military working dogs; calculating
the trajectory; bullet triangulation; using decoys to lure a sniper; using
another sniper; UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles); directing artillery or
mortar fire onto suspected sniper positions, the use of smoke-screens;
emplacing tripwire-operated munitions, mines, or other booby-traps near
suspected sniper positions( you can improvise booby-traps by connecting
trip-wires to fragmentation hand grenades, smoke grenades or flares. Even
though these may not kill the sniper, they will reveal his location. Booby
â€“traps devices should be placed close to likely sniper hides or along the
probable routes used into and out of the sniperâ€™s work area). If the squad
is pinned down by sniper fire and still taking casualties, the order may be
given to rush the sniperâ€™s position. If the sniper is too far for a direct
rush, a â€œrush to coverâ€ can also be used. The squad may take casualties,
but with many moving targets and a slow-firing rifle, the losses are usually
small compared to holding position and being slowly picked off. If the
sniperâ€™s position is known, but direct retaliation is not possible, a pair
of squads can move through concealment (cover) and drive the nipper toward
the group containing the targets. This decreases the chances that the sniper
will find a stealthy, quick escape route.
2. Passive: limited exposure of the personnel (use concealed routes, avoid
plazas and intersections, stay away from doorways and windows, move along the
side of the street and not down the center, move in the shadows, move
dispersed, avoid lighted areas at night, move quickly across open areas,
avoid wearing obvious badges of rank, adapt screens on windows, use armored
vehicles); use Kevlar helmet and bulletproof vest.
3. Locating an enemy sniper
1. Recon by fire. If a few possible sniper positions are visible, the squad
can offer limited fire into each while the sniperâ€™s spotter watches for
signs of retaliation. In situations with heavy cover, the friendly sniper can
fire a tracer round into the location to direct heavier fire from the squad.
2. Mad minute. If there are too many possible positions for a recon by fire, each likely enemy position is assigned to one or more friendly soldiers,
and upon receiving the signal, all simultaneously fire a specific number of
3. Reserve azimuth. If a sniperâ€™s bullet enters a stationary object,
inserting a straight rod into the hole can reveal both the direction and arc
of the bullet, and can also be used to estimate range or elevation. This
technique is risky without cover, as it often involves entering the
sniperâ€™s current field of fire.
4. Triangulation. Technique at two or more locations can identify more
accurately identify the position of a sniper at the time of firing.
5. Sound delay (â€œcrack-bangâ€). The enemyâ€™s supersonic bullets produce
a sonic boom, creating a â€œcrackâ€ sound as they pass by. If the enemyâ€™s
bullet speed is known, his range can be estimated by measuring the delay
between the bulletâ€™s passing and the sound of the rifle shot, then
comparing it to a table of values. This is only effective at distances of up
to 450 meters; beyond this, the delay continus to increase, but ar a rate
too small for humans to accurately distinguish.
6. Decoys. As more shots are fired, the chances of locating or directly
observing the enemy sniper increase. Decoys help to increase the number of
shots without taking human losses, and may include attractive targets such as
valuable (but unusable) equipment. Provocative signage (designed to offend
/insult the sniper) may even work if an enemy sniper is unwise, aggressive,
or does not know of the friendly presence in the area. Most trained snipers
are specifically trained to take as few shots as possible, be patient and
disciplined to circumvent this.
7. Detector. The sniper detector system, named Boomerang, can determine the
bullet type, trajectory and point of fire of unknown shooter location. The
system uses microphone sensors to detect both the muzzle blast and the sonic
shock wave that emanate from a high-speed bullet. Sensors detect, classify,
localize nd display the results on a map immediately after the shot.
Chapter 6. Military tricks
1. Use rapid dominance: technology + speed + information domination.
2. Use artillery preparation. It is the artillery fire delivered before an
attack to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemyâ€™s defense and to
disrupt communications and disorganize the enemyâ€™s defense.
3. Use deception especially before the first strike (air strike + artillery).
Deception plays a key part in offensive operations and has two objectives:
the first objective is to weaken the local defense by drawing reserves to
another part of the battlefield. This may be done by making a small force
seem larger than it is. The second objective is to conceal the avenue of
approach and timing of the main attack.
5. Imitate assault to make the enemy expose his positions and fire system.
6. Mines, mines, mines. There are four types of minefield : the tactical
large-area minefield, usually laid by engineers, for tactical use on the
battlefield(i. e. to canalize the enemy into killing areas); the protective
minefield, the sort that you will plant in front of your position for
defensive purposes; the nuisance minefield, designed to hamper and disrupt
enemy movement ; and the dummy minefield â€“ a wired off area suitably marked
can be as effective as the real thing.
7. Donâ€™t touch anything in the places the enemy just left â€” check for
mines first. A minefield is a mortal surprise and you have to know how to
breach and cross it: remove your helmet, rucksack, watch, belt, and anything
else that may hinder movement or fall off, leave your rifle and equipment
with another soldier in the team, get a wooden stick about 30 cm (12 in) long
for a probe and sharpen one of the ends (do not use a metal probe), place the
unsharpened end of the probe in the palm of one hand with your fingers
extended and your thumb holding the probe, and probe every 5 cm (2 in) across
a 1-meter area in front of you and push the probe gently into the ground at
an angle less than 45 degrees, kneel (or lie down) and feel upward and
forward with your free hand to find tripwires and pressure prongs before
starting to probe, put enough pressure on the probe to sink it slowly into
the ground and if the probe does not go into the ground, pick or chip the
dirt away with the probe and remove it by hand, stop probing when a solid
object is touched, remove enough dirt from around the object to find out what
it is. If you found a mine, remove enough dirt around it to see what type of
mine it is, mark it and report its exact location to your leader. Once a
footpath has been probed and the mines marked, a security team should cross
the minefield to secure the far side. After the far side is secure, the rest
of the unit should cross.
8. Visual indicators. Pay attention to the following indicators : trip
wires, signs of road repair (new fill or paving, road patches, ditching),
dead animals, damaged vehicles, tracks that stop unexplainably, wires leading
away from the side of the road (they may be firing wires that are partially
buried), mounds of dirt, change of plants color,, pieces of wood or othr
debris on a road. Remember, mined areas, like other obstacles are often
covered by fire. Keep also in mind, that local civilians try to avoid certain
9. Use phony minefields to simulate live minefields. For example, disturb the
ground so that it appears that mines have been emplaced and mark boundaries
with appropriate warnings.
10. Make a real minefield appear phony, or camouflage it. For example, once a
real minefield is settled, a wheel or a specially made circular wooden tank
track marker can be run through the field, leaving track or tire marks to
lure the enemy onto live mines. Antipersonnel mines should not be sown in
such a field until the track marks have been laid. Another method is to leave
gaps in the mechanically laid field, run vehicles through the gaps, and then
close them with hand-laid mines without disturbing the track marks.
11. Use feint attack to draw defensive action towards the point under assault
(itâ€™s usually used as a diversion and to force the enemy to concentrate
more manpower in a given area so that the opposing force in another area is
12. Issue false orders over the radio, imitate a tanksâ€™, fightersâ€™ and
bombersâ€™ assault while preparing to retreat.
13. Use dummy units and installations, phony radio traffic, movement and
suppressive fires in other areas timed to coincide with the real attack
14. Use force multiplication by using decoy vehicles and use small convoys to
generate dust clouds. Move trucks into and out of the area giving it the
appearance of being a storage facility or logistic base.
15. Simulate damage to induce the enemy to leave important targets alone. For
example, ragged patterns can be painted on the walls and roof of a building
with tar and coal dust, and covers placed over them.
16. Stack debris nearby and wire any unused portions for demolition. During
an attack, covers are removed under cover of smoke generators, debris
scattered and demolitions blown. Subsequent enemy air photography will
disclose a building that is too badly damaged to be used.
17. Change positions at night time only.
18. Use dispersal to relocate and spread out forces to increase their chances
19. Imitate fake ballistic missiles divisions and military headquarters to
entrap enemyâ€™s intelligence and sabotage groups.
20. Use â€œsackâ€ strategy (â€œcuttingâ€ enemyâ€™s army into separate
21. Use strategic bombing (the massive attack on cities, industries, lines of
communication and supply).
22. Simulate bombing of minor objects and attack important ones.
23. Use counter-battery fire (detecting with counter-battery radars the
source of incoming artillery shells and firing back), using mobile artillery
pieces or vehicles with mounted rocket launchers to fire and then move before
any counter-battery fire can land on the original position.
24. Use airborne operations, when helicopters transport troops into the
battle and provide fire support at battle sites simultaneously with artillery
fire, keeping enemy off guard.
25. Helicopters are extremely important as they can be sent everywhere: to
kill tanks and other helicopters, for aerial mine laying, for electronic
warfare, for naval operations (anti-submarine and anti-ship patrols), to
correct artillery and tactical fighters fire, for reconnaissance, command,
control and communications, to insert special forces, to evacuate casualties
(this helps maintain the morale of the troops), to carry supplies (missile
systems, ammunition, fuel food, to escort convoys, for navigational help, to
destroy battlefield radars, communications and radio relay systems, to seal
gaps and protect flanks, for rear-area security, counter â€” penetration,
rapid reinforcement of troops under pressure, raids and assaults behind enemy
lines, air assault in offensive and defensive operations, to strengthen
anti-tank defenses by inserting infantry anti-tank teams. Helicopters offer a
strong tactical surprise and take a ground conflict into the third dimension,
making the enemyâ€™s ground maneuvers impossible.
26. When fighting an insurgency: once you get intelligence, you have to bomb
the area to â€œsoftenâ€ insurgents and then send helicopters with special
forces teams right away. Helicopters suppress and cut-off by fire insurgents
trying to escape and the teams clear-up the remains. Transport helicopters
must bring in troops rapidly from different bases and build-up numerically
superior force which insurgents cannot match.
27. Use joint bombers/fighters flights to bomb transportation, supply,
bridges, railroads, highways, antiaircraft and radar sites. To gain surprise, attack with the sun behind you. Remember, enemy will try to saturate the
airspace through which the aircraft will fly with fire.
28. Watch out for tank ambushes!
Chapter 7 Storming the City
7. 1 Procedure
1. Effective intelligence is 90% of success. Use sources like agents among
the enemyâ€™s high ranking officers, prisoners of war, captured documents and
maps, enemyâ€™s activity, local civilians (agents). Use intelligence and
sabotage groups (through them you can deliver your fake plans and maps). You
must know how the enemy usually defends a built-up area and the approaches to
it, critical objectives within the built-up area that provide decisive
tactical advantages, tactical characteristics of the built-up area and its
structure. Information about the population will assist in determining where
to attack, what firepower restrictions may be imposed, and what areas within
the urban complex must be avoided to minimize destruction of life-support
facilities and civilian casualties.
2. Make the enemy attack you if possible, because if you attack first the
victims calculation is 5:1.
