COUNTER-TERROR INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECRET SERVICE.. By Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, CIA

By Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, a former CIA  

kryzhanovsky7777@gmail. com  

New York  

MG1/6001503259310  

COUNTERTERROR  

Homegrown terrorists  

Homegrown terrorists are not easy targets, especially if you deal with a "lonely wolf" (individual) or a separate small group of 2-3 people. They are not connected to any terrorist groups, organizations, radical parties, mafia.  

That's why you have to:  

1. Recruit assets among illegal weapons dealers, they have to inform you about anybody, trying to buy a gun and a lot of ammunition, automatic weapons, explosives.  

2. The assets have to inform you about any person with radical views and ready for radical action (to blackmail the government and make it change it's policy).  

NSA has to fix all phone calls where you hear key words like "kill", "gun", "explosive", "explosion", "FBI", "surveillance", "kidnapping", "sniper", "torture", etc.  

3. Detect people who search Internet, looking for instructions on "home made" explosives.  

4. Watch terrorists in jail – they might keep contacts with with those outside. Watch terrorists who are out of jail.  

5. Keep under control all shooting ranges in the country and people who try to get training as snipers.  

6. ATTENTION: keep under control scientists who work with explosives. And companies which produce weapons, explosives, and sell them.  

7. Watch army veterans with radical views, pay special attention to those who served in special forces and involved in war zones special operations.  

Now comes my instruction  

Responses to terrorism include:  

–targeted laws, criminal procedures, deportations and enhanced police powers  

–target hardening, such as locking doors or adding traffic barriers  

–pre-emptive or reactive military action  

–increased intelligence and surveillance activities  

–pre-emptive humanitarian activities  

–more permissive interrogation and detention policies  

–official acceptance of torture as a valid tool  

You must gather the following information:  

1. Group information.  

Names, ideology (political or social philosophy), history of the group, dates significant to the group, and dates when former leaders have been killed or imprisoned (terrorist groups often strike on important anniversary dates).  

2. Financial information.  

Source of funds, proceeds from criminal activities, bank accounts information (sudden influxes of funding or bank withdrawals indicate preparation for activity). It’s also important to determine the group’s legal and financial supporters. Generally, anyone who would write an official letter of protest or gather names on a petition for a terrorist is a legal supporter. Sometimes, an analysis of support will reveal linkages and mergers with other groups.  

3. Personnel information.  

List of leaders, list of members (and former members), any personnel connections with other groups of similar ideology. The skills of all group members (weapons expertise, electronics expertise) – knowing the skills of the group is an important part of threat assessment. If the philosophy revolves around one leader, it’s important to know what will occur if something happens to that leader. Often, the analysis of family background is useful to determine how radically a leader or member was raised. Group structure, particularly if the organizational pattern is cellular, determines who knows whom.  

As a group, terrorists are very team-oriented and always prepared for suicide missions. They are well-prepared for their mission, are willing to take risks and are attack-oriented. If captured, they will usually not confess or snitch on others as ordinary criminals do. Traditional law enforcement are not that effective when it comes to the investigation or intelligence of terrorism.  

4. Location information.  

Location of group’s headquarters, location of group’s “safe” houses (where they hide from authorities) and location of the group’s “stash” houses (where they hide weapons and supplies). Regular attacks on “stash” houses is the most frequently used counterterrorism technique). It’ important to specify the underground that exists where terrorists can flee. Terrorists like to live in communal homes instead of living alone.  

Remember this:  

1. Knowing just the functions of terrorism is a fight. Since terrorists are usually trying to provoke government’s overreaction, anything the government can do to keep itself from overreacting works against them.  

2. Since terrorists are usually trying to provoke government’s overreaction, anything the government can do to keep itself from overreacting works against them. Since terrorists are trying to gain control of the media, anything on the part of the media which stifles exposure also stiles terrorism. Bombings make the best pictures (watch TV! ), that’s why terrorists use them mostly.  

3. Terrorists often demand to release political prisoners, but this is never a true objective. The real trick is politization of all prisoners, the winning over of new recruits among the prison population.  

4. Go after financial supporters of terrorism, not the terrorists themselves. It’s only with narcoterrorism that this strategy fails, since the drug market doesn’t respond to simple supply-demand forces.  

5. Terrorists are imitators, not innovators. They often wait until some other group makes the first move. Most of them do this because they are sorely trying to imitate military strategy, others do it because of standardized paramilitary training or textbook lessons in guerrilla tactics, and still others do it to throw off suspicion from themselves..  

6. The Stockholm Syndrome works in the favor of anti-terrorist forces. The longer the hostages stay alive, the less likelihood harm will come to them. With this syndrome, the hostages come to think of their captors as protecting them from the police and soon start to identify with their captors. The captors themselves start to develop a parent/child relationship with their hostages. Other syndromes include the Penelope Syndrome, where women find violent criminals sexually attractive.  

7. In assessing the threat of terrorism, it’s important to concentrate on counting the number of incidents, not the number of victims or the value of harm. The only true comparison is the number of attacks since terrorists often have no idea themselves about how many victims will be killed by their actions. Nationalist groups tend to seek a high number of fatalities while revolutionary groups tend to seek fewer deaths and more wounds or injuries. Splinter or spin-off groups seem more interested in death counts and fatalities. The point is that no matter how many victims are targeted, the group is only a threat via its number of attacks as a percent of total activity.  

8. Do count the number of victims saved by any preventive action. If you manage through some leverage to get the terrorist leader to stop things with a cease-fire agreement, regardless of whether further negotiation follows or not, it will help your agency if you have calculated how many lives you’ve saved, and can report this information to policymakers. Everyone wins by a cease-fire – the terrorist leaders look good, your leaders look good too. After the cease-fire, it’s important to also measure the resumed level of violence and compare to pre-cease-fire levels.  

9. Giving into terrorists’ demands for political change only changes the pattern of violence, not violence itself. Economic and political reforms aimed at helping a certain group and resolving its grievances will win over some supporters among the general population, but in the long-run, will create new problems and a new set of grievances over the precise implementation of policy and the degree of power sharing. A much better strategy is to initiate economic and political reforms for all nation. Economic development solutions have worked in Ireland, Uruguay andItaly.  

10. Reduction of recruits, supplies and support. You have to reduce the number of active trainee members of the terrorist organization. Capture and imprisonment works (it has helped to keep Spain fairly terrorism-free), as well as preemptive strikes against training camps. The number of terrorists captured or killed should be counted, and this can be put as the denominator in a fraction with the number of government security forces killed in the numerator. You’ve also got to keep weapons, ammo and supplies out of hands of terrorists by destruction of their “stash” houses. Unfortunately, many religious terrorist groups operate under the cover of religion and blowing up religious buildings has a strong negative effect.  

11. Terrorism does not respond to coalition-based sanctions which are intended to express the international community’s disregard for them. Terrorist actually want their enemies to wage a war on terrorism because this gives them some pseudo-legitimacy that they are soldiers-at war. If they are broken up from receiving any psychological rewards or sympathy from their social support groups, this strategy might work.  

12. Sharing of information and intelligence by counter-terrorism agents is essential. But there’s always a threat, thata secret source might be “burnt out” during such“sharing”.  

13. Terrorist groups with a cell structure are most likely to thwart human intelligence since the purpose of the cell structure is to prevent any members from knowing who is the immediate leader. This may or may not be true with some groups (like the IRA) which mix family with business, depending upon levels of fidelity. The best approach for such groups may electronic surveillance. However, groups with military or paramilitary organization might be easier to infiltrate or penetrate.