3. Train your troops to storm this certain city.
4. Blockade the city completely.
5. Attack the city from different points ( flanks and rear! ) at the same
time after intense artillery fire and bombing (thatâ€™s a very strong
psychological blow. Its intensity is determined by the strength of defensive
forces, the type of building construction, and the density of fires required
to suppress observation and fires. You must destroy command posts, heavy
weapons positions, communications, troop emplacements, tall structures that
permit observation. Then engineers move forward under the cover of smoke and
high explosives to neutralize barriers and breach minefields on routes into
the city). Field artillery, attack helicopters and offense air support must
disrupt the enemy command and control network and destroy his support units (
field artillery mostly creates breaches in buildings, walls and barricades.
Mortars cover avenues of enemy troop movements, such as street intersections
and alleys; mortars firing positions are placed behind walls or inside
buildings close to their targets). A hasty attack is conducted when the
enemy has not established strong defensive positions and attacking forces can
exploit maneuver to overwhelm the defense â€“ locate a weak spot or gap in
enemy defenses, fix forward enemy elements, rapidly move through or around
the gap or weak spot to be exploited. A deliberate attack is necessary
when enemy defenses are extremely prepared, when the urban obstacle is
extremely large or severely congested., or when the advantage of surprise has
been lost. Itâ€™s divided into three basic phases: isolation from
reinforcement and resupply by securing dominating terrain and utilizing
direct and indirect fires; assault to rupture the defenses and secure a
foothold on the perimeter of the built-up area from which attacks to clear
the area may be launched (an envelopment, assaulting defensive weaknesses on
the flanks or rear of the built-up area, is preferred, however, a
penetration may be required; and clearance, a systematic
building-by-building, block-by-block advance through the entire area..
6. Target vital bridges, transportation facilities that are required to
sustain future combat operations, strategic industrial or vital
communications facilities. Attacks against built-up areas will be avoided
when the area is not required to support future operations, bypassing is
tactically feasible, the built-up area has been declared an â€œopen cityâ€
to preclude civilian casualties or to preserve cultural or historical
facilities, sufficient combat forces are not available to seize and clear the
7. Donâ€™t use tanks on narrow streets! Tanks can be decisive in city
fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy
machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are
especially vulnerable in urban combat. Itâ€™s much easier for enemy infantry
to sneak behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is vulnerable. In
addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the soft
upper turret armor and even basic weapons like Molotov cocktails, if aimed at
the engine air intakes, can disable a tank.
8. Use 3 groups at each point.
1st. A â€œdeadâ€ group plus tanks moves fast to the center, again, after
intense artillery fire and bombing (otherwise youâ€™ll have heavy
2nd. The group follows the first one and inside the city goes like a
â€œfanâ€ in all directions enveloping the defenderâ€™s flanks and rear.
3rd. The group is on reserve in case the enemy counterattacks.
The first phase of the attack should be conducted when visibility is poor.
Troops can exploit poor visibility to cross open areas, gain access to
rooftops, infiltrate enemy areas and gain a foothold. If the attack must be
made when visibility is good, units should consider using smoke to conceal
movement. The formation used in attack depends on the width and depth of the
zone to be cleared, the character of the area, anticipated enemy resistance,
and the formation adopted by the next higher command. Lead companies may have
engineers attached for immediate support. Tasks given to engineers may
include preparing and using explosives to breach walls and obstacles, finding
and exploding mines in place or helping remove them, clearing barricades and
rubble, cratering roads.
9. Use paratroopers to capture important objects (airport, government
buildings, military headquarters, port, railway station).
10. Capture high buildings and place machine gunners and snipers on upper
floors (buildings provide excellent sniping posts for defenders, too).
11. Get all important cross-roads to maneuver troops and tanks.
12. Block highways!
13. Watch out â€” there are mines everywhere (alleys and rubble-filled
streets are ideal for planting booby traps). Be alert for boobytraps in
doors, windows, halls, stairs, and concealed in furniture.
14. Watch underground communications â€” the enemy could stay in subway
tunnels, sewage system.
15. Donâ€™t waste time storming the buildings â€” blow up the walls and move
16. Soldiers in an urban environment are faced with ground direct fire danger
in three dimensions â€” not just all-round fire but also from above
(multi-story buildings) and from below (sewers and subways) and thatâ€™s why,
here, the most survivable systems, like tanks, are at great risk. Also, there
are increased casualties because of shattered glass, falling debris, rubble,
ricochets, urban fires and falls from heights. Difficulty in maintaining
situational awareness also contributes to this problem because of increased
risk of fratricide. Stress-related casualties and non-battle injuries
resulting from illnesses or environmental hazards, such as contaminated
water, toxic industrial materials also increase the number of casualties.
17. In the streets use artillery and mortars to â€œsoftenâ€ the enemy up
7. 2 House clearing.
Donâ€™t spare your grenades (avoid throwing grenades at upper windows or
upstairs; they may bounce back), move fast from room to room. Machinegunners
from outside have to help the assault group with intense fire on upper
floors. The assault group always has to enter from the top floor. Shoot
ceilings and floors, furniture and other hiding places. Avoid stairways
whenever possible. Use flame weapons.
7. 3 Seizure of a bridge.
1. Clear the near bank. The first step in seizing the bridge is to clear the
buildings on the clear bank that overwatch the bridge and the terrain on the
far side. The commander must find out which buildings dominate the
approaches to the bridge. Buildings that permit him to anti-tank weapons,
machine guns and riflemen are cleared while supporting fire prevents the
enemy from reinforcing his troops on the fart bank and keeps enemy demolition
parties away from the bridge.
2. Suppress. You have to suppress enemy weapons on the far bank with direct
and indirect fire (tanks, TOWs and machine guns). In suppressing the
enemyâ€™s positions on the far bank, priority is given to those positions
from which the enemy can fire directly down the bridge. Use screening smoke
to limit enemy observation.
3. Assault. Seize a bridgehead (buildings that overwatch and dominate the
bridge) on the far bank by an assault across the bridge. The objectives of
the assaulting platoons are buildings that dominate the approaches to the
bridge on the far side. One or two platoons assault across the bridge using
all available cover while concealed by smoke. In addition to a frontal
assault across the bridge, other routes should be considered. They are
supported by the rest of the company and any attached forces. Once on the
other side, they call for the shifting of supporting fire and start clearing
buildings. When the first buildings are cleared, supporting fire is lifted
and/or shifted again and the assault continues until all the buildings in the
objective area are cleared.
4. Clear the bridge. Secure a perimeter around the bridge so that the
engineers can clear any obstacles and remove demolitions from the bridge. The
company commander may expend his perimeter to prepare for counterattack. Once
the bridge is cleared, tanks and other support vehicles are brought across to
the far bank.
7. 4 Seizure of a traffic circle.
A company may have to seize a traffic circle either to secure it for friendly
use or to deny it top the enemy. This operation consists of seizing and
clearing the buildings that control their traffic circle, and bringing
direct-fire weapons into position to cover it.
7. 5 Search.
You are not done even if the storm was a success, because right away you have
to search the houses and buildings in the following way: divide the area to
be searched into zones, and assign a search team to each. A team usually
consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a security element (to
encircle the area) and a reserve area (to assist, as required). Then search
the buildings, underground and underwater areas using mine detectors. And
itâ€™s necessary to establish checkpoints and roadblocks around the area.
Building clearing assault team.
The direction each man moves in should not be preplanned unless the exact
room layout is known. Each man should go in a direction opposite the man in
front of him. Every team member must know the sectors and duties of erach
position. The first man (rifleman) enters the room and eliminates the
immediate threat. He has the option of going left or right, normally moving
along the path of least resistance to one of two corners. When using a
doorway as the point of entry, the path of least resistance is determined
initially based on the way the door opens; if the door opens inward he plans
to move away from the hinges. If the door opens outward, he plans to move
toward the hinged side. Upon entering, the size of the room, enemy situation,
and furniture or other obstacles that hinder or channel movement become
factors that influence the number 1 soldierâ€™s direction of movement. As the
first man goes through the entry point, he can usually see into the far
corner of the room. He eliminates any immediate threat and continues to move
along the wall if possible and to the first corner, where he assumes a
position of domination facing into the room.
The second man (team leader), entering almost simultaneously with the first,
moves in the opposite direction, following the wall and staying out of the
center. The second man must clear the entry point, clear the immediate threat
area, clear his corner, and move to a dominating position on his side of the
The third man (grenadier) simply goes opposite of the second man inside the
room at least one meter from the entry point and moves to a position that
dominates his sector.
The fourth man (SAW gunner) moves opposite of the third man and moves to a
position that dominates his sector.
Stairwells and staircases are comparable to doorways in that they create a
fatal funnel; however, the danger is intensified by the three-dimensional
aspect of additional landings. The ability of the squad or team to conduct
the movement depends upon which direction they are travelling and the layout
of the stairs. The clearing technique follows a basic format: the squad
leader designates an assault element to clear the stairs; the squad or team
maintains 360-degree, three-dimensional security in the vicinity of the
stairs; the squad leader then directs the assault team to locate, mark,
bypass and clear any obstacles or booby traps that may be blocking access to
the stairs. ; the assault element moves up (or down) the stairways by using
either the two-, three-, or four-man flow technique, providing overwatch up
and down the stairs while moving.
7. 6 How to move and how to fire
Moving from building to building or between buildings present a problem to
units conductive offensive operations. Most casualties can be expected during
movement from building to building and down streets. You must consider which
buildings must be isolated, suppressed and obscured, as well as using armored
assets as shields for maneuver elements. In movement down narrow streets, or
down wider streets with narrow paths through the debris, infantry should move
ahead of tanks, clearing the buildings on each side. Personnel movement
across open areas must be planned with specific destination in mind. Street
intersections should be avoided, since they are normally used as engagement
areas. Suppression of enemy positions and smoke to cover infantry movement
should also be included in the fire support plan. When needed, tanks move up
to places secured by the infantry to hit suitable targets. When an area is
cleared, the infantry again moves forward to clear the next area. Tanks and
infantry should use the traveling overwatch movement technique and
communicate with tank crews by using arm-and-hand signals and radio. For
movement down wider streets, infantry platoons normally have a section of
attached tanks with one tank on each side of the street. Single tanks should
not be employed. Other tanks of the attached tank platoon should move behind
the infantry and fire at targets in upper stories of the buildings. In wide
boulevards, you can employ a tank platoon secured by one or more infantry
platoons. The infantry can secure the forward movement of the lead tanks,
while the trailing tanks overwatch the movement of the lead units. Tanks may
drive inside buildings or behind walls for protection from enemy antitank
missile fire where feasible. Buildings are cleared by the infantry first.
Ground floors are checked to ensure they support the tank and there is no
basement into which tank could fall. When moving, all bridges and overpasses
are checked for mines, booby traps and load capacity.
When moving from position to position, each soldier must be ready to cover
the movement of other members of his fire team or squad. He must use his new
position effectively and fire his weapon from either shoulder depending on
the position. The most common errors a soldier makes when firing from a
position are firing over the top of his cover and silhouetting himself
against the building to his rear. Both provide the enemy an easy target. The
correct technique for firing from a covered position is to fire around the
side of the cover, which reduces exposure to the enemy. Another common error
is for a right-handed shooter to fire from the right shoulder around the left
corner of a building. Firing left-handed around the left corner of a building
takes advantage of the corner afforded by the building. Right-handed and
left-handed soldiers should be trained to adapt cover and concealment to fit
their manual orientation. A common mistake when firing around corners is a
firing from the standing position. You expose yourself at the height the
enemy would expect a target to appear. When firing from behind the walls, you
must fire around cover and not over it.
In an urban area, windows provide convenient firing ports. Avoid firing
from the standing position since it exposes most of the body to return fire
from the enemy and could silhouette you against a light-colored interior
beyond the window. This is an obvious sign of the soldierâ€™s position,
especially at night when the muzzle flash can easily be observed. In using
the proper method of firing from a window, be well back into the room and
kneel to limit exposure. When no cover is available, reduce exposure by
firing from the prone position, from shadows and by presenting no silhouette
The area around a corner must be observed before you move. The most common
mistake is allowing your weapon to extend beyond the corner exposing your
position (flagging the weapon). A special clearing technique is used when
speed is required (the pie-ing method) â€“ this procedure is done by aiming
the weapon beyond the corner into the direction of travel (without flagging)
and side-stepping around the corner in a circular fashion with the muzzle as
the pivot point.
Doorways should not be used as entrances or exits since they are normally
covered by enemy fire. If you must use a doorway as an exit, you should move
quickly to your next position, staying as low as possible to avoid
silhouetting yourself. Pre-selection of positions, speed, a low silhouette
and the use of covering fires must be emphasized in exiting doorways.
Use double tap – it is a shooting technique where two shots are fired
quickly at the same target. In the double tap technique, after the first
round is fired, the trigger is quickly pulled again while maintaining the
same point of aim. Ideally, both rounds should strike anywhere within the
centre of the target, causing two sites of trauma and maximizing shock. The
technique is meant to both impose restraint and fire control on the users of
any weapon while maximizing the potential of both hitting and incapacitating
the target. Extensive tests show that after the third round of sustained
fire, accuracy drops off sharply, as aim is thrown off by gun recoil. Using
the double tap technique maintains target accuracy without wasting ammunition
and decreases the probability of damage to non-targets. Furthermore, since
single rounds tend to have poor terminal ballistics characteristics, a pair
of bullets traversing through a target in close track (eg. the double tap)
increases the probability of incapacitating a target. Also, since the center
of mass is the most desirable target for a sidearm, firing two rounds helps
compensate for the possibility that the first round might be deflected by
heavy bone or miss a vital organ. Against armored targets, the double-tap is
sometimes the only way to penetrate armored protection. While appropriate
soft armor can stop almost any pistol-caliber round once, two rounds impcting
the same spot will almost certainly penetrate the armor. Likewise with hard
armor, two rounds from a higher-powered weapon stand a much better chance of
penetrating the armor if the rounds strike closely.
7. 7 Reasons for not-defending urban areas
1. The location of the urban area does not support the overall defensive plan.
If the urban area is too far forward or back in a unitâ€™s defensive sector,
is isolated, or is not astride an enemyâ€™s expected avenue of approach, the
commander may choose not to defend it
2. Nearby terrain allows the enemy to bypass on covered or uncovered routes.
Some urban areas, mainly smaller ones, are bypassed by main road and highway
3. Structures within the urban area do not adequately protect the defenders.
Extensive areas of lightly built or flammable structures offer little
protection. Urban areas near flammable or hazardous industrial areas, such as
refineries or chemical plants, should not be defended because of increased
danger of fire to the defenders.
4. Dominating terrain is close to the urban area. If the urban area can be
dominated by an enemy force occupying this terrain, the commander may choose
to defend from there rather than the urban area. This applies mainly to small
urban areas such as village.
5. Better fields of fire exist outside the urban area. The commander may
choose to base all or part of his defense on long-range fields of fire
outside an urban area. This applies mainly to armor-heavy forces defending
sectors with multiple, small urban areas surrounded by open terrain, such as
agricultural areas with villages.
6. The urban area has cultural, religious or historical significance. The
area may have been declared an â€œopen cityâ€ in which case by international
law, it is demilitarized and must be neither defended nor attacked. The
attacking force must assume civil administrative control and treat the
civilians as noncombatants in an occupied country. The defender must
immediately evacuate and cannot arm the civilian population. A city can be
declared open only before it is attacked. The presence of large numbers of
noncombatants, hospitals or wounded personnel may also affect the
commanderâ€™s decision not to defend an urban area.
7. 8 Reasons for defending urban areas
1. Certain urban areas contain strategic industrial, transportation or
economic complexes that must be defended. Capital and cultural centers may be
defended for strictly psychological or national morale purposes even when
they do not offer a tactical advantage to the defender. Because of the sprawl
of such areas, significant combat power is required for their defense. The
decision to defend these complexes is made by political authorities or the
2. The defenderâ€™s need to shift and concentrate combat power, and to move
large amounts of supplies over a wide battle area may require retention of
vital transportation centers. Since most transportation centers serve large
areas, the commander must defend the urban area to control such centers.
3. Most avenues of approach are straddled by small towns every few kilometers
and must be controlled by defending forces. These areas can be used as battle
positions or strongpoints. Blocked streets covered by mortar and/or artillery
fire can canalize attacking armor into mined areas or zones covered by
anti-armor fire. If an attacker tries to bypass an urban area, he may
encounter an array of tank-killing weapons. To clear such an area, the
attacker must sacrifice speed and momentum, and expend many resources. A city
or town can easily become a major obstacle.
4. Aerial photography, imagery and sensory devices cannot detect forces
deployed in cities.
Chapter 8. Special forces.
Maximum damage, minimum loss.
8. 1 Special military operations have special requirements.
1. Detailed planning and coordination that allow the special unit to discern
and exploit the enemyâ€™s weakness while avoiding its strength.
2. Decentralized execution, individual and unit initiative.
3. Surprise, achieved through the unitâ€™s ability to move by uncommon means,
along unexpected routes, over rough terrain, during poor weather and reduced
visibility. Survivability, achieved by rapid mission accomplishment and a
prompt departure from the objective area.
4. Mobility, speed, and violence of execution (the speed at which events take
place confuses and deceives the enemy as to the intent of the unit, and
forces the enemy to react rather than to take the initiative).
5. Shock effect, which is a psychological advantage achieved by the combining
of speed and violence. The special unit strives to apply its full combat
power at he decisive time and place, and at the point of the greatest enemy
6. Multiple methods of insertion and attack, trying not to repeat operations
thus decreasing the chance the enemy will detect a pattern. Deception,
achieved by feints, false insertions, electronic countermeasures, and dummy
7. Audacity, achieved by a willingness to accept a risk.
Any special team member has to have experience in sniping, underwater
swimming, conducting high-altitude, low-opening parachute operations,
demolition, using all kinds of weapons, including man-portable air-defense
system weapons. And there are some limitations, like limited capability
against armored or motorized units in open terrain and no casualty evacuation
8. 2 Use special forces for:
a) establishing a credible American presence in any part of the world
b) conducting limited combat operations under conditions of chemical, nuclear
or biological contamination
c) surveillance and intelligence gathering using recruited agents too (local
citizens who support your war or just work for money). To get to the area you
have to use infiltration, the movement into the territory occupied by enemy
troops, the contact is avoided.
d) raids on the enemyâ€™s defense system
Raids are normally conducted in the following phases: the team inserts or
infiltrates into the objective area; the objective area is sealed off from
outside support or reinforcement, to include the enemy air threat; any enemy
force at or near the objective is overcome by surprise and violent attack,
using all available firepower for shock effect; the mission is accomplished
quickly before any surviving enemy can recover or be reinforced; the ranger
force quickly withdraws from the objective area and is extracted. (The team
can land on or near the objective and seize it before the enemy can react.
Thus you avoid forced marches over land carrying heavy combat loads. If there
is no suitable landing area near the objective, or the enemy has a strong
reaction force nearby, the team has to land unseen far from the objective. It
then assembles and moves to the objective).
Depending on terrain ambushes are divided into near (less than 50 meters, in
jungle or heavy woods) and far (beyond 50 meters, in open terrain).
Raids consist of clandestine insertion, brief violent combat, rapid
disengagement, swift deceptive withdrawal. The raid is used mostly to destroy
command posts, communication centers and supply dumps, shipyards, electrical
generation facilities, water pumping stations, phone lines, oil or natural
gas pipelines, radio and TV stations, mountain passes or routes in restricted
terrain, capture supplies and personnel, rescue friendly forces, distract
attention from other operations, steal plans and code books, rescue prisoners
of war, create havoc in the enemyâ€™s rear areas, blow railroads and bridges.
By blowing bridges you block and delay the movement of personnel and supplies
and by making railroads and certain routes temporary useless you change
enemyâ€™s movement on to a small number of major roads and railway lines
where it is more vulnerable to attack by other forces (especially air
Stages of an ambush:
1. Planning. You have to identify a suitable killing zone (a place where the
ambush will be laid). Itâ€™s a place where enemy units are expected to pass
and which gives reasonable cover for the deployment execution and extraction
phases of the ambush patrol. Ambush includes 3 main elements: surprise,
coordinated fire of all weapons to isolate the killing zone and to inflict
maximum damage and control (early warning of target approach, opening fire at
the proper time, timely and orderly withdrawal). You can also plan a
mechanical ambush, which consists of the mines set in series. Preparation.
You have to deploy into the area covertly, preferably at night and establish
secure and covert positions overlooking the killing zone. Then you send two
or more cut off groups a short distance from the main ambushing group into
similarly covert positions â€” they have to give you early warning of
approaching enemy by radio and, when the ambush is initiated, to prevent any
enemy from escaping. Another group will cover the rear of the ambush position
and thus give all-round defense to the ambush patrol. No smoking! Attention:
you have to occupy the ambush site as late as possible â€” this reduces the
risk of discovery. (While choosing and ambush site pay attention to natural
cover and concealment for your team, routes of entry and withdrawal, good
observation and fields of fire, harmless-looking terrain, few enemy escape
routes, terrain that will canalize enemy into the killing zone, and natural
obstacles to keep him there).
2. Execution. You must give a clear instruction for initiating the ambush. It
should be initiated with a mass casualty producing weapon (mortars and
machine guns) to produce a maximum shock effect and break the enemyâ€™s
spirit to fight back (shock effect can cover unexpected defects in ambush,
like ambushing a much larger force that expected). Then, after the firefight
has been won, the ambush patrol has to clear the zone by checking bodies for
intelligence and taking prisoners. After that you have to leave the area as
soon as possible, by a pre-determined route.
3. Disruption of the government functions: recruitment of informants; terror
and murders of political leaders and federal and local government chiefs,
provoking strikes and mass disobedience; publishing illegal newspapers and
literature; anti-government propaganda through illegal radio stations;
involving locals in the guerrilla campaign.
Chapter 9. Guerrilla warfare.
Guerrilla warfare is the unconventional warfare and combat with which a
small group use mobile tactics (ambushes, raids, etc) to fight a larger and
less mobile regular army. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY WRONG â€“ they sabotage the rear! Same mistake Soviet guerrillas did during World War II, though Chechnya is
Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence, ambush, deception, sabotage,
undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. A
guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation above what
the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrillas
may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even
combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle.
These tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale
of the guerrillas. In many cases, a small force holds off a much larger and
better equipped army for a long time, as in Russiaâ€™s Second Chechen War.
Guerrilla operations include attacks on transportation routes, individual
groups of police and military, installations and structures, economic
enterprises and targeted civilians, politicians included. Attacking in small
groups, using camouflage and captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla
force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers,
while still allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of
such attacks is not only military but political, aiming to demoralize target
populations or governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the
population to take sides for or against the guerrillas. Ambushes on key
transportation routes are a hallmark of guerrilla operations, causing both
economic and political disruption.
Whatever the particular tactics used, the guerrillas primarily fight to
preserve his forces and political support, not capture or hold specific
territory as a conventional force would.
Guerrilla warfare resembles rebellion, yet it is a different concept.
Guerrilla organization ranges from small, local, rebel groups of a few dozen
guerrillas, to thousands of fighters, deploying from cells to regiments. In
most cases, the leaders have clear political aims for the warfare they wage.
Typically, the organization has political and military wings, to allow the
political leaders â€œplausible denialâ€ for military attacks. Guerrillas
operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to conventional
formations. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed bases and
depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and
destroy. Mobility and speed are the keys and wherever possible, the guerrilla
must live off the land, or draw support from the civilian population in which
he is embedded. Financing of operations ranges from direct individual
contributions (voluntary or not), and actual operation of business
enterprises by insurgent operatives, to bank robberies, kidnappings and
complex financial networks based on kin, ethnic and religious affiliation
(such as used by Jihad organizations). Permanent and semi-permanent bases
form part of the guerilla logistical structure, usually located in remote
areas or in cross-border sanctuaries sheltered by friendly regimes.
Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting (mujahedeen and
Taliban in Afghanistan, the Contras of Nicaragua). Guerrillas however
successfully operate in urban settings (as in Jerusalem, Israel or Baghdad,
Iraq). Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of
cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas.
Urban guerrillas blend into the population and are also dependent on a
support base among the people.
Intelligence is very important; collaborators and sympathizers will usually
provide a steady flow of information.
Public sources of information and Internet serve very well, too.
Intelligence is concerned also with political factors such as occurrence of
an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy
Able to choose the time and place to strike, guerrillas possess the
tactical initiative. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear
numerical superiority can be achieved in the target area. Individual suicide
bomb attacks offer another pattern, involving only one individual bomber and
his support team. Whatever approach is, guerrillas hold the initiative and
can prolong their survival through varying the intensity of combat. This
means that attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to
years. During interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply, train,
provide propaganda indoctrination, gather intelligence, infiltrate into army,
police, political parties and community organizations,
Relationships with civil population are influenced by whether the
guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly
population is of huge importance to guerrillas, providing shelter, supplies,
financing, intelligence and recruits. Popular mass support in a confined
local area or country however is not always strictly necessary. Guerrillas
can still operate using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing
supplies, weapons, intelligence, local security and diplomatic cover. The
Al-Qaeda is an example of the latter type, drawing sympathizers and support
primarily from the wide-ranging Arab world.
Foreign support (soldiers, weapons, sanctuary or statements of sympathy for
the guerrillas can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory.
Foreign diplomatic support may bring the guerrilla cause to international
attention, putting pressure on local opponents to make concessions, or
garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries
can add heavily to guerrilla chances, furnishing weapons, supplies, materials
and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law,
particularly if the sponsoring government is successful in concealing its
support and in claiming â€œplausible denialâ€ for attacks by operatives
based on its territory. Al-Qaeda, for example, made effective use of remote
territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, to plan and
execute its operations.
Terror is used by guerrillas to focus international attention on the
guerrilla cause, kill opposition leaders, extort money from targets,
intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers
and potential defectors in line. Such tactics may backfire and cause the
civil population to withdraw its support, or to back countervailing forces
against the guerrillas. Such situations occurred in Israel, where suicide
bombings encouraged most Israeli opinion to take a harsh stand against
Palestinian attackers, including general approval of â€œtargeted
killingsâ€ to kill enemy cells and leaders. Civilians may be attacked or
killed for alleged collaboration, or as a policy of intimidation and coercion
â€“ operations are sanctioned by the guerrilla leaders if they see a
political benefit. Attacks may be aimed to weaken civilian morale so that
support for the guerrilla opponents decreases. The use of attacks against
civilians to create atmosphere of chaos ( and thus political advantage where
the atmosphere causes foreign occupiers to withdraw or offer concessions), is
well established in guerrilla and national liberation struggles.
Examples of successful guerrilla warfare against a native regime include
the Cuban Revolution, Chinese Civil War, Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua.
Many coups and rebellions in Africa reflect guerrilla warfare, with various
groups having clear political objectives and using the above mentioned
tactics (Uganda, Liberia). In Asia, native or local regimes have been
overthrown by guerrilla warfare (Vietnam, China, Cambodia). Unsuccessful
examples include Portuguese Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau),
Malaysia (then Malaya), Bolivia, Argentina and the Philippines. The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, fighting for an independent homeland in the
north and east of Sri Lanka, achieved significant military successes against
the Sri Lankan military and the government itself for twenty years. It was
even able to use these tactics effectively against the peace keeping force
sent by India.
Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and
focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision,
guidance, coordination and organizational coherence. The leaders of the
insurgency must make their cause known to people. They must gain popular
support, and their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the
government and to establish their movementâ€™s credibility. They must replace
the governmentâ€™s legitimacy with that of their own. Their education,
background, family, social connections and experience shape how they think,
what they want, and how they fulfill their goals. Leadership is both a
function of organization and of personality. Some organizations de-emphasize
individual personalities and provide mechanisms for rebundancy and
replacement in decision making; these mechanisms produce collective power and
do not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. They are
easier to penetrate but more resilient to change. Other organizations may
depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a
rallying point for the movement. Leadership organized in this way can
produce decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, nut it is vulnerable to
disruption if key personalities are removed or co-opted.
To win, insurgency must have a program that justifies its actions and
explains what is wrong with society. It must promise great improvement after
the government is overthrown. Ideology guides the insurgents in offering
society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for
ease of focus. The insurgent leader can use ideology to justify the use of
violence and extralegal action in challenging the current social order, and
to form a framework of the program for the future. Ideology identifies those
sectors of society which the insurgency targets. Ideology may suggest
probable objectives and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgentâ€™s
perception of his environment. The combination of the insurgentâ€™s ideology
and his perception of his environment shapes the movementâ€™s organizational
and operational methods.
The strategic objective is the insurgentâ€™s desired end state â€“ that is, how the insurgent will use power once he has it.
Operational objectives are those which the insurgents pursue as part of the
overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively
establishing their desired end state. The following are examples of
-isolation of the government from diplomatic and material support, and
increased international support for the insurgency
–destruction of the self-confidence of the governmentâ€™s leaders, cadre and
armed forces, causing them to abdicate or withdraw
-establishment of civil cervices and administration ion areas under insurgent
-capture of the support (or neutrality) of critical segments of the
Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, for example,
the dissemination of a psychological operation product or the attack and
seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives which
lead to operational goals.
4. External support.
There are four types of external support:
– moral â€“ acknowledgement of the insurgent cause as just and admirable
– political â€“ active promotion of the insurgents strategic goals in
– resources â€“ money, weapons, food, advisors, training
– sanctuary â€“ secure training, operational and logistic bases
5. Organizational and operational patterns.
Subversive insurgents penetrate the political structure to control it and
use it for their own purposes. They seek elective and appointed offices. They
employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, disrupt
and discredit the government. Violence shows the system is incompetent. It
may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response which
further undermines its legitimacy. A subversive insurgency most often appears
in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal
and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal
party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law.
Subversive insurgencies can quickly shift to the â€œcritical-cellâ€ pattern
when conditions dictate. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930s is an example of
this model. Subversive insurgencies primarily present a problem for police
In the critical-cell, the insurgents also infiltrate government
institutions. Their object is to destroy system from within. The â€œmolesâ€
operate both covertly and overtly. Normally, the insurgents do not reveal
their affiliation or program. They seek to undermine institutional legitimacy
and convince or coerce others to assist them. Their violence remains covert
until the institutions are so weakened that the insurgencyâ€™s superior
organization seizes power, supported by armed force. The Russian October,
1917 revolution followed this pattern.
There are variations of the critical-cell pattern, too. The first is the
co-opting of an essentially leaderless, mass popular revolution. The
Sandinistasâ€™ takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution is a case of point. The
insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing
government. The insurgent movement then emerges, activating its cells to
guide reconstruction under its direction. It provides a disciplined structure
to control the former bureaucracy. The mass popular revolution then coalesces
around the structure.
A second variation of the critical-cell pattern is the foco (or Cuban
model) insurgency. A foco is a single, armed cell which emerges from hidden
strong holds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this
cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents
erect new institutions and establish control on the basis of that support.
The foco insurgencies are often made up predominantly of guerrilla fighters
operating initially from remote enclaves. The Cuban revolution occurred in
this manner. The Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative
revolutionary attempts patterned on it, principally in Latin America and
Africa â€“ they all failed, but that does not discredit foco theory. It does
emphasize the importance of a particular set of circumstances to this model.
Legitimacy must be near total collapse, timing is critical. The Nicaraguan
insurgency for example, combined the foco with a broad-front political
The mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed
mobilization of a large popular movement. They emphasize creating a political
and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system
and then destroy or supplant it. These insurgents patiently build a large
armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base
of active and passive political supporters. They plan a protracted campaign
of increasing violence to destroy the governments and its institutions from
the outside. They organize in detail. Their political leadership normally is
distinct from their military leadership. Their movement establishes a rival
government which openly proclaims its own legitimacy. They have a
well-developed ideology and decide on their own objectives only after careful
analysis. Highly organized and using propaganda and guerrilla action, they
mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the
government. Once established, mass-oriented insurgencies are extremely
resilient because of their great depth of organization. Examples of this
model include the communist revolution in China, the Vietcong insurgency, the
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru.
The traditional insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances and
initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, radical, religious or
other similarly identifiable groups. These insurgents perceive that the
government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to
establish or restore them. The frequently seek withdrawal from government
control through autonomy or semi-autonomy. They seldom seek specifically to
overthrow the government or to control the whole society. They generally
respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from
strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. These
insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgentsâ€™
demands. The concessions of insurgentsâ€™ demands, however, are usually so
great that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them. Examples
of this model include the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Ibo revolt in
Nigeria (Biafra), the Tami separatists in Sri Lanka.
No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively.
Typical missions which guerrillas conduct to accomplish their goals include:
destroying or damaging vital installations, equipment or supplies; capturing
supplies, equipment, or key governmental or military personnel; diverting
government forces from other operations; creating confusion and weakening
government morale. Remember: guerrilla is a political war, and asymmetric
Guerrillas are not normally organized or equipped for stand-and-fight type
defensive operations. They prefer to defend themselves by moving, by
dispersing into small groups, or by diverting the opponentâ€™s attention
while they withdraw. Whenever possible, these operations are accomplished by
offensive operations against the opponentâ€™s flank or rear. One of the most
important needs of guerrilla forces is support, which can come from different
sources â€” food can be stolen or supplied by political sympathizers, weapons
can be gathered from raids on government installations or provided by a
foreign power (as well as secret training and indoctrination).
– highly motivated leadership and simple organization. The basic guerrilla
organization is an independent three- to five-men cell. The cells can be
brought together for larger operations and dispersed later. Guerrillas are
organized into cells for two reasons: first, itâ€™s security, second, itâ€™s
for support (guerrillas must live off the land to a large degree, and small
cells easier support themselves).
– strong belief in a political, religious, or social cause (most of them are
– ability to blend with local population and perfect knowledge of environment
– strong discipline
– effective intelligence through penetration into the government agencies
– limited responsibilities (the guerrillas usually donâ€™t have the
responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society)
– the ability to utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage
through conventional warfare. They donâ€™t hesitate to use bombings,
kidnappings, murders, torture, blackmail to press local authorities or
provoke overreaction on the part of the government forces, so that the
population will be alienated by the government forces actions (it happens
when they target government leaders). In cities guerrillas can disrupt public
utilities and services by sabotage and the government may lose control of the
situation; they can widely use snipers and explosives there. They can
generate widespread disturbances, attack government offices, create incidents
or massing crowds in order to lure the government forces into a trap.
– mobility. Guerrillas usually disperse during their movements and unite near
the target area. The most common techniques employed by them are the ambush,
raid and small-scale attacks against security posts, small forces, facilities
and lines of communication, using mining, booby trapping and sniping. Targets
are selected by the guerrilla based on an analysis of how much the
elimination of the target will disrupt the government, what the effect on the
populace will be, the risk of being killed or captured, and the amount of
weapons or supplies which can be used (this analysis calls for timely
intelligence, which is gained by active patrolling).
– mental and physical stress, caused by long periods of isolation in an
– fear of criminal prosecution by the government, or of reprisals against
friends and family
– feeling of numerical and technological inferiority of counter-guerrilla
– limited personnel and resources, and uncertain public base of support
– security problems about their base camps (they are usually not more than
one day march from a village or town). If guerrillas receive support from
external sources, they are faced with a problem of security for supply lines,
transport means and storage facilities. Besides, you have to know their
organization and plans, resources (arms, ammunition, food and medicine
supply), leaders and their personalities, lines of communications, relations
with civilian population, vulnerabilities. (Again, recruit, recruit and
recruit! ). You have to evaluate also the effects of terrain (including
landing and pickup zones) and the weather effect on men, weapons, equipment,
visibility and mobility.
Urban guerrilla warfare has its own peculiarities. Cities and towns are
vulnerable to urban guerrilla because they are the focus of economic and
political power. In many cases, public utilities can be disrupted and the
government may appear to have lost control of the situation. The
concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small area provides
cover for the guerrilla. However, the insurgent may find support only in a
certain areas of a town or a city. Anyway, the urban guerrilla lives in a
community that is friendly to him or is too frightened to withhold its
support or betray him. In a city the snipers and explosive devices can be
placed everywhere. The availability of large numbers of people ensures that
crowds can be assembled and demonstrations manipulated easily. The presence
of women and children restricts counter-guerrilla force reactions, and
excessive force may ensure a major incident that provides the guerrilla with
propaganda. Publicity is easily achieved in an urban area because no major
incident can be concealed from the local population even if it is not widely
reported by the news media. Every explosion may be exploited to discredit the
ability of the government to provide protection and control.
Urban guerrilla tactics:
– disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage
– generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the
– creating incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the counter-guerrilla
into a trap
– provoking the counter-guerrilla force in the hope that it may overreact (to
provide hostile propaganda after that)
– fomenting interfactional strife
– sniping at roadblocks, outposts and sentries
– attacking buildings with rockets and mortars
– planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or
indiscriminately, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public
-ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters
1. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter,
financing, you must focus your efforts on providing physical and economic
security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and
2. There must be a clear political program that can neutralize the guerrilla
program â€“ this can range from granting political autonomy to economic
development measures in the affected region + an aggressive media campaign.
3. You have to â€œcleanâ€ and re-build all levels of the government
structure â€“ usually insurgents talk about corrupted politicians a lot and
thatâ€™s why they have support from population.
4. You donâ€™t have to overreact to guerrilla actions, because this is what
they are looking for.
5. Use big military operations only to break up significant guerrilla
concentrations and split them into small groups.
6. Keep insurgents on run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids,
ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches. Intelligence and
recruitment of informants is the key to success. (KGB in post WWII period
used bogus guerrilla groups in Western Ukraine that helped reveal real
7. An â€œink spotâ€ clear and hold strategy must be used to divide the
conflict area into sectors and assign priorities between them. Control must
expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and
eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to
the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions
elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.
8. Mass forces, including village self-defense groups and citizen militias
organized for community defense can be useful in providing civic mobilization
and local security.
9. Use special units and â€œhunter-killerâ€ patrols.
10. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully
used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and
technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops
can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for
victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper â€œtaking overâ€ the
local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the
guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the stream of dead
foreigners mounts. Such scenario occurred with United States in Vietnam and
since 2003 â€“ in Iraq.
11. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict,
which wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces.
Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time, but the
counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done.
TACTICAL COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
1. Encirclement, which is designed to cut off all ground routes for escape and
reinforcement of the encircled force (darkness recommended) combined with
combined with air assault, artillery and airborne troops. And â€” itâ€™s good
to divide the enemy while encircling.
Encirclement offers the best chance to fix guerrilla forces in position and
achieve decisive results. The battalion and larger units will usually plan
and conduct encirclements. The company and smaller units normally do not have
the manpower and command and control capability to execute encirclements
except as part of a larger force. Encirclements require accurate intelligence
on the location of guerrilla elements. Since it requires a major portion of
the counterguerrilla force to execute this maneuver, it is usually targeted
against large guerrilla forces or guerrilla base complexes, a series of
smaller base camps clustered within area. Planning, preparation and execution
are aimed at encircling the guerrilla force rapidly. Maximum security and
surprise can be gained by occupying the initial encirlclement positions
during darkness. In large operations, air assault and airborne troops add
speed and surprise to the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneously in
order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not possible, probable
escape routes are covered first. Initial occupation is the most critical
period of the operation. When the guerrillas become aware that they are being
encircled, they will probably probe for gaps or attack weak points and
attempt to break out.
Encircling units provide strong combat patrols far to their front to give
early warning of attempted breakouts. Mobile reserves are positioned to
counter a breakout and to reinforce difficult areas such as broken terrain or
areas with caves, tunnels or fortification complexes. Indirect fire support
can serve to cloak an encirclement by gaining and holding the guerrillasâ€™
attention. Fires are planned in detail to support the encirclement. Following
completion of the encirclement, the circle is contracted to capture or
destroy the guerrilla force. AS the circle is contracted, units may be
removed from the line and added to the reserve. Against small guerrilla
forces, the encircled area may be cleared by contraction and a final sweep.
Against larger guerrilla forces, however, at some point, some action other
than contraction will be required. One technique consists of driving a wedge
through the guerrilla force to divide it and then destroying the guerrillas
in each subarea. Another technique, employed after some degree of
contraction, is to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the
perimeter while the remainder of the encircling force drives the guerrillas
against blocking force. Either element may accomplish the actual destruction.
The technique is effective when the blocking force can be located on, or
immediately in the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.
2. Search (of a village), which might be done in different ways:
– assemble inhabitants in a central location (if they are hostile) and then
start the operation
– restrict inhabitants to their homes or control the heads of households (and
take other family members to a central location) and then start the convoy
security operation, which is one of your top priorities.
Think about ambushes and mines on the route all the time and place a strong
attack element at the rear of the convoy where it has maximum flexibility in
moving forward to attack guerrillas attempting to ambush the head or center
of the convoy. At the first indication of an ambush vehicles have to move out
of the killing zone (do not drive to roadsides or shoulders, which may be
mined). A security team immediately returns fire from inside vehicles to
cover dismounting personnel (if you have to stop) and then dismounts last
under cover of the fire by those who dismounted first. Upon dismounting,
personnel caught in a killing zone open fire and immediately assault toward
the ambush force. Any movements of the troops and supplies are planned and
conducted as tactical operations with effective front, flank and rear
Search techniques in built-up areas are required when you search either a
few isolated huts or buildings, or for searching well-developed urban
sections. Procedure :
a)divide the area to be searched into zones, and assign a search party to
each. A search party consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a
security element (to encircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to
secure open areas), and a reserve element (to assist, as required). Then the
search element conducts the mission assigned for the operation. Normally it
is organized into special teams. The security element surrounds the area
while the search element moves in. Members of the security element orient
primarily upon evaders from the populated area; however, they can cut off any
insurgents trying to reinforce. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established.
Subsurface routes of escape, such as subways and sewers, must be considered
when operating in cities. The reserve element is a mobile force within a
nearby area. Its specific mission is to assist the other two elements should
they meet resistance they cannot handler. In addition, it is capable of
replacing or reinforcing either of the other two elements should the need
b)consider any enemy material found, including propaganda signs and leaflets,
to be booby-trapped until inspection proves it is safe.
c) thoroughly search underground and underwater areas. Any freshly excavated
ground can be a hiding place. Use mine detectors to locate metal objects
underground and underwater.
d) deploy rapidly, especially when a guerrilla force is still in the area to
be searched. The entire area to be searched is surrounded simultaneously. If
this is not possible, observed fire must cover that portion not covered by
An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or
temporary halted target. Ambushes give the counter-guerrilla force several
a) an ambush does not require ground to be seized or held
b) smaller forces with limited weapons and equipment can harass or destroy
larger, better armed forces
c) guerrillas can be forced to engage in decisive combat at unfavorable times
d) guerrillas can be denied freedom of movement and deprived of weapons and
equipment that are difficult to replace.
Well-planned and well-executed ambushes is the most successful operational
technique employed against guerrillas. It is an effective technique to
interdict movement guerrilla forces within an area. Selection of the site is
a key step in developing a well-organized ambush.
Ambushes are executed to reduce the guerrillaâ€™s overall combat
effectiveness. Destruction is the primary purpose of an ambush since
guerrillas killed or captured, and equipment and supplies destroyed or
captured, critically affect the guerrilla force. Harassment, the secondary
purpose, diverts guerrillas from other missions. A series of successful
ambushes causes the guerrilla force to be less aggressive and more defensive,
to be apprehensive and overly cautious, and to be reluctant to go on patrols
and move in convoys or in small groups.
There are two types of ambushes. A point ambush involves patrol elements
deployed to support the attack of a single killing zone. An area ambush
involves patrol elements deployed as multiple, related, point ambushes. An
ambush is categorized as either hasty or deliberate. A hasty ambush is an
immediate action drill, an action of a combat patrol with little or no
information. When information does not permit detailed planning required for
a deliberate ambush, a hasty ambush is planned. In this case, ambush patrol
plans and prepares to attack the first suitable guerrilla force. A deliberate
ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target. Detailed
information of the guerrilla force is required: size, nature, organization,
armament, equipment, route and direction of movement, and time the force will
reach or pass certain points on its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned
when reliable information is received on the intended movement of a specific
force; patrols, convoys, carrying parties or similar forces establish
patterns of size, time and movement sufficient to permit detailed planning
for the ambush.
Basic elements of an ambush are:
1. Surprise. It has to be achieved or else the attack is not an ambush.
Surprise, which distinguishes an ambush from other forms of attack, allows
the ambush force to seize and retain control of the situation. Surprise is
achieved by careful planning, preparation and execution. Guerrillas are
attacked in a manner they least expect.
2. Coordinated fires. All weapons, including mines and demolitions, are
positioned, and all direct and indirect fires are coordinated to achieve
isolation of the kill zone to prevent escape or reinforcement; surprise
delivery of a large volume of concentrated fires into the kill zone to
inflict maximum damage so the target can be assaulted and destroyed.
3. Control. Close control is maintained during movement to, occupation of, and
withdrawal from the ambush site. The ambush commanderâ€™s control of all
elements is critical at the time of target approach. Control measures provide
for early warning of target approach, withholding fire until the target moves
into the kill zone, opening fire a the proper time, initiating appropriate
actions if the ambush is prematurely detected, lifting or shifting supporting
fires when the ambush includes assault of the target, timely and orderly
withdrawal to an easily recognized rallying point.
Planning provides for simplicity, type of ambush and deployment. The attack
may be by fire only (harassing ambush) or may include assault of the target
(destruction ambush). The force is tailored for its mission. Two men may be
adequate for a harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require the entire
unit (squad, platoon, company).
An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as other combat patrols to
include headquarters, an assault element, a support element and a security
element. The assault and support are the attack force; the security element
is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is further
organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site is to be occupied
for an extended period, double ambush forces may be organized. One ambush
force occupies the site while the other rests, eats and tends to personal
needs at the objective rallying point or other concealed location. They
alternate after a given time, which is usually 8 hours. If the waiting period
is over 24 hours, three ambush forces may be organized.
The selection of equipment and supplies needed is based on the mission,
size of guerrilla force, means of transportation, distance and terrain,
weight and bulk of equipment. A primary route is planned which allows the
unit to enter the ambush site from the rear. The kill zone is not entered if
entry can be avoided. If the kill zone must be entered to place mines or
explosives, care is taken to remove any tracks or signs that might alert the
guerrillas and compromise the ambush. If mines, mantraps or explosives are to
be placed on the far side, or if the appearance of the site might cause the
guerrillas to check it, then a wide detour around the killing zone is made.
Here, too, care is taken to remove any traces which might reveal the ambush.
Also, an alternate route from the ambush site is planned.
Maps and aerial photos are used to analyze the terrain. As far as possible,
so-called â€œideaâ€ ambush sites are avoided. Alert guerrillas are
suspicious of these areas, avoid them and increase vigilance and security
when they must be entered. Considering this, an ambush site must provide
fields of fire, concealed positions, canalization of the guerrillas into the
killing zone, covered routes of withdrawal ( to enable the ambush force to
break contact and avoid pursuit), no-exit route for the guerrilla force.
Ambush force, as a rule occupies the ambush site at the latest possible time
permitted by the tactical situation and the amount of site preparation
required. This not only reduces the risk of discovery but also reduces the
time that soldiers must remain still and quiet in position.
The unit moves into the ambush site from the rear. Security elements are
positioned first to prevent surprise while the ambush is being established.
Automatic weapons are then positioned so that each can fire along the entire
killing zone. If this is not possible, they are given overlapping sectors of
fire so the entire killing zone is covered. The unit leader then selects his
position, located where he can see when to initiate the ambush. Claymore
mines, explosives and grenade launchers may be used to cover any dead space
left by the automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to
provide mutual support. The unit leader sets a time by which positions are to
be prepared. The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All men
work at top speed during the allotted time. Camouflage is very important â€“
each soldier must be hidden from the target and each one has to secure his
equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions are prepared with
minimal change in the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting
from preparation of positions is concealed. Movement is kept to a minimum and
the number of men moving at a time is closely controlled. Light discipline is
rigidly enforced at night.
A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, is
positioned along the expected route of approach of the guerrilla force.
Formation is important because, to a great extent, it determines whether a
point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of highly concentrated fire
necessary to isolate, trap and destroy the guerrillas. The formation to be
used is determined by carefully considering possible formations and the
advantages and disadvantages of each in relation to terrain, conditions of
visibility, forces, weapons and equipment ease or difficulty of control,
force to be attacked and overall combat situation.
1. Line formation.
The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the guerrilla
forceâ€™s route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions the attack
element parallel to the long axis of the killing zone and subjects the
guerrilla force to heavy flanking fire. The size of the force that can be
trapped in the killing zone is limited by the area which the attack element
can effectively cover with highly concentrated fire. The force is trapped in
the killing zone by natural obstacles, mines, demolitions, and direct and
indirect fires. A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that
lateral dispersion of the force may be too big for effective coverage. The
line formation is appropriate in close terrain that restricts guerrilla
maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is restricted by mines,
demolitions or mantraps. Similar obstacles can be placed between the attack
element and the killing zone to provide protection from guerrilla
counter-ambush measures. When a destruction ambush is deployed in this
manner, access lanes are left so that the force in the killing zone can be
assaulted. The line formation can be effectively used by a â€œrise from the
ground ambushâ€ in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush. An advantage of
the line formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of
The L-formation is a variation of the line formation. The long side of the
attack element is parallel to the killing zone and delivers flanking fire.
The short side of the attack element is at the end of, and at right angles
to, the killing zone and delivers enfilading fire that interlocks with fire
from the other leg. This formation is flexible. It can be established on a
straight stretch of a trail or stream or at a sharp bend in a trail or
stream. When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to parallel
the long leg if the guerrilla force attempts to assault or escape in the
opposite direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape in that
direction or reinforcement from that direction.
The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the L-formation. The attack
force is deployed as in the L-formation but with an additional side so that
the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side may serve to engage
a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the guerrillas, restrict a flank,
prevent envelopment (of the ambush force), seal the end of the killing zone.
The attack element is deployed across, and at right angles to, the route of
movement of the hostile force so that the attack element and the target form
the letter T. This formation can be used day or night to establish a purely
harassing ambush, and at night to establish an ambush to interdict movement
through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies). A small unit can use
the T-formation to harass, slow and disorganize a larger force. When the lead
guerrilla elements are engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver right
or left to close with the ambush force. Mines, mantraps and other obstacles
placed to the flanks of the killing zone slow the guerrillaâ€™s movement and
permit the unit to deliver heavy fire and then withdraw without becoming
decisively engaged. The T-formation can be used to interdict small groups
attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the attack element
may be deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second member facing in
the opposite direction. The attack of a force approaching from either
direction requires only that every second member shift to the opposite side
of the dike. Each member fires only to his front and only when the target is
at a close range. Attack is by fire only, and each member keeps the guerrilla
force under fire as long as it remains to his front. If the force attempts to
escape in either direction along the dike, each member takes it under fire as
it comes into his vicinity. The T-formation is effective at halting
infiltration. It has one chief disadvantage: there is a possibility that
while spread out the ambush will engage a superior force. Use of this
formation must, therefore, fit the local enemy situation.
The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the guerrilla
route of movement so that it forms a V. Care is taken to ensure that neither
group (or leg) fires into the other. This formation subjects the guerrilla to
both enfilading and interlocking fire. The V-formation is suited for fairly
open terrain but can also be used in the jungle. When established in the
jungle, the legs of the V close in as the lead elements of the guerrilla
force approach the apex of the V, elements then open fire from close range.
Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and fire is carefully
coordinated and controlled to ensure that the fire of one leg does not
endanger the other. Wider separation of the elements makes this formation
difficult to control, and there are fewer sites that favor its use. Its main
advantage is that it is difficult for the guerrilla to detect the ambush
until well into the killing zone.
6. Triangle formation.
Closed triangle. The attack element is deployed in 3 groups, positioned so
they form a triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each
point of the triangle and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to
interlock with either of the others. Elements are positioned so that their
fields of fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When
deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small unit strongpoint
which is used to interdict night movement through open areas, when guerrilla
approach is likely to be from any direction. The formation provides all-round
security, and security elements are deployed only when they can be positioned
so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will not compromise the
ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is allowed to approach within
close range before the ambush force opens fire. Advantages include ease of
control, all-round security, and guerrillas approaching from any direction
can be fired on by at least two automatic weapons. Disadvantages include the
requirement for an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the
danger of being overturn by a guerrilla force; one or more legs of the
triangle may come under guerrilla enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion,
particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla mortar fire.
Open triangle (harassing ambush). This variation of the triangle ambush is
designed to enable a small unit to harass, slow, and inflict heavy casualties
upon a larger force without being decisively engaged. The attack group is
deployed in 3 elements, positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a
triangle containing the killing zone. When the guerrillas enter the killing
zone, the element to the guerrillasâ€™ front opens fire on the lead
guerrillas. When the guerrillas counterattack, the element withdraws and an
assault element to the flank opens fire. When this group is attacked, the
element to the opposite flank opens fire. This process is repeated until the
guerrillas are pulled apart. Each element reoccupies its position, if
possible, and continues to inflict maximum damage without becoming decisively
Open triangle (destruction ambush). The attack group is again deployed in 3
elements, positioned so that each element is a point of the triangle, 200 to
300 meters apart. The killing zone is the area within the triangle. The
guerrillas are allowed to enter the killing zone; the nearest element attacks
by fire. As the guerrillas attempt to maneuver or withdraw, the other
elements open fire. One or more assault elements, as directed, assault or
maneuver to envelop or destroy the guerrillas. As a destruction ambush, this
formation is suitable for platoon-size or larger units; a unit smaller than a
platoon would be in danger of being overrun. Also, control in assaulting or
maneuvering is difficult. Close coordination and control are necessary to
ensure that assaulting or maneuvering elements are not fired by another
party; and the ambush site must be a fairly level, open area that provides
(around its border) concealment for the ambush elements (unless it is a
â€œriseâ€ from the groundâ€ ambush).
7. Box formation.
This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush. The unit
is deployed in 4 elements positioned so that each element becomes a corner of
a square or rectangle containing the killing zone. It can be used as a
harassing ambush or a destruction ambush in the same manner as the two
variations of the open triangle ambush.
Killing zone. A point ambush is established at a site having several trails
or other escape routes leading away from it. The site may be a water hole,
guerrilla campsite, or known rendezvous point, or a frequently traveled
trail. This site is the central killing zone.
Area ambushâ€ multiple point.
Point ambushes are established along the trails or other escape routes
leading away from the central killing zone. The guerrilla force, whether a
single group or several parties approaching from different directions, is
permitted to move to the central killing zone. Outlying ambushes do not
attack (unless discovered). The ambush is initiated when the guerrillas move
into the central killing zone. When the guerrillas break contact and attempt
to disperse, escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying
ambushes. The multiple point ambush increases casualties and harassment and
This version of the area ambush is best suited in terrain where movement is
largely restricted to trails. It provides best results when established as a
deliberate ambush. When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate
ambush, an area ambush of opportunity (hasty ambush) may be established. The
outlying ambushes are permitted to attack guerrillas approaching the central
killing zone, if the guerrilla force is small. If it is too large for the
particular outlying ambush, the guerrillas are allowed to continue and they
are attacked in the central killing zone.
Area ambush: â€œbaited trapâ€.
A variation of the area ambush. A central killing zone is established along
the guerrillaâ€™s route of approach. Point ambushes are established along the
routes over which units relieving or reinforcing the guerrilla will have to
approach. The guerrilla force in the central killing zone serves as a
â€œbaitâ€ to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill
zones of the outlying ambushes. A friendly force can also be used as the
â€œbaitâ€. The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to destroy
their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes that delay, disorganize
and cause casualties by successive contacts.
This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as â€œbaitâ€ to
lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the killing zone to
overcome the installation or may use it as a ruse. These variations are best
suited for situations where routes of approach for relieving or reinforcing
guerrilla units are limited to those favorable for ambush.
Unusual ambush techniques
Spider hole ambush. This point ambush is designed for open areas that lack
cover and concealment and other features normally desirable in a â€œgoodâ€
ambush site. The attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to
the overall situation. The attack element is concealed in the â€œspider
holeâ€ type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and positions
camouflaged. When the ambush is initiated, the attack element members throw
back the covers and rise from the ground to attack. This ambush takes
advantage of the tendency of patrols and other units, to relax in areas that
do not appear to favor ambush. The chief advantage is that the ambush element
is vulnerable if detected prematurely.
Demolition ambush. Dual primed, electrically detonated mines or demolition
charges are planted in the area over which a guerrilla force is expected to
pass. This may be a portion of as road or trail, an open field, or any area
that can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are run to a
concealed observation point sufficiently distant to ensure safety of the
ambush element. As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine
the area. The ambush element remains to fire the charges, other personnel
return to the unit. When a guerrilla force enters the mined area (killing
zone), the element on site detonates the explosives and withdraws immediately
to avoid detection and pursuit.
Special ambush situation. Attacks against columns protected by armored
vehicles depend on the type and location of armored vehicles in a column, and
the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed
or disabled by fire or antitank weapons, landmines and Molotov cocktails, or
by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize
armored vehicles at a point where they are unable to give protection to the
rest of the convoy and where they will block the route of other supporting
vehicles. In alternate bounds, all except the first two vehicles keep their
relative places in the column. The first two vehicles alternate as lead
vehicles on each bound. Each covers the bound of the other. This method
provides more rapid advance than movement by successive bounds but is less
secureâ€™ it doers not allow soldiers in the second vehicle enough time to
thoroughly observe the terrain to the front before passing the first vehicle.
Security is obtained by the vehicle commander who assigns each soldier a
direction of observation: to the front, flank(s) or rear. This provides each
vehicle with some security against surprise fire from every direction and
provides visual contact with vehicles to the front and rear. For maximum
observation, all canvas is removed from the vehicles.
Action at danger areas. The commander of the leading vehicle immediately
notifies the unit leader when he encounters an obstacle or other danger area.
Designated soldiers reconnoiter these places under cover of the weapons in
the vehicle. Obstacles are bypassed, if possible. When they cannot be
bypassed, they are cautiously removed. Side roads intersecting the route of
advance are investigated. Soldiers from one vehicle secure the road junction;
one or two vehicles investigate the side road. The amount of reconnaissance
of side roads is determined by the patrol leaderâ€™s knowledge of the
situation. Men investigating side roads do not, however, move past supporting
distance of the main body of the patrol. Bridges, road junctions, defiles and
curves (that deny observation beyond the turn) are danger areas. Soldiers
dismount and take advantage of available cover and concealment to investigate
these areas. The vehicle is moved off the road into a covered or concealed
position; weapons from the vehicle cover the advance of the investigating
Ambush during darkness is difficult to control, bur darkness increases the
security of the ambush party and the confusion of those being ambushed.
4. Roadblocks and checkpoints. Element of the checkpoint force has to be
positioned and concealed at appropriate distance from the checkpoint to
prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back.
Itâ€™s necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to
apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggling of controlled items. Since
checkpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, itâ€™s important
that the civil population understands that checkpoints are a preventive and
not a punitive measure. Checkpoints may be deliberate or hasty. The
deliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the open country, often
on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. The hasty
checkpoint is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the
open country. The actual location of the hasty checkpoint is designed to
achieve quick success.
Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible. The
location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a
vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges or deep cuts may be
suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that
drivers do not see the checkpoint in sufficient time to avoid inspection.
Safety disadvantages may outweight the advantages of such positions. A
scarcity of good roads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint. A
checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise by a
5. Patrols. Used to saturate areas of suspected guerrilla activity, control
critical roads, maintain contact between villages and units, interdict
guerrilla routes of supply and communication, provide internal security in
rural and urban areas, locate guerrilla units and base camps. A patrol is a
detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance
operation. Patrolling is used when limited (or no) intelligence on guerrilla
activity is available. Routes are planned carefully and coordinated with
higher, lower and adjacent units, to include air and ground fire support
elements and reserve forces. There are three key principles to successful
patrolling: detailed planning, thorough reconnaissance, all-round security..
It often happens that the patrol has to break the contact with a larger enemy
(to break contact use the clock system. the direction the patrol moves is
always 12 oâ€™clock. When contact is made, the leader shouts a direction and
distance to move (such as â€œ7 oâ€™clock, 400 metersâ€. The leader can also
use the system to shift or direct fire at a certain location).
Saturation patrolling is extremely effective â€“ patrols are conducted by
many lightly armed, small, fast-moving units and provide thorough area
coverage. Patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which are engaged
frequently to avoid establishing patterns. Use of saturation patrolling
results in the sustained denial of an area to guerrilla forces as they seek
to avoid contact with the counter-guerrilla units. In addition to harassment
and discovery of guerrilla tactical forces, this technique provides an
opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of operations; a form
of reassurance to the local population that the government is concerned about
their protection and security; a means by which information about the
guerrilla can be obtained.
Watch out: guerillas usually try to cut the lines of communications by mining
roads, waterways and railways, or by ambushes located adjacent to them, blow
up bridges and tunnels.
Footprints. You can â€œreadâ€ the following by footprints:
– the direction and rate of movement of a party
– the number of persons in a party
– whether or not heavy loads are carried
– the sex of the members of the party
– whether the members of a party know they are being followed
If the footprints are deep and the pace is long, the party is moving
rapidly. Very long strides and deep prints, with toe prints deeper than heel
prints, indicate the party is running. If the prints are deep, short and
widely spaced, with signs of scuffing or shuffling, a heavy load is probably
being carried by the parson who left the prints. You can also determine a
personâ€™s sex by studying the size and position of the footprints. Women
generally tend to be pigeon-toed, while men usually walk with their feet
pointed straight ahead or slightly to the outside. Womenâ€™s prints are
usually smaller than menâ€™s, and their strides usually shorter. If a party
knows it is being followed, it may attempt to hide its tracks. Persons
walking backward have a short, irregular stride. The prints have and
unusually deep toe. The soil will be kicked in the direction of movement. The
last person in a group usually leaves the clearest footprints. Therefore, use
his prints as the key set.
Use the box method to count the number of persons in the group. Up to 18
persons can be counted. Use it when the key prints can be determined. To use
this method, identify a key print on a trail and draw line from its heel
across the trail. Then move forward to the key print of the opposite foot and
draw a line through its instep. This should form a box with the edges of the
trail forming two sides, and the drawn lines forming the other two sides.
Next, count every print of partial print inside the box to determine the
number of persons. Any person walking normally would have stepped in the box
at least one time. Count the key prints as one.
Also, you can track paying attention to such things as foliage, moss,
vines, sticks or rocks moved from their original places; stones and sticks
that are turned over; grass that is bent or broken in the direction of
Staining. A good example of staining is the mark left by blood from a
bleeding wound. You can determine the location of a wound on a man being
followed by studying the bloodstains. If the blood seems to be dripping
steadily, it probably came from a wound on his trunk. A wound in the lungs
will deposit bloodstains that are pink, bubbly, frothy. A bloodstain
deposited from a head wound will appear heavy, wet and slimy, like gelatin.
Abdominal wounds often mix blood with digestive juices so that the deposit
will have an odor, and the stains will be light in color.
Water in footprints in swampy ground may be muddy if the tracks are
recent. In time, however, the mud will settle and the water is clear. The
clarity of the water can be used to estimate the age of the prints. Normally,
the mud will clear in 1 hour, but that will vary with terrain.
If a party knows that you are tracking it, it will probably use camouflage
to conceal its movements and to slow and confuse you. Remember: a
well-defined approach that leads to the enemy will probably be mined,
ambushed or covered by snipers.
6. Aerial search. This technique has little value in areas of dense
vegetation. Use of search units mounted in armed helicopters should be
limited to those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to
justify their use and then normally in conjunction with ground operations. In
ground search operations, helicopters drop off troops in an area suspected of
containing guerrillas. With the helicopters overmatching from the air, troops
search the area. Troops are then picked up and the process is repeated in
7. Raid. It is an operation involving a swift penetration of hostile territory
to secure information, harass the guerrilla or destroy the guerrilla force
and its installation. Raids are usually targeted against single, isolated
guerrilla base camps. To assist in attaining surprise, the raiding force uses
inclement weather, limited visibility, or terrain normally considered
impassable. If night airborne or air assault raids are conducted, the force
must be accurately inserted and oriented on the ground. Air assault forces
supported by armed helicopters offer infinite possibilities for conducting
raids. This type of force can move in, strike the objective and withdraw
without extensive preparation or support from other sources.
8. Crowd dispersal.
9. Assassination of the guerrilla leader.
10. Taking hostages to press guerrillas.
11. Organization of false guerrilla units.
Meanwhile the enemy will attempt to engage you in locations where your fire
would endanger civilians or damage their property. You have to match the size
of the guerrilla unit. Employing a large force to counter a smaller one is
inefficient because it compromises the chance of achieving surprise.
Psychological operations (PSYOP) in foreign internal defense include
propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes,
and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups to support the
achievement of national objectives. There are 5 major target groups for
1. Insurgents. The major PSYOP objective here is to discredit the insurgents
and isolate them from he population. The most important direction of attack
is against their morale. Themes should publicize and exploit differences
between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other themes
might stress lack of support, isolation, homesickness, and hardship. Amnesty
programs are often useful in neutralizing insurgents, and they are most
effective when they are well publicized, directed against lower ranking
members of the insurgency, and offer sufficient reason and benefits for
quitting the unit. These programs do, however, have several disadvantages:
they recognize the insurgents as a legitimate political force, they forgo
punishment of anyone accepting amnesty, and they increase the image of the
2. The population supporting the insurgents. You have to achieve withdrawal
of support for the insurgents and a total defection. Propaganda should
highlight the insurgents shortcomings, ultimate government victory,
government successes, and the practical advantages of surrendering or of
accepting amnesty. Sometimes, displays of military might are used; invading
forces may assemble and parade through the streets of conquered towns,
attempting to demonstrate the futility of any further fighting. These
displays may also include public executions of enemy soldiers, resistance
fighters, and other conspirators. Particularly in antiquity, the death or
imprisonment of a popular leader was sometimes enough to bring about a quick
surrender. However, this has often had the unintended effect of creating
martyrs around which popular resistance can rally.
3. The uncommitted population. The major mission here is to build national
morale, unity, and confidence in the government. There should also be a major
effort to win popular acceptance of the government force, and convince the
people that government programs serve their interests, the government forces
can protect them, ultimate government victory is assured. This may be
accomplished through re-education, allowing conquered citizens to
participate in their government, or, especially in impoverished or besieged
areas, simply by providing food, water and shelter.
4. Government personnel. When targeting government personnel, seek to
maintain loyalties and develop policies and attitudes which will result in
group members who will realize the importance of popular support, promote
public welfare and justice, take action to eliminate the basic causes of the
subversive insurgency, and protect the population. You have to indoctrinate
the host country security and military forces regarding the importance of the
civilian population support. When government personnel interact with neutral
and non-hostile elements of the population, the emphasis should be positive
5. Foreign audiences. There are two major groups to be addressed: neutral
nations and hostile nations. For neutral nations, the purpose of
psychological operations is to achieve friendly neutrality or active support
for your side. For hostile powers, the major objective of these operations is
to influence public opinion against involvement in supporting the insurgency.
Besides, you have to use psychological operations to establish and maintain a
favorable image of our country. The themes most useful in establishing that
image are that the US presence is requested by the host country government,
it is legal and necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory. Intelligence
operations are facilitated by employing psychological operation media to
inform the people that they should report to the proper authority information
pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, and guerrilla activities.
Posters and leaflets provide definite instruction as to persons and places
that are available to receive the information (indicate what rewards are
The Viet Cong used â€œhit and runâ€ attacks involving a small group,
usually hiding in ambush and attacking a larger force, only to retreat
seconds later. This reduced the advantages of the conventional forceâ€™s
advanced weapon systems. It gave an ambushed squad no time to call in
artillery or air strike. Booby traps ( like simple spikes, incorporated into
various types of traps, for example, in camouflaged pit into which a man
might fall) were another common tactic among guerrillas. Grenade traps
(poised with the pin removed) were also used. Moving them would take the
pressure off the lever, causing the grenades to explode. Camouflage was very
important, and fighters travelled in small groups, often wearing civilian
clothes to make it difficult for American soldiers to know who they were.
Often, they would in tunnels underground. Tunnels and â€œspider holesâ€ were
often used to spring ambushes on American troops. The Vietcong would wait for
part of American formation to pass before coming out of the ground and
opening fire. Before the Americans had a chance to realize where the fire
came from, the Vietcong would duck back into the trenches. This often caused
fratricide (friendly fire incident) because soldiers who were ambushed would
fire back behind them, hitting other American patrols. American troops,
usually assigned to Vietnam for a one-year tour of duty, found themselves
ill-trained to wage a war against a mostly invisible enemy.
When the Stinger missile was introduced to Mujahideen, they began to ambush
Soviet helicopters and fixed wing aircraft at airfields. The Stinger was
effective only up to 15, 000 feet (4, 600 m), so Mujahideen would attack
aircraft as they were landing or taking off. Soviets modified their tactics:
helicopters stayed over friendly forces, fixed wing aircraft began flying
higher, and armor and electronic defense systems were added to aircraft to
help protect them from Stinger. Also, Spetsnaz ( Special Forces) were used
extensively. They would be flown into areas where Mujahideen often passed,
had been seen or were ambushing someone. Tanks and aircraft were of
comparatively little use. The only technology with a significant impact on
Mujahideen were land mines and helicopters. As the Soviets got stalled, they
began punishing the local population for supporting Mujahideen. It was not
uncommon for Soviet helicopters to raze an Afghan village in retaliation for
an attack against Soviet soldiers. They also dropped mines from aircraft in
fields and pastures and shot livestock with machineguns. Another common
tactic was to cordon off and search villages for Mujahideen.
The conflict between Russia and Chechen terrorists has been mostly a
guerilla war. Most fighting was done with the support of armored vehicles,
artillery and aircraft, rather than infantry. Russian soldiers were not
prepared for urban warfare in Grozny (the capital of Chechnya). Terrorists
would hide on the top floors and basements of buildings armed with small arms
and anti-tank weapons. The Russians came in with convoys of armored vehicles
which were unprepared for the tactics the terrorists would use. Chechen
ambush tactics were planned, and involved destroying the first and the last
vehicle (armored personnel carrier or a tank) in the column. This was done by
either rocket propelled grenade(RPG) or improvised explosive device. If the
initial attack was successful, the rest of the convoy would be trapped in
between. Later Russians used artillery and airstrikes more extensively.
Terrorists changed their urban combat tactics and used fire-teams of three
fighters : a machine gunner, a sniper and a fighter armed with rocket
propelled grenade. As a result, a very small and mobile fire-team could meet
any potential sizable threat with great effectiveness. Chechen snipers used
to wound Russian soldiers and pick off their rescuers. They also shot off
antennas from the moving armored personnel carriers â€“ since this was often
the only means of communication with the command center, the troops inside
would end up isolated and attacked with RPG or by the sniper as they tried to
repair the antenna. As Russia controlled more area, ambushes gave place to
roadside bombings, and these usually involved modified mines and improvised
U. S. â€“ Iraq war (2003-present)
Suicide bombers attack American soldiers at checkpoints, on patrols, on
their bases and in convoys. Iraqis used the same tactics Chechen terrorists
used against convoys.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
Abwehr, a German intelligence organization from 1921 to 1944).
One of the known Abwehrâ€™s successful actions was â€œOperation Nordpolâ€,
which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the
time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). In
March 1941, Abwehr forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages
to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator
gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did
not notice that. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch
operation and for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending
false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.
But in general Abwehr was not an effective organization, because much of its
intelligence deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Then,
Wilhelm Canaris, the Abwehr Chief, was anti-Nazi – he personally gave false
information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland and persuaded
Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade
Gibraltar; he was involved in July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler.
The incident which eventually resulted in the dissolution of the Abwehr is
known as the â€œFrau Solf Tea Partyâ€, which took place on September
10, 1943. Frau Johanna Solf, the widow of Dr. Wilhelm Solf, a former Colonial
Minister and ex-Ambassador to Japan, had been involved in the anti-Nazi
intellectual movement in Berlin. At a tea party hosted by her, a new member
was included ith circle, an attractive young Swiss doctor named Reckse (the
Gestapo agent), who reported to Gestapo on the tea party and turned over
several incriminating documents. The Solf circle was tipped off and had to
flee fo their lives, but they were all rounded up on January 12, 1944 and
executed, except Frau Solf and her daughter, the Countess Lagi Graffin von
Ballestrem. One of those executed was Otto Kiep, an official in the Foreign
Office, who had friends in the Abwehr, among whom were Erich Vermehren and
his wife, the former Countess Elizabeth von Pettenberg, who were stationed as
agents in Istanbul. Both were summoned to Berlin by the Gestapo in connection
with the Kiep case. Fearing for their lives, they contacted British and
defected. It was mistakenly believed in Berlin that the Vermehrens absconded
with Abwehrâ€™s secret codes and turned them over to the British. Despite the
efforts of the Abwehr to shift the blame to the RSHA or even to the Foreign
Ministry, Hitler had had enough of Canaris and he told so Himmler twice. He
summoned Canaris for a final interview and accused him of allowing the Abwehr
to â€œfall into bitsâ€ â€“ Canaris agreed that it was â€œnot surprisingâ€
as Germany was already losing the war. On February 18, 1944 Hitler signed a
decree that abolished the Abwehr â€“ itâ€™s functions were taken over by the
RSHA. This action deprived the army of an intelligence service of its own
and strengthened Himmlerâ€™s control over the generals.
GRU ( Russian Army General Staff MAIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY), Russia
The undercover residency is one of the basic forms of intelligence set-up
for the GRU abroad. The minimum number of staff for residency is two â€“ the
resident and a radio/cipher officer. The resident is the senior
representative of the GRU in any given place and answerable to the head of
GRU only. He has the right to send any officer, including his own deputies,
out of the country immediately. He must have a minimum of three to five years
of successful work as an operational officer and three to five years as the
deputy resident before his appointment. A resident in a large residency will
hold the military rank of major-general, in small residences that of colonel.
In some very large residencies, and also where there is big activity on the
part of GRU illegals, there is a position called deputy resident for illegals
(the undercover residency and the illegal residency are completely separate,
but often the undercover residency is used to rescue illegals.
An illegal residency is an intelligence organization comprising a minimum of
two illegals, usually the resident and a wireless operator, and a small
number of agents (at least one) working for them. Gradually, as a result of
recruiting new agents, the residency may increase in size. More illegals may
be sent out to the resident, one of whom may become his assistant. The GRU
does not have large residences. Five illegals and eight to ten agents are
considered the maximum, but usually the residencies are much smaller than
this. In cases where the recruitment of new agents has gone well the GRU
divides the residency in two parts. Thereafter any contact between the two
new residencies is forbidden, so that if one residency is discovered the
other does not suffer.
Defense Intelligense Agency (DIA), USA
DIA is a major producer and manager of military intelligence for the
Pentagon, with about 8000 people working worldwide. DIA has major operational
activities at the Pentagon, the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling
Air Force Base in Washington, D. C., the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence
Center in Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the Missile and Space Intelligence
Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The DIAâ€™s mission is to provide timely and
objective military intelligence to warfighters, policymakers, and force
planners. To help weapon systems planners and the Defense community, DIA
plays a major role in providing intelligence on foreign weapon systems.
Directorate for Human Intelligence
Defense Attache System
Strategic Support Branch (linguists, field analysts, case officers,
interrogation experts, technical specialists, special forces). Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld created it to bypass the limitations of the CIA
Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection
Collects measurements and signature intelligence which is any intelligence
that does not fit within the definitions of Signals Intelligence, Imagery
Intelligence, and Human Intelligence. This includes radar intelligence,
acoustic intelligence, nuclear intelligence, and chemical and biological
Directorate for Analysis.
Analyzes and disseminates finalized intelligence products for the DIA from
all sources as well as from partner Intelligence Community agencies. Analysts
focus on the military issues that may arise from political or economic events
in foreign countries and also analyze foreign military capabilities,
transportation systems, weapons of mass destruction, and missile systems, and
contribute to National Intelligence Estimates and to the Presidentâ€™s daily
briefing. Analysts serve DIA in all of the agencyâ€™s facilities as well as
in the field.
Directorate for Intelligence Joint Staff.
Advises and supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military
intelligence for defense policy and war planning